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DIO'S ROME

AN

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ORIGINALLY COMPOSED IN GREEK DURING THE REIGNS OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS, GETA AND CARACALLA, MACRINUS, ELAGABALUS AND ALEXANDER SEVERUS:

AND

NOW PRESENTED IN ENGLISH FORM

BY

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DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
45

VOL. 3.— 1

The following is contained in the Forty-fifth of Dio's Rome:

About Gaius Octavius, who afterward was named Augustus (chapters 1–9).

About Sextus, the son of Pompey (chapter 10).

How Cæsar and Antony entered upon a period of hostility (chapters 11–17).

How Cicero delivered a public harangue against Antony (chapters 18–47).

Duration of time, the remainder of the year of the 5th dictatorship of C. Iulius Cæsar with M. Æmilius Lepidus, Master of the Horse, and of his 5th consulship with Marcus Antonius. (B. C. 44 = a. u. 710.)[1]

[1] The events, however, run over into the following year.

—1—
B. C. 44
(a. u. 710)

This was Antony's course of procedure.— Gaius Octavius Copia,— this was the name of the son of Cæsar's niece, Attia,— came from Velitræ in the Volscian country, and having been left without a protector by the death of his father Octavius he was brought up in the house of his mother and her husband, Lucius Philippus, but on attaining maturity spent his time with Cæsar. The latter, who was childless, based great hopes upon him and was devoted to him, intending to leave him as successor to his name, authority, and supremacy. He was influenced largely by Attia's explicit affirmation that the youth had been engendered by Apollo. While sleeping once in his temple, she said, she thought she had intercourse with a serpent, and through this circumstance at the end of the allotted time bore a son. Before he came to the light of day she saw in a dream her womb lifted to the heavens and spreading out over all the earth; and the same night Octavius thought the sun rose from her vagina. Hardly had the child been born when Nigidius Figulus, a senator, straightway prophesied for him sole command of the realm.[1]

1 Interesting to compare are three citations from an unknown Byzantine writer (in Excerpta cod. Paris. suppl. Gr. 607 A, edited by M. Treu, Ohlau, 1880, p. 29 ff.), who seems to have used Dio as a source:

a) The mother of Augustus just one day previous to her travail beheld in a dream how her womb was snatched away and carried up into heaven.

b) And in the same night as Octavius was born his father thought that the sun rose from his wife's entrails.

c) And a certain senator, Nigidius Figulus, who was an astrologer, asked Octavius, the father of Augustus, why he was so slow

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) He could distinguish most accurately of his contemporaries the order of the firmament and the mutations of the stars, what they accomplished by separation and what by conjunctions, in their associations and retirements, and for this reason had incurred the charge of practicing some kind of forbidden pursuits. He accordingly met on that occasion Octavius, who was somewhat tardy in reaching the senate on account of the birth of the child,— there happened to be a meeting of the senate that day,— and asked him why he was late. On learning the cause he cried out: "You have begotten a master over us."[1] At that Octavius was alarmed and wished to destroy the infant, but Nigidius restrained him, saying that it was impossible for it to suffer any —2— such fate. This was the conversation at that time. While the boy was growing up in the country an eagle snatched from his hands a loaf of bread, and after soaring aloft flew down and gave it back to him.[2] When he was a lad and staying in Rome Cicero dreamed that

in leaving his house. The latter replied that a son had been born to him. Nigidius thereupon exclaimed: "Ah, what hast thou done? Thou hast begotten a master for us!" The other believing it and being disturbed wished to make away with the child. But Nigidius said to him: "Thou hast not the power. For it hath not been granted thee to do this."

[1] Suetonius in relating this anecdote (Life of Augustus, chapter 5) says that the senate-meeting in question was called to consider the conspiracy of Catiline. Since, however, Augustus is on all hands admitted to have been born a. d. IX. Kal. Octobr. and mention of Catiline's conspiracy was first made in the senate a. d. XII. Kal. Nov. (Cicero, Against Catiline, I, 3, 7), the claim of coincidence is evidently based on error.

[2] Compare again the same Byzantine writer quoted in footnote to chapter 1 (ibid. p. 30),— two excerpts:

d) Again, while he was growing up in the country, an eagle swooping down snatched from his hands the loaf of bread and again returning replaced it in his hands.

e) Again, during his boyhood, Cicero saw in a dream Octavius himself fastened to a golden chain and wielding a whip being let down from the sky to the summit of the Capitol.

the boy was let down by golden chains to the summit of the Capitol and received a whip from Jupiter.[1] He did not know who the youth was, but meeting him the next day on the Capitol itself he recognized him, and told the vision to the bystanders. Catulus, who had likewise never seen Octavius, beheld in a vision all the noble children on the Capitol at the termination of a solemn procession to Jupiter, and in the course of the ceremony the god cast what looked like an image of Rome into that child's lap. Startled at this he went up into the Capitol to offer prayers to the god, and finding there Octavius, who had ascended the hill for some other reason, he compared his appearance with the dream and was satisfied of the truth of the vision. When later he had become a young man and was about to reach maturity, he was putting on the dress of an adult when his tunic was rent on both sides from his shoulders and fell to his feet. This event of itself not only had no significance as forecasting any good fortune, but displeased the spectators considerably because it had happened in his first putting on the garb of a man: it occurred to Octavius to say: "I shall put the whole senatorial dignity beneath my feet"; and the outcome proved in accordance with his words. Cæsar founded great hopes upon him as a result of this, introduced him into the class of patricians and trained him for rulership. In everything that is proper to come to the notice of one destined to control so great a power well and worthily he educated him with care. The youth was trained in oratorical speeches, not only in the Latin but in this language [Greek], labored per-

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

1 Compare Suetonius, Life of Augustus, chapter 94.

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) sistently in military campaigns, and received minute instruction in politics and the science of government.

—3— Now this Octavius chanced at the time that Cæsar was murdered to be in Apollonia near the Ionic Gulf, pursuing his education. He had been sent thither in advance to look after his patron's intended campaign against the Parthians. When he learned of the event he was naturally grieved, but did not dare at once to take any radical measures. He had not yet heard that he had been made Cæsar's son or heir, and moreover the first news he received was to the effect that the people were of one mind in the affair. When, however, he had crossed to Brundusium and had been informed about the will and the people's second thought, he made no delay, particularly because he had considerable money and numerous soldiers who had been sent on under his charge, but he immediately assumed the name of Cæsar, succeeded to his estate, and began to busy

—4— himself with the situation. At the time he seemed to some to have acted recklessly and daringly in this, but later as a result of his good fortune and the successes he achieved he acquired a reputation for bravery. In many instances in history men who were wrong in undertaking some project have been famed for wisdom because they proved fortunate in it: others who used the best possible judgment have had to stand a charge of folly because they did not attain their ends. He, too, acted in a blundering and dangerous way; he was only just past boyhood,— eighteen years of age,— and saw that the succession to the inheritance and the family was sure to provoke jealousy and censure: yet he started in pursuit of objects that had led to Cæsar's

murder, and no punishment befell him, and he feared neither the assassins nor Lepidus and Antony. Yet he was not thought to have planned poorly, because he became successful. Heaven, however, indicated not obscurely all the upheaval that would result from it. As he was entering Rome a great variegated iris surrounded the whole sun. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

In this way he that was formerly called Octavius, —5— but already at this time Cæsar, and subsequently Augustus, took charge of affairs and settled them and brought them to a successful close more vigorously than any mature man, more prudently than any graybeard. First he entered the city as if for the sole purpose of succeeding to the inheritance, and as a private citizen with only a few attendants, without any ostentation. Still later he did not utter any threat against any one nor show that he was displeased at what had occurred and would take vengeance for it. So far from demanding of Antony any of the money that he had previously plundered, he actually paid court to him although he was insulted and wronged by him. Among other injuries that Antony did him by both word and deed was his action when the lex curiata was proposed, according to which the transfer of Octavius into Cæsar's family was to take place: Antony himself, of course, was active to have it passed, but through some tribunes he secured its postponement in order that the young man being not yet Cæsar's child according to law might not meddle with the property and might be weaker in all other ways. Cæsar was restive under —6— this treatment, but as he was unable to speak his mind freely he bore it until he had won over the crowd, by

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) whose members he understood his father had been raised to honor. He knew that they were angry at the latter's death and hoped they would be enthusiastic over him as his son and perceived that they hated Antony on account of his having been master of the horse and also for his failure to punish the murderers. Hence he undertook to become tribune as a starting point for popular leadership and to secure the power that would result from it; and he accordingly became a candidate for the place of Cinna, which was vacant. Though hindered by Antony's clique he did not desist and after using persuasion upon Tiberius Cannutius, a tribune, he was by him brought before the populace. He took as an excuse the gift bequeathed by Cæsar and in his speech touched upon all the important points, promising that he would discharge this debt at once, and gave them cause to hope for much besides. After this came the festival appointed in honor of the completion of the temple of Venus, which some, while Cæsar was alive, had promised to celebrate, but were now holding in slight regard as they did the horse-race connected with the Parilia;[1] and to win the favor of the populace he provided for it at his private expense on the ground that it concerned him because of his family. At this time out of fear of Antony he brought into the theatre neither Cæsar's gilded chair nor his crown set with precious stones, though it was permitted by decree.

—7— When, however, a certain star through all those days appeared in the north toward evening, some called it a comet, and said that it indicated the usual occurrences; but the majority, instead of believing this, ascribed it

[1] See footnote to Book Forty-three, chapter 42.

to Cæsar, interpreting it to mean that he had become a god and had been included in the number of the stars. Then Octavius took courage and set up in the temple of Venus a bronze statue of him with a star above his head. Through fear of the populace no one prevented this, and then, at last, some of the earlier decrees in regard to honors to Cæsar were put into effect. They called one of the months July after him and in the course of certain triumphal religious festivals they sacrificed during one special day in memory of his name. For these reasons the soldiers also, and particularly since some of them received largesses of money, readily took the side of Cæsar. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

Rumors accordingly went abroad, and it seemed likely that something unusual would take place. This idea gained most headway for the reason that when Octavius was somewhat anxious to show himself in court in an elevated and conspicuous place, as he had been wont to do in his father's lifetime, Antony would not allow it, but had his lictors drag him down and drive him out. All were exceedingly vexed, and especially because Cæsar with a view to casting odium upon his rival and arousing the multitude would no longer even frequent the Forum. So Antony became terrified, and in conversation with the bystanders one day remarked that he harbored no anger against Cæsar, but on the contrary owed him affection, and felt inclined to dispel the entire cloud of suspicion. The statement was reported to the other, they held a conference, and some thought they had become reconciled. As a fact they understood each other's dispositions accurately, and, thinking it inopportune at that time to put them to the —8—

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) test, they came to terms by making a few mutual concessions. For some days they were quiet; then they began to suspect each other afresh as a result of either some really hostile action or some false report of hostility,— as regularly happens under such conditions,— and were again at variance. When men become reconciled after a great enmity they are suspicious of many acts that contain no malice and of many chance occurrences. In brief, they regard everything, in the light of their former hostility, as done on purpose and for an evil end. While they are in this condition those who stand on neutral ground aggravate the trouble, irritating them still more by bearing reports to and fro under the pretence of devotion. There is a very large element which is anxious to see all those who have power at variance with one another,— an element which consequently takes delight in their enmity and joins in plots against them. And the party which has previously suffered from calumny is very easy to deceive with words adapted to the purpose by a band of friends whose attachment is not under suspicion. This also accounts for the fact that these men, who did not trust each other previously, became now even more estranged.

—9— Antony seeing that Cæsar was gaining ground attempted to attract the populace by various baits, to see if he could detach the people from his rival and number them among his own forces. Hence through Lucius Antonius, his brother, who was tribune, he introduced a measure that considerable land be opened

for settlement, among the parcels being the region of the Pontine marshes, which he stated had already been filled and were capable of cultivation. The three Antonii, who were brothers, all held office at the same time. Marcus was consul, Lucius tribune, and Gaius prætor. Therefore they could very easily remove those who were temporarily rulers of their allies and subjects (except the majority of the assassins and some others whom they regarded as loyal) and choose others in place of them: they could also grant some the right to hold office for an unusually long term, contrary to the laws established by Cæsar. Also Macedonia, which fell to Marcus by lot, was appropriated by his brother Gaius, but Marcus himself with the legions previously despatched into Apollonia laid claim to Gaul on this side of the Alps, to which Decimus Brutus had been assigned; the reason was that it seemed to be very strong in resources of soldiers and money. After these measures had been passed the immunity granted to Sextus Pompey by Cæsar, as to all the rest, was confirmed: he had already considerable influence. It was further resolved that whatever moneys of silver or gold the public treasury had taken from his ancestral estate should be restored. As for the lands belonging to it Antony held the most of them and made no restoration. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

This was the business in which they were engaged. —10— But I shall now go on to describe how Sextus had fared. When he had fled from Corduba, he first came to Lacetania and concealed himself there. He was pursued,

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) to be sure, but eluded discovery through the fact that the natives were kindly disposed to him out of regard for his father's memory. Later, when Cæsar had started for Italy and only a small army was left behind in Bætica, he was joined both by the native inhabitants and by those who escaped from the battle, and with them he came again into Bætica, because he thought it more suitable for the carrying on of war. There he gained possession of soldiers and cities, particularly after Cæsar's death, some voluntarily and some by violence; the commandant in charge of them, Gaius Asinius Pollio, held a force that was far from strong. He next set out against Spanish Carthage, but since in his absence Pollio made an attack and did some damage, he returned with a large force, met his opponent, and routed him. After that the following accident enabled him to startle and conquer the rest, as well, who were contending fiercely. Pollio had cast off his general's cloak, in order to suffer less chance of detection in his flight, and another man of the same name, a brilliant horseman, had fallen. The soldiers, hearing the name of the latter, who was lying there, and seeing the garment which had been captured, were deceived, and thinking that their general had perished surrendered. In this way Sextus conquered and held possession of nearly that entire region. When he was now a powerful factor, Lepidus arrived to govern the adjoining portion of Spain, and persuaded him to enter into an agreement on condition that he should recover his father's estate. Antony, in-

fluenced by his friendship for Lepidus and by his hostility toward Cæsar, caused such a decree to be passed. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

So Sextus, in this way and on these conditions, held aloof from Spain proper. Cæsar and Antony in all —11— their acts opposed each other, but had not fallen out openly, and whereas in reality they were alienated they tried to disguise the fact so far as appearances went. As a result all other interests in the city were in a most undecided state and condition of turmoil. People were still at peace and yet already at war. Liberty led but a shadow existence, and the deeds done were the deeds of royalty. To a casual observer Antony, since he held the consulship, seemed to be getting the best of it, but the enthusiasm of the masses was for Cæsar. This was partly on his father's account, partly on account of the hopes he held out to them, but above all because they were displeased at the considerable power of Antony and were inclined to assist Cæsar while he was yet devoid of strength. Neither man had their affection, but they were always eager for a change of administration, and it was their nature to try to overthrow every superior force and to help any party that was being oppressed. Consequently they made use of the two to suit their own desires. After they had at this period humbled Antony through the instrumentality of Cæsar they next undertook to destroy the latter also. Their irritation toward the men temporarily in power and their liking for the weaker side made them attempt to overthrow the former. Later they became estranged from the weaker also. Thus they showed

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) dislike for each of them in turn and the same men experienced their affection and their hatred, their support and their active opposition.

—12— While they were maintaining the above attitude toward Cæsar and Antony, the war began as follows. Antony had set out for Brundusium to meet the soldiers who had crossed over from Macedonia. Cæsar sent some persons to that city with money, who were to arrive there before Antony and win over the men, and himself went to Campania, where he collected a large crowd of men, chiefly from Capua because the people there had received their land and city from his father, whom he said he was avenging. He made them many promises and gave them on the spot five hundred denarii apiece. These men usually constituted the corps of evocati, whom one might term in Greek "the recalled", because having ended their service they have been recalled to it again. Cæsar took charge of them, hastened to Rome before Antony could make his way back, and came before the people, who had been made ready for him by Cannutius. There he called to their minds in detail all the excellent works his father had done, made a considerable, though moderate, defence of himself, and brought accusations against Antony. He also praised the soldiers who had accompanied him, saying that they were present voluntarily to lend aid to the city, that they had elected him to preside over the State and that through his mouth they made known these facts to all. For this speech he received the approbation of his following and of the throng that stood

by, after which he departed for Etruria with a view to obtaining an accession to his forces from that country. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

—13— While he was doing this Antony had been at first kindly received in Brundusium by the soldiers, because they expected they would secure more from him than was offered them by Cæsar. This belief was based on the idea that he had possession of much more than his rival. When, however, he promised to give each of them a hundred denarii, they raised an outcry, but he reduced them to submission by ordering centurions as well as others to be slain before the eyes of himself and his wife. For the time being the soldiers were quiet, but on the way toward Gaul when they arrived opposite the capital they revolted, and many of them, despising the lieutenants that had been set over them, arrayed themselves on Cæsar's side. The so-called Martian and the fourth legion went over to him in a body. He took charge of them and won their attachment by giving money to all alike,—an act which added many more to his troops. He also captured all the elephants of Antony, by confronting the train suddenly as they were being conducted along. Antony stopped in Rome only long enough to arrange a few affairs and to bind by oath all the rest of the soldiers and the senators who were in their company; then he set out for Gaul, fearing that that country too might indulge in an uprising. Cæsar without delay followed behind him.

—14— Decimus Brutus was at this time governor of that province, and Antony set great hopes upon him, be-

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) cause he had been a slayer of Cæsar. But it turned out as follows. Decimus did not look askance particularly at Cæsar, for the latter had uttered no threats against the assassins: on the other hand, he saw that Antony was no more formidable a foe than his rival, or, indeed, than himself or any of the rest who were in power as a result of natural acquisitiveness; therefore he refused to give ground before him. Cæsar, when he heard this decision, was for some time at a loss what course to adopt. The young man hated both Decimus and Antony but saw no way in which he could contend against them both at once. He was by no means yet a match for either one of the two, and he was further afraid that if he risked such a move he should throw them into each other's arms and face the united opposition of the two. After stopping to reflect that the struggle with Antony was already begun and was urgent, but that it was not yet a fitting season for taking vengeance for his father, he decided to make a friend of Decimus. He understood well that he should find no great difficulty in fighting against the latter, if with his aid he could first overcome his adversaries, but that Antony would be a powerful antagonist on any subsequent occasion. So much did they differ from

—15— each other. Accordingly he sent a messenger to Decimus, proposing friendship and promising alliance, if he would refuse to receive Antony. This proposal caused the people in the city likewise to join in expressing their gratitude to Cæsar. Just at this time the year was drawing to a close and no consul was on

the ground, Dolabella having been previously sent by Antony to Syria. Eulogies, however, were delivered in the senate by the members themselves and by the soldiers who had abandoned Antony,— with the concurrence also of the tribunes. When they entered upon the new year they decided, in order that they might discuss freely existing conditions, to employ a guard of soldiers at their meetings. This pleased nearly all who were in Rome at the time,— for they cordially detested Antony,— but particularly Cicero. He, on account of his bitter and long-standing hostility toward the man, paid court to Cæsar, and so far as he could, by speech and action, strove to assist him in every way and to injure Antony. It was for this reason that, when he had left the city to escort his son to Athens for the benefit of his education, he had returned on ascertaining that the two were publicly estranged. B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

Besides these events which took place that year Servilius Isauricus died at a very advanced age. I have mentioned him both for that fact and to show how the Romans of that period respected men who were prominent through merit and hated those who behaved insolently, even on the very slightest grounds. This Servilius while walking had once met on the road a man on horseback, who so far from dismounting on his approach spurned him violently aside. Later he recognized the fellow in a defendant of a case in court, and when he mentioned the affair to the judge, they paid no further attention to the man's plea, but unanimously condemned him. —16—

—17—
B. C. 43
(*a. u.* 711)

In the consulship of Aulus Hirtius (who was now appointed consul in spite of the fact that his father's name had been posted on the tablets of Sulla), with his colleague Gaius Vibius, a meeting of the senate was held and votes were taken for three successive days, including the first of the month itself. As a result of the war which was upon them and the portents, very numerous and extremely unfavorable, which took place, they were so excited that they failed to pass over these *dies nefasti* on which they ought not to deliberate on any matter touching their interests. Ominous had been the falling of great numbers of thunderbolts, some of which descended on the shrine sacred to Capitoline Jupiter, that stood in the temple of Victory. Also a great wind arose which snapped and scattered the columns erected about the temple of Saturn and the shrine of Fides, and likewise knocked down and shattered the statue of Minerva the Protectress, which Cicero had set up on the Capitol before his exile. This portended, of course, the death of Cicero himself. Another thing that frightened the rest of the population was a great earthquake which occurred, and the fact that a bull which was sacrificed on account of it in the temple of Vesta leaped up after the ceremony. In addition to these clear indications of danger a flash darted across from the place of the rising sun to the place of its setting and a new star was seen for several days. Then the light of the sun seemed to be diminished and even extinguished, and at times to appear in three circles, one of which was surmounted by a fiery

crown of sheaves. This, if anything, proved as clear a sign as possible to them. For three men were in power,— I mean Cæsar and Lepidus and Antony,— and of them Cæsar subsequently secured the victory. At the same time that these things occurred all sorts of oracles tending to the downfall of the democracy were recited. Crows, moreover, flew into the temple of the Dioscuri and pecked out the names of the consuls and of Antony and of Dolabella, which were inscribed there somewhere on a tablet. And by night dogs in large numbers gathered throughout the city and especially near the house of the high priest, Lepidus, and set up howls. Again, the Po, which had flooded a large portion of the surrounding territory, suddenly receded and left behind on the dry land a vast number of snakes. Countless fish were cast up from the sea on the shore near the mouth of the Tiber. Succeeding these terrors a plague spread over nearly the whole of Italy in a malignant form, and in view of this the senate voted that the Curia Hostilia[1] should be rebuilt and the spot where the naval battle had taken place be filled up. However, the curse did not appear disposed to rest even at this point, especially when during Vibius's conduct of the initial sacrifices on the first of the month one of his lictors suddenly fell down and died. Because of these events many men in the course of those days took one side or the other in their speeches and advice, and among the deliverances was the following, of Cicero:— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

[1] The senate-house already mentioned in Book Forty, chapter 50.

—18— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) "You have heard recently, Conscript Fathers, when I made a statement to you about the matter, why I made preparations for my departure as if I were going to be absent from the city a very long time and then returned rapidly with the idea that I could benefit you greatly. I would not endure an existence under a sovereignty or a tyranny, since under such forms of government I can not enjoy the rights of free[1] citizenship nor speak my mind safely nor die in a way that is of service to you; and again, if opportunity is afforded to obey any of duty's calls, I would not shrink from action, though it involved danger. I deem it the task of an upright man equally to keep watch over himself for his country's interests (guarding himself that he may not perish uselessly), and in this course of action not to fail to say or do whatever is requisite, even if it be necessary to suffer some harm in preserving his native land.

—19— "These assumptions granted, a large degree of safety was afforded by Cæsar both to you and to me for the discussion of pressing questions. And since you have further voted to assemble under guard, we must frame all our words and behavior this day in such a fashion as to establish the present state of affairs and provide for the future, that we may not again be compelled to decide in a similar way about it. That our condition is difficult and dangerous and requires much care and attention you yourselves have made evident,

[1] This word is inserted by Boissevain on the authority of a symbol in the manuscript's margin, indicating a gap.

if in no other way, at least by this measure. For you would not have voted to keep the senate-house under guard, if it had been possible for you to deliberate at all with your accustomed orderliness, and in quiet, free from fear. It is necessary for us even on account of the presence of the soldiers to accomplish some measure of importance, that we may not incur the disgrace that would certainly follow from asking for them as if we feared somebody, and then neglecting affairs as if we were liable to no danger. We shall appear to have acquired them only nominally in behalf of the city against Antony, but to have given them in reality to him against our own selves, and it will look as if in addition to the other legions which he gathers against his country he needed to acquire these very men and so prevent your passing any vote against him even to-day. B. C. 43 (a. u. 711)

" Yet some have attained such a height of shamelessness as to dare to say that he is not warring against the State and have credited you with so great folly as to think that they will persuade you to attend to their words rather than to his acts. But who would choose to desist from regarding his performances and the campaign which he has made against our allies without any orders from the senate or the people, the countries which he is overrunning, the cities which he is besieging, and the hopes upon which he is building in his entire course,— who would distrust, I say, the evidence of his own eyes, and to his ruin yield credence to the words of these men and their false statements, by which they put you off with pretexts and excuses? —20—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) I myself am far from asserting that in doing this he is carrying out any legal act of administration. On the contrary, because he has abandoned the province of Macedonia, which was assigned to him by lot, and because he chose instead the province of Gaul, which in no way pertained to him, and because he assumed control of the legions which Cæsar had sent ahead against the Parthians, keeping them about him though no danger threatens Italy, and because he has left the city during the period of his consulship to go about pillaging and injuring the country,— for all these reasons I declare

—21— that he has long been an enemy of us all. If you did not perceive it immediately at the start or experience vexation at each of his actions, he deserves to be hated all the more on this account, in that he does not cease injuring you, who are so long-suffering. He might perchance have obtained pardon for the errors which he committed at first, but now by his perseverance in evil he has reached such a pitch of knavery that he ought to be brought to book for his former offences as well. And you ought to be especially careful in regard to the situation, noticing and considering this point,— that the man who has so often despised you in such weighty matters cannot submit to be corrected by the same gentleness and kindliness that you have shown, but must now against his will, even though never previously, be chastised by force of arms.

—22— "And because he partly persuaded and partly compelled you to vote him some privileges, do not think that this makes him less guilty or deserving of less

punishment. Quite the reverse,— for this very procedure in particular he merits the infliction of a penalty: he determined from the outset to commit many outrages, and after accomplishing some of them through you, he employed against your own selves the resources which came from you, which by deception he forced you to vote to him, though you neither knew nor foresaw any such result. On what occasion did you voluntarily abolish the commands given by Cæsar or by the lot to each man, and allow this person to distribute many appointments to his friends and companions, sending his brother Gaius to Macedonia, and assigning Gaul to himself with the aid of the legions which he was not by any means keeping to use in your defence? Do you not remember how, when he found you startled at Cæsar's demise, he carried out all the plans that he chose, communicating some to you carefully dissimulated and at inopportune moments, and on his own responsibility executing others that inflicted injuries, while all his acts were characterized by violence? He used soldiers, and barbarians at that, against you. And need any one be surprised that in those days some vote was passed which should not have been, when even now we have not obtained a free hand to speak and do what is requisite in any other way than by the aid of a body-guard? If we had been formerly endued with this power, he would not have obtained what any one may say he has obtained, nor would he have risen to the prominence enabling him to do the deeds that were a natural sequence. Accordingly, let no one retort that the rights which we were seen to give him under

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) command and compulsion and amid laments were legally and rightfully bestowed. For, even in private business, that is not considered binding which a man does under compulsion from another.

—23— "And yet all these measures which you are seen to have voted you will find to be slight and varying but little from established custom. What was there dreadful in the fact that one man was destined to govern Macedonia or Gaul in place of another? Or what was the harm if a man obtained soldiers during his consulship? But these are the facts that are harmful and abominable,— that your land should be damaged, allied cities besieged, that our soldiers should be armed against us and our means expended to our detriment: this you neither voted nor intended. Do not, merely because you have granted him some privileges, allow him to usurp what was not granted him; and do not think that just as you have conceded some points he ought similarly to be permitted to do what has not been conceded. Quite the reverse: you should for this very reason both hate and punish him, because he has dared not only in this case but in all other cases to use the honor and kindness that you bestowed against you. Look at the matter. Through my influence you voted that there should be peace and harmony between individuals. This man was ordered to manage the business, and conducted it in such a way (taking Cæsar's funeral as a pretext) that almost the whole city was burned down and great numbers were once more slaughtered. You ratified all the grants made to vari-

ous persons and all the laws laid down by Cæsar, not because they were all excellent — far from it!,— but because our mutual and unsuspecting association, quite free from any disguise, was not furthered by changing any one of those enactments. This man, appointed to examine into them, has abolished many of his acts and has substituted many others in the documents. He has taken away lands and citizenship and exemption from taxes and many other honors from the possessors,— private individuals, kings, and cities,— and has given them to men who had not received any, altering the memoranda of Cæsar; from those who were unwilling to give up anything to his grasp he took away even what had been given them, and sold this and everything else to such as wished to buy. Yet you, foreseeing this very possibility, had voted that no tablet should be set up after Cæsar's death which might contain any article given by him to any person. Notwithstanding, it happened many times after that. He also said it was necessary for some provisions found in Cæsar's papers to be specially noted and put into effect. You then assigned to him, in company with the foremost men, the task of making these excerpts; but he, paying no attention to his colleagues, carried out everything alone according to his wishes, in regard to the laws, the exiles, and other points which I enumerated a few moments since. This is the way in which he wishes to execute all your decrees. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"Has he then shown himself such a character only in these affairs, while managing the rest rightly? In —24—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

what instance? On what motive? He was ordered to search for and declare the public money left behind by Cæsar, and did he not seize it, paying some of it to his creditors and spending some on high living so that he no longer has even any of this left? You hated the name of dictator on account of Cæsar's sovereignty and rejected it entirely from the constitution: but is it not true that Antony, though he has avoided adopting it (as if the name in itself could do any harm), has exhibited the behavior belonging to it and the greed for gain, under the title of consulship? You assigned to him the duty of promoting harmony, and has he not on his own responsibility begun this great war, neither necessary nor sanctioned, against Cæsar and Decimus, whom you approve? Innumerable cases might be mentioned, if one wished to go into details, in which you entrusted business to him to manage as consul, and he has not conducted a single bit of it as the circumstances demanded, but has done quite the opposite, using against you the authority that you imparted. Now will you assume to yourself also these errors that he has committed and say that you yourselves are responsible for all that has happened, because you assigned to him the management and investigation of the matters in question? It is ridiculous. If some general or envoy that had been chosen should fail in every way to do his duty, you who sent him would not incur the blame for this. It would be a sorry state of things, if all who are elected to perform some work should themselves receive the advantages and the honors, but

lay upon you the complaints and the blame. Accordingly, there is no sense in paying any heed to him when he says: 'It was you who permitted me to govern Gaul, you ordered me to administer the public finances, you gave me the legions from Macedonia.' Perhaps these measures were voted — yet ought you to put it that way, and not instead exact punishment from him for his action in compelling you to make that decision? At any rate, you never at any time gave him the right to restore the exiles, to add laws surreptitiously, to sell the privileges of citizenship and exemption from taxes, to steal the public funds, to plunder the possessions of allies, to abuse the cities, or to undertake to play the tyrant over his native country. And you never conceded to any one else all that was desired, though you have granted by your votes many things to many persons; on the contrary you have always punished such men so far as you could, as you will also punish him, if you take my advice. For it is not in these matters alone that he has shown himself to be such a man as you know and have seen him to be, but briefly in all undertakings which he has ever attempted to perform for the commonwealth. —25— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"His private life and his private examples of licentiousness and avarice I shall willingly pass over, not because one would fail to discover that he had committed many abominable outrages in the course of them, but because, by Hercules, I am ashamed to describe minutely and separately — especially to you who know it as well as I — how he conducted his youth —26—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) among you who were boys at the time, how he auctioned off the vigor of his prime, his secret lapses from chastity, his open fornications, what he let be done to him as long as it was possible, what he did as early as he could, his revels, his periods of drunkenness, and all the rest that follows in their train. It is impossible for a person brought up in so great licentiousness and shamelessness to avoid defiling his entire life: and so from his private concerns he brought his lewdness and greed to bear upon public matters. On this I will refrain from dilating, and likewise by Jupiter on his visit to Gabinius in Egypt and his flight to Cæsar in Gaul, that I may not be charged with going minutely into every detail; for I feel ashamed for you, that knowing him to be such a man you appointed him tribune and master of the horse and subsequently consul. I will at present recite only his drunken insolence and abuses in these very positions.

—27— "Well, then, when he was tribune he first of all prevented you from settling suitably the work you then had in hand by shouting and bawling and alone of all the people opposing the public peace of the State, until you became vexed and because of his conduct passed the vote that you did. Then, though by law he was not permitted to be absent from town a single night, he escaped from the city, abandoning the duties of his office, and, having gone as a deserter to Cæsar's camp, guided the latter back as a foe to his country, drove you out of Rome and all the rest of Italy, and, in short, became the prime cause of all the civil dis-

orders that have since taken place among you. Had he not at that time acted contrary to your wishes, Cæsar would never have found an excuse for the war and could not, in spite of all his shamelessness, have gathered a competent force in defiance of your resolutions; but he would have either voluntarily laid down his arms, or been brought to his senses unwillingly. As it is, this fellow is the man who furnished him with the excuses, who destroyed the prestige of the senate, who increased the audacity of the soldiers. He it is who planted the seeds of evils which sprang up afterward: he it is who has proved the common bane not only of us, but also of practically the whole world, as, indeed, Heaven rather plainly indicated. When, that is to say, he proposed those astonishing laws, the whole air was filled with thunder and lightning. Yet this accursed wretch paid no attention to them, though he claims to be a soothsayer, but filled not only the city but the whole world with the evils and wars which I mentioned. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"Now after this is there any need of mentioning that he served as master of the horse an entire year, something which had never before been done? Or that during this period also he was drunk and abusive and in the assemblies would frequently vomit the remains of yesterday's debauch on the rostra itself, in the midst of his harangues? Or that he went about Italy at the head of pimps and prostitutes and buffoons, women as well as men, in company with the lictors bearing festoons of laurel? Or that he alone of man- —28—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) kind dared to buy the property of Pompey, having no regard for his own dignity or the great man's memory, but grasping eagerly those possessions over which we even now as at that time shed a tear? He threw himself upon this and many other estates with the evident intention of making no recompense for them. Yet with all his insolence and violence the price was nevertheless collected, for Cæsar took this way of discountenancing his act. And all that he has acquired, vast in extent and gathered from every source, he has consumed in dicing, consumed in harlotry, consumed in feasting, consumed in drinking, like a second Charybdis.

—29— "Of this behavior I shall make no chronicle. But on the subject of the insults which he offered to the State and the assassinations which he caused throughout the whole city alike how can any man be silent? Is memory lacking of how oppressive the very sight of him was to you, but most of all his deeds? He dared, O thou earth and ye gods, first in this place, within the wall, in the Forum, in the senate-house, on the Capitol, at one and the same time to array himself in the purple-bordered garb, to gird a sword on his thigh, to employ lictors, and to be escorted by armed soldiers. Next, whereas he might have checked the turmoil of the citizens, he not only failed to do so, but set you at variance when you were in concord, partly by his own acts and partly through the medium of others. Moreover he directed his attention in turn to the latter themselves, and by now assisting them and now abandoning

them[1] incurred full responsibility for great numbers of them being slain and for the fact that the entire region of Pontus and of the Parthians was not subdued at that time immediately after the victory over Pharnaces. Cæsar, being called hither in haste to see what he was doing, did not finish entirely any of those projects, as he was surely intending. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"Even this result did not sober him, but when he was consul he came naked, naked, Conscript Fathers, and anointed into the Forum, taking the Lupercalia as an excuse, then proceeded in company with his lictors to the rostra, and there harangued us from the elevation. From the day the city was founded no one can point to any one else, even a prætor or tribune or ædile, let alone a consul, who has done such a thing. To be sure it was the festival of the Lupercalia, and the Lupercalia had been put in charge of the Julian College[2]; yes, and Sextus Clodius had trained him to conduct himself so, upon receipt of two thousand plethra of the land of Leontini.[3] But you were consul, respected sir (for I will address you as though you were present), and it was neither proper nor permissible for you as such to speak in such a way in the Forum, hard by the rostra, with all of us present, and to cause us both to behold your remarkable body, so corpulent and detes- —30—

1 Inserting with Reimar προτέμενος, to complete the sense.

2 See Roscher I, col. 1458, on the Puperci Iulii. And compare Suetonius, Life of Cæsar, chapter 76.

3 For further particulars about Sex. Clodius and the *ager Leontinus* (held to be the best in Sicily, Cicero, Against Verres, III, 46) see Suetonius, On Rhetoric, 5; Arnobuis, V, 18; Cicero, Philippics, II, 4, 8; II, 17; II, 34, 84; II, 39, 101; III, 9, 22.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) table, and to hear your accursed voice, choked with unguent, speaking those outrageous words; for I will preferably confine my comment to this point about your mouth. The Lupercalia would not have missed its proper reverence, but you disgraced the whole city at once,— not to speak a word yet about your remarks on that occasion. Who is unaware that the consulship is public, the property of the whole people, that its dignity must be preserved everywhere, and that its holder must nowhere strip naked or behave wantonly?

—31— Did he perchance imitate the famous Horatius of old or Clœlia of bygone days? But the latter swam across the river with all her clothing, and the former cast himself with his armor into the flood. It would be fitting — would it not? — to set up also a statue of this consul, so that people might contrast the one man armed in the Tiber and the other naked in the Forum. It was by such conduct as has been cited that those heroes of yore were wont to preserve us and give us liberty, while he took away all our liberty from us, so far as was in his power, destroyed the whole democracy, set up a despot in place of a consul, a tyrant in place of a dictator over us. You remember the nature of his language when he approached the rostra, and the style of his behavior when he had ascended it. But when a man who is a Roman and a consul has dared to name any one King of the Romans in the Roman Forum, close to the rostra of liberty, in the presence of the entire people and the entire senate, and straightway to set the diadem upon his head and further to af-

firm falsely in the hearing of us all that we ourselves bade him say and do this, what most outrageous deed will that man not dare, and from what action, however revolting, will he refrain? Did we lay this injunction upon you, Antony, we who expelled the Tarquins, who cherished Brutus, who hurled Capitolinus headlong, who put to death the Spurii?[1] Did we order you to salute any one as king, when we have laid a curse upon the very name of monarch and furthermore upon that of dictator as the most similar? Did we command you to appoint any one tyrant, we who repulsed Pyrrhus from Italy, who drove back Antiochus beyond the Taurus, who put an end to the tyranny even in Macedonia? No, by the rods of Valerius and the law of Porcius, no, by the leg of Horatius and the hand of Mucius, no, by the spear of Decius and the sword of Brutus! But you, unspeakable villain, begged and pleaded to be made a slave as Postumius pleaded to be delivered to the Samnites, as Regulus to be given back to the Carthaginians, as Curtius to be thrown into the chasm. And where did you find this recorded? In the same place where you discovered that the Cretans had been made free after Brutus was their governor, when we voted after Cæsar's death that he should govern them.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—32—

1 Compare here (and particularly with reference to the plural *Spurii*) the passage in Cicero, Philippics, III, 44, 114:

Quod si se ipsos illi nostri liberatores e conspectu nostro abstulerunt, at exemplum facti reliquerunt: illi, quod nemo fecerat, fecerunt: Tarquinium Brutus bello est persecutus, qui tum rex fuit, cum esse Romæ licebat; Sp. Cassius, Sp. Mælius, M. Manlius propter suspitionem regni appetendi sunt necati; hi primum cum gladiis non in regnum appetentem, sed in regnum impetum fecerunt.

—33— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) "So then, seeing that you have detected his baneful disposition in so many and so great enterprises, will you not take vengeance on him instead of waiting to learn by experience what the man who caused so much trouble naked will do to you when he is armed? Do you think that he is not eager for the tyrant's power, that he does not pray to obtain it some day, or that he will put the pursuit of it out of his thoughts, when he has once allowed it a resting-place in his mind, and that he will ever abandon the hope of sole rulership for which he has spoken and acted so impudently without punishment? What human being who, while master of his own voice, would undertake to help some one else secure an honor, would not appropriate it himself when he became powerful? Who that has dared to nominate another as tyrant over his country and himself at once —34— would himself refuse to be monarch? Hence, even if you spared him formerly, you must hate him now for these acts. Do not desire to learn what he will do when his success equals his wishes, but on the basis of his previous ventures plan beforehand to suffer no further outrages. What defence could any one make of what took place? That Cæsar acted rightly at that time in accepting neither the name of king nor the diadem? If so, this man did wrong to offer something which pleased not even Cæsar. Or, on the other hand, that the latter erred in enduring at all to look on at and listen to such proceedings? If so, and Cæsar justly suffered death for this error, does not this man,

who admitted in a certain way that he desired a tyranny, most richly deserve to perish? That this is so is evident from what I have previously said, but is proved most clearly by what he did after that. What other end than supremacy had he in mind that he has undertaken to cause agitation and to meddle in private business, when he might have enjoyed quiet with safety? What other end, that he has entered upon campaigns and warfare, when it was in his power to remain at home without danger? For what reason, when many have disliked to go out and take charge even of the offices that belonged to them, does he not only lay claim to Gaul, which pertains to him in not the slightest degree, but use force upon it because of its unwillingness? For what reason, when Decimus Brutus is ready to surrender to us himself and his soldiers and the cities, has this man not imitated him, instead of besieging and shutting him up? The only interpretation to be put upon it is that he is strengthening himself in this and every other way against us, and to no other end. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"Seeing this, do we delay and give way to weakness and train up so monstrous a tyrant against our own selves? Is it not disgraceful that our forefathers, brought up in slavery, felt the desire for liberty, but we who have lived under an independent government become slaves of our own free will? Or again, that we were glad to rid ourselves of the dominion of Cæsar, though we had first received many favors from his hands, and accept in his stead this man, a self-elected —35—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) despot, who is far worse than he; this allegation is proved by the fact that Cæsar spared many after his victories in war, but this follower of his before attaining any power has slaughtered three hundred soldiers, among them some centurions, guilty of no wrong, at home, in his own quarters, before the face and eyes of his wife, so that she too was defiled with blood. What do you think that the man who treated them so cruelly, when he owed them care, will refrain from doing to all of you,— aye, down to the utmost outrage,— if he shall conquer? And how can you believe that the man who has lived so licentiously even to the present time will not proceed to all extremes of wantonness, if he shall further secure the authority given by arms?

—36— "Do not, then, wait until you have suffered some such treatment and begin to rue it, but guard yourselves before you are molested. It is out of the question to allow dangers to come upon you and then repent of it, when you might have anticipated them. And do not choose to neglect the seriousness of the present situation and then ask again for another Cassius or some more Brutuses. It is ridiculous, when we have the power of aiding ourselves in time, to seek later on men to set us free. Perhaps we should not even find them, especially if we handle in such a way the present situation. Who would privately choose to run risks for the democracy, when he sees that we are publicly resigned to slavery? It must be evident to every man that Antony will not rest contented with what he is now doing, but that in far off and small con-

cerns even he is strengthening himself against us. He is warring against Decimus and besieging Mutina for no other purpose than to provide himself, by conquering and capturing them, with resources against us. He has not been wronged by them that he can appear to be defending himself, nor does he merely desire the property that they possess and with this in mind endure toils and dangers, while ready and willing to relinquish that belonging to us, who own their property and much beside. Shall we wait for him to secure the prize and still more, and so become a dangerous foe? Shall we trust his deception when he says that he is not warring against the City? Who is so silly as to decide whether a man is making war on us or not by his words rather than by his deeds? I do not say that now for the first time is he unfriendly to us, when he has abandoned the City and made a campaign against alleys and is assailing Brutus and besieging the cities; but on the basis of his former evil and licentious behavior, not only after Cæsar's death but even in the latter's lifetime, I decide that he has shown himself an enemy of our government and liberty and a plotter against them. Who that loved his country or hated tyranny would have committed a single one of the many and manifold offences laid to this man's charge? From every point of view he is proved to have long been an enemy of ours, and the case stands as follows. If we now take measures against him with all speed, we shall get back all that has been lost: but if, neglecting to do this, we wait till he himself admits that he is plotting against us, we shall lose everything. This he will never do, not even if he should actually march upon the City,

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—37—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) any more than Marius or Cinna or Sulla did. But if he gets control of affairs, he will not fail to act precisely as they did, or still worse. Men who are anxious to accomplish an object are wont to say one thing, and those who have succeeded in accomplishing it are wont to do quite a different thing. To gain their end they pretend anything, but having obtained it they deny themselves the gratification of no desire. Furthermore, the last born always desire to surpass what their predecessors have ventured: they think it a small thing to behave like them and do something that has been effected before, but determine that something original is the only thing worthy of them, because unexpected.

—38— "Seeing this, then, Conscript Fathers, let us no longer delay nor fall a prey to the indolence that the moment inspires, but let us take thought for the safety that concerns the future. Surely it is a shame when Cæsar, who has just emerged from boyhood and was recently registered among those having attained years of discretion, shows such great interest in the State as to spend his money and gather soldiers for its preservation that we should neither ourselves perform our duty nor coöperate with him even after obtaining a tangible proof of his good-will. Who is unaware that if he had not reached here with the soldiers from Campania, Antony would certainly have come rushing from Brundusium instanter, just as he was, and would have burst into our city with all his armies like a winter torrent?[1] There is, moreover, a striking inconsistency

[1] For the figure, compare Aristophanes, The Acharnians, vv. 380–381 (about Cleon):

διέβαλλε καὶ ψευδῆ κατεγλώττιζέ μου
κἀκυκλοβόρει κἄπλυνεν.

in our conduct. Men who have long been campaigning voluntarily have put themselves at your service for the present crisis, regarding neither their age nor the wounds which they received in past years while fighting for you, and you both refuse to ratify the war in which these very men elected to serve, and show yourselves inferior to them, who are ready to face dangers; for while you praise the soldiers that detected the defilement of Antony and withdrew from him, though he was consul, and attached themselves to Cæsar, (that is, to you through him), you shrink from voting for that which you say they were right in doing. Also we are grateful to Brutus that he did not even at the start admit Antony to Gaul, and is trying to repel him now that Antony confronts him with a force. Why in the world do we not ourselves do the same? Why do we not imitate the rest whom we praise for their sound judgment? There are only two courses open to us. One is —39— to say that all these men,— Cæsar, I mean, and Brutus, the old soldiers, the legions,— have decided wrongly and ought to submit to punishment, because without our sanction or that of the people they have dared to offer armed resistance to their consul, some having deserted his standard, and others having been gathered against him. The other is to say that Antony by reason of his deeds has in our judgment long since admitted that he is our enemy and by public consent ought to be chastised by us all. No one can be ignorant that the latter decision is not only more just but more expedient for us. The man neither understands how to handle business himself (how or by what means could a person that lives in drunkenness and dicing?)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) nor has he any companion who is of any account. He loves only such as are like himself and makes them the confidants of all his open and secret undertakings. Also he is most cowardly in extreme dangers and most treacherous even to his intimate friends, neither of —40— which qualities is suited for generalship or war. Who can be unaware that this very man caused all our internal troubles and then shared the dangers to the slightest possible degree? He tarried long in Brundusium through cowardice, so that Cæsar was isolated and on account of him almost failed: likewise he held aloof from all succeeding wars,— that against the Egyptians, against Pharnaces, the African, and the Spanish. Who is unaware that he won the favor of Clodius, and after using the latter's tribuneship for the most outrageous ends would have killed him with his own hand, if I had accepted this promise from him? Again, in the matter of Cæsar, he was first associated with him as quæstor, when Cæsar was prætor in Spain, next attached himself to him during the tribuneship, contrary to the liking of us all, and later received from him countless money and excessive honors: in return for this he tried to inspire his patron with a desire for supremacy, which led to talk against him and was more than anything else responsible for Cæsar's death.

—41— "Yet he once stated that it was I who directed the assassins to their work. He is so senseless as to venture to invent so great praise for me. And I for my part do not affirm that he was the actual slayer of Cæsar,— not because he was not willing, but because in this, too, he was timid,— yet by the very course of his actions I say that Cæsar perished at his hands. For

this is the man who provided a motive, so that there seemed to be some justice in plotting against him, this is he who called him 'king', who gave him the diadem, who previously slandered him actually to his friends. Do I rejoice at the death of Cæsar, I, who never enjoyed anything but liberty at his hands, and is Antony grieved, who has rapaciously seized his whole property and committed many injuries on the pretext of his letters, and is finally hastening to succeed to his position of ruler? B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"But I return to the point that he has none of the qualities of a great general or such as to bring victory, and does not possess many or formidable forces. The majority of the soldiers and the best ones have abandoned him to his fate, and also, by Jupiter, he has been deprived of the elephants. The remainder have perfected themselves rather in outraging and pillaging the possessions of the allies than in waging war. A proof of the sort of spirit that animates them lies in the fact that they still adhere to him, and of their lack of fortitude in that they have not taken Mutina, though they have now been besieging it for so long a time. Such is the condition of Antony and of his followers found to be. But Cæsar and Brutus and those arrayed with them are firmly intrenched without outside aid; Cæsar, in fact, has won over many of his rival's soldiers, and Brutus is keeping the same usurper out of Gaul: and if you come to their assistance, first by approving what they have done of their own motion, next by ratifying their acts, at the same time giving them legal authority for the future, and next by sending out both the consuls to take charge of —42—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) the war, it is not possible that any of his present associates will continue to aid him. However, even if they should cling to him most tenaciously, they would not be able to resist all the rest at once, but he will either lay down his arms voluntarily, as soon as he ascertains that you have passed this vote, and place himself in your hands, or he will be captured involuntarily as the result of one battle.

"I give you this advice, and, if it had been my lot to be consul, I should have certainly carried it out, as I did in former days when I defended you against Catiline and Lentulus (a relative of this very man), who —43— had formed a conspiracy. Perhaps some one of you regards these statements as well put, but thinks we ought first to despatch envoys to him, then, after learning his decision, in case he will voluntarily give up his arms and submit himself to you, to take no action, but if he sticks to the same principles, then to declare war upon him: this is the advice which I hear some persons wish to give you. This policy is very attractive in theory, but in fact it is disgraceful and dangerous to the city. Is it not disgraceful that you should employ heralds and embassies to citizens? With foreign nations it is proper and necessary to treat by heralds in advance, but upon citizens who are at all guilty you should inflict punishment straightway, by trying them in court if you can get them under the power of your votes, and by warring against them if you find them in arms. All such are slaves of you and of the people and of the laws, whether they wish it or not; and it is not fitting either to coddle them or to put them on an equal footing with the highest class of free persons,

but to pursue and chastise them like runaway servants, with a feeling of your own superiority. Is it not a disgrace that he should not delay to wrong us, but we delay to defend ourselves? Or again, that he should for a long time, weapons in hand, have been carrying on the entire practice of war, while we waste time in decrees and embassies, and that we should retaliate only with letters and phrases upon the man whom we have long since discovered by his deeds to be a wrong-doer? What do we expect? That he will some day render us obedience and pay us respect? How can this prove true of a man who has come into such a condition that he would not be able, even should he wish it, to be an ordinary citizen with you under a democratic government? If he were willing to conduct his life on fair and equitable principles, he would never have entered in the first place upon such a career as his: and if he had done it under the influence of folly or recklessness, he would certainly have given it up speedily of his own accord. As the case stands, since he has once overstepped the limits imposed by the laws and the government and has acquired some power and authority by this action, it is not conceivable that he would change of his own free will or heed any one of our resolutions, but it is absolutely requisite that such a man should be chastised with those very weapons with which he has dared to wrong us. And I beg you now to remember particularly a sentence which this man himself once uttered, that it is impossible for you to be saved, unless you conquer. Hence those who bid you send envoys are doing nothing else than planning how you may be dilatory and the body of your allies be-

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) —44—

—45—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) come as a consequence more feeble and dispirited; while he, on the other hand, will be doing whatever he pleases, will destroy Decimus, storm Mutina, and capture all of Gaul: the result will be that we can no longer find means to deal with him, but shall be under the necessity of trembling before him, paying court to him, worshiping him. This one thing more about the embassy and I am done:— that Antony also gave you no account of what business he had in hand, because he intended that you should do this.

"I, therefore, for these and all other reasons advise you not to delay nor to lose time, but to make war upon him as quickly as possible. You must reflect that the majority of enterprises owe their success rather to an opportune occasion than to their strength; and you should by all means feel perfectly sure that I would never give up peace if it were really peace, in the midst of which I have most influence and have acquired wealth and reputation, nor have urged you to
—46— make war, did I not think it to your advantage. And I advise you, Calenus, and the rest who are of the same mind as you, to be quiet and allow the senate to vote the requisite measures and not for the sake of your private good-will toward Antony recklessly betray the common interests of all of us. Indeed, I am of the opinion, Conscript Fathers, that if you heed my counsel I may enjoy in your company and with thorough satisfaction freedom and preservation, but that if you vote anything different, I shall choose to die rather than to live. I have, in general, never been afraid of death as a consequence of my outspokenness, and now I fear it least of all. That accounts, indeed, for my overwhelm-

ing success, the proof of which lies in the fact that you decreed a sacrifice and festival in memory of the deeds done in my consulship,— an honor which had never before been granted to any one, even to one who had achieved some great end in war. Death, if it befell me, would not be at all unseasonable, especially when you consider that my consulship was so many years ago; yet remember that in that very consulship I uttered the same sentiment, to make you feel that in any and all business I despised death. To dread any one, however, that was against you, and in your company to be a slave to any one would prove exceedingly unseasonable to me. Wherefore I deem this last to be the ruin and destruction not only of the body, but of the soul and reputation, by which we become in a certain sense immortal. But to die speaking and acting in your behalf I regard as equivalent to immortality. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"And if Antony, also, felt the force of this, he would never have entered upon such a career, but would have even preferred to die like his grandfather rather than to behave like Cinna who killed him. For, putting aside other considerations, Cinna was in turn slain not long afterward for this and the other sins that he had committed; so that I am surprised also at this feature in Antony's conduct, that, imitating his works as he does, he shows no fear of some day falling a victim to a similar disaster: the murdered man, however, left behind to this very descendant the reputation of greatness. But the latter has no longer any claim to be saved on account of his relatives, since he has neither emulated his grandfather nor inherited his father's property. Who is unaware of the fact that in restor- —47—

B. C. 43
(*a. u.* 711)

ing many who were exiled in Cæsar's time and later, in accordance forsooth with directions in his patron's papers, he did not aid his uncle, but brought back his fellow-gambler Lenticulus, who was exiled for his unprincipal life, and cherishes Bambalio, who is notorious for his very name, while he has treated his nearest relatives as I have described and as if he were half angry at them because he was born into that family. Consequently he never inherited his father's goods, but has been the heir of very many others, some whom he never saw or heard of, and others who are still living. That is, he has so stripped and despoiled them that they differ in no way from dead men."

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
46

The following is contained in the Forty-sixth of Dio's Rome:

How Calenus replied to Cicero in defence of Antony (chapters 1–28).

How Antony was defeated at Mutina by Cæsar and the consuls (chapters 29–38).

How Cæsar came to Rome and was appointed consul (chapters 39–49).

How Cæsar, Antony, and Lepidus formed a solemn pact of union (chapters 50–56).

Duration of time one year, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated:

C. Vibius C. filius Pansa Capronianus, Aulus Hirtius Auli filius (B. C. 43 = a. u. 711).

When Cicero had finished speaking in this vein, Quintus Fufius Calenus arose and said:— —1— B. C. 43 (a. u. 711)

"Ordinarily I should not have wished either to say anything in defence of Antony or to assail Cicero. I really do not think it proper in such discussions as is the present to do either of these things, but simply to make known what one's opinion is. The former method belongs to the courtroom, whereas this is a matter of deliberation. Since, however, he has undertaken to speak ill of Antony on account of the enmity that exists between them, instead of sending him a summons, as he ought, if Antony were guilty of any wrong, and since he has further mentioned me in a calumnious fashion, as if he could not have exhibited his cleverness without heedlessly insulting one or two persons, it behooves me also to set aside the imputation against Antony and to bring counter-charges against the speaker. I would not have his innate impudence fail of a response nor let my silence aid him by incurring the suspicion of a guilty conscience; nor would I have you, deceived by what he said, come to a less worthy decision by accepting his private spleen against Antony in exchange for the common advantage. He wishes to effect nothing else than that we —2— should abandon looking out for the safest course for the commonwealth and fall into discord again. It is not the first time that he has done this, but from the outset, ever since he had to do with politics, he has been continually causing disturbance one way or the other.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) Is he not the one who embroiled Cæsar with Pompey and prevented Pompey from becoming reconciled with Cæsar? The one who persuaded you to pass that vote against Antony by which he irritated Cæsar, and persuaded Pompey to leave Italy and transfer his quarters to Macedonia? This proved the chief cause of all the evils which befell us subsequently. Is not he the one who killed Clodius by the hand of Milo, and slew Cæsar by the hand of Brutus? The one who made Catiline hostile to us and despatched Lentulus without
—3— a trial? Hence I should be very much surprised at you, seeing that you then changed your mind about his conduct just mentioned and made him pay the penalty for it, if you should now heed him again, when his talk and actions are similar. Do you not see, too, that after Cæsar's death when our affairs were settled in a most tranquil way by Antony, as not even his accuser can deny, the latter left town because he deemed our life of harmony to be alien and dangerous to him? That when he perceived that turmoil had again arisen, he bade a long farewell to his son and to Athens, and returned? That he insults and abuses Antony, whom he was wont to say he loved, and coöperates with Cæsar, whose father he killed? And if chance so favor, he will ere long attack Cæsar also. For the fellow is naturally distrustful and turbulent and has no ballast in his soul, and he is always stirring things up and twisting about, turning more ways than the sea-passage to which he fled and got the title of deserter for it, asking all of you to take that man for friend or foe whom he bids.

"For these reasons be on your guard against the man. He is a juggler and imposter and grows rich and strong from the ills of others, blackmailing, dragging, tearing the innocent, as do dogs; but in the midst of public harmony he is embarrassed and withers away. It is not friendship or good-will among us that can support this kind of orator. From what other source do you think he has become rich or from what other source great? Certainly neither family nor wealth was bequeathed him by his father the fuller, who was always trading in grapes and olives, a man who was glad to make both ends meet by this and by his washing, and whose time was taken up every day and night with the vilest occupations. The son, having been brought up in them, not unnaturally tramples and dowses his superiors, using a species of abuse invented in the workshops and on the street corners. —4— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"Now being of such an origin yourself, and after growing up naked among your naked companions, picking up pig manure and sheep dung and human excrement, have you dared, O most accursed wretch, first to slander the youth of Antony who had the advantage of pedagogues and teachers as his rank demanded, and next to impugn him because in celebrating the Lupercalia, an ancestral festival, he came naked into the Forum? But I ask you, you that always used all the clothes of others on account of your father's business and were stripped by whoever met you and recognized them, what ought a man who was not only priest but also leader of his fellow priests to have done? Not to conduct the procession, not to celebrate the festival,

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) not to sacrifice according to ancestral custom, not to appear naked, not to anoint himself? 'But it is not for that that I censure him,' he answers, 'but because he delivered a speech and that kind of speech naked in the Forum.' Of course this man has become acquainted in the fuller's shop with all minute matters of etiquette, that he should detect a real mistake and be able to rebuke it properly.

—6— "In regard to this matter I will say later all that needs to be said, but just now I want to ask the speaker a question or two. Is it not true that you for your part were nourished by the ills of others and educated in the misfortunes of your neighbors and for this reason are acquainted with no liberal branch of knowledge, that you have established a kind of association here and are always waiting, like the harlots, for a man who will give something, and that having many men in your pay to attract profit to you you pry into people's affairs to find out who has wronged (or seems to have wronged) whom, who hates whom, and who is plotting against whom? With these men you make common cause, and through these men you are supported, selling them the hopes that chance bestows, trading in the decisions of the jurors, deeming him alone a friend who gives more and more, and all those enemies who furnish you no business or employ some other advocate, while you pretend not even to know those who are already in your clutch and affect to be bored by them, but fawn upon and giggle at those just

—7— approaching, like the mistresses of inns? How much

better it were that you too should have been born Bambalio,—if this Bambalio really exists,—than to have taken up such a livelihood, in which it is absolutely inevitable that you should either sell your speech in behalf of the innocent, or else preserve the guilty. Yet you can not do even this effectively, though you wasted three years in Athens. On what occasion? By what help? Why, you always come trembling up to court as if you were going to fight in armor and after speaking a few words in a low and half-dead voice you go away, not remembering a word of the speech you practiced at home before you came, and without finding anything to say on the spur of the moment. In making affirmations and promises you surpass all mankind in audacity, but in the contests themselves beyond uttering some words of abuse and defamation you are most weak and cowardly. Do you think any one is ignorant of the fact that you never delivered one of those wonderful speeches of yours that you have published, but wrote them all up afterward, like persons who form generals and masters-of-horse out of clay? If you feel doubtful of this point, remember how you accused Verres,—though, to be sure, you only gave him an example of your father's trade, when you made water. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"But I hesitate, for fear that in saying precisely what fits your case I may seem to be uttering words that are unfitting for myself.[1] This I will accordingly pass over; and further, by Jupiter, also the affairs of —8—

1 Dio has in this sentence imitated almost word for word the utterance of Demosthenes, inveighing against Aischines, in the Speech on the Crown (Demosthenes XVIII, 129).

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) Gabinius, against whom you prepared accusers and then pled his cause in such a way that he was condemned; and the pamphlets which you compose against your friends, in regard to which you feel yourself so guilty that you do not dare to make them public. Yet it is a most miserable and pitiable state to be in, not to be able to deny these charges which are the most disgraceful conceivable to admit. But I will leave these to one side and bring forward the rest. Well, though we did grant the trainer, as you say, two thousand plethra of the ager Leontinus, we still learned nothing adequate from it.[1] But who should not admire your system of instruction? And what is it? You are ever jealous of your superiors, you always toady to the prominent man, you slander him who has attained distinction, you inform against the powerful and you hate equally all the excellent, and you pretend love only for those through whom you may do some mischief. This is why you are always inciting the younger against their elders and lead those who trust you even
—9— in the slightest into dangers, where you desert them. A proof of this is, that you have never accomplished any achievement worthy of a distinguished man either in war or in peace. How many wars have we won under you as prætor and what kind of territory did we acquire with you as consul? Your private activity all these years has consisted in continually deceiving some of the foremost men and winning them to your side and managing everything you like, while publicly you have been shouting and bawling out at random those detes-

[1] Compare Book Forty-five, chapter 30.

table phrases,— ' I am the only one that loves you,' or, if it should so chance, 'And what's-his-name, all the rest, hate you,' and ' I alone am friendly to you, all the rest are engaged in plots,' and other such stuff by which you fill some with elation and conceit, only to betray them, and scare the rest so that you gain their attachment. If any service is rendered by any one whomsoever of the whole people, you lay claim to it and write your own name upon it, repeating: ' I moved it, I proposed it, it was through me that this was done so.' But if anything happens that ought not to have occurred, you take yourself out of the way and censure all the rest, saying: ' You see I wasn't prætor, you see I wasn't envoy, you see I wasn't consul.' And you abuse everybody everywhere all the time, setting more store by the influence which comes from appearing to speak your mind boldly than by saying what duty demands: and you exhibit no important quality of an orator. What public advantage has been preserved or established by you? Who that was really harming the city have you indicted, and who that was really plotting against us have you brought to light? To neglect the other cases,— these very charges which you now bring against Antony are of such a nature and so many that no one could ever suffer any adequate penalty for them. Why, then, if you saw us being wronged by him at the start, as you assert, did you never attack or accuse him at the time, instead of telling us now all the transgressions he committed when tribune, all his irregularities when master of horse, all his villanies when consul? You might at once, at the time, in

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—10—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) each specific instance, have inflicted the appropriate penalty upon him, if you had wanted to show yourself in very deed a patriot, and we could have imposed the punishment in security and safety during the course of the offences themselves. One of two conclusions is inevitable,— either that you believed this to be so at the time and renounced the idea of a struggle in our behalf, or else that you could not prove any of your charges and are now engaged in a reckless course of blackmail.

—11— "That this is so I will show you clearly, Conscript Fathers, by going over each point in detail. Antony did say some words during his tribuneship in Cæsar's behalf: Cicero and some others spoke in behalf of Pompey. Why now does he accuse him of preferring one man's friendship, but acquit himself and the rest who warmly embraced the opposite cause? Antony, to be sure, hindered at that time some measures adverse to Cæsar from being passed: and Cicero hindered practically everything that was known to be favorable to Cæsar. 'But Antony obstructed,' he replies, 'the public judgment of the senate.' Well, now, in the first place, how could one man have had so much power? Second, if he had been condemned for this, as is said, how could he have escaped punishment? 'Oh, he fled, he fled to Cæsar and got out of the way.' Of course you, Cicero, did not 'leave town' just now, but you fled, as in your former exile.[1] Don't be so ready to apply your own shame to all of us. To flee is what you

[1] There is a play on words here which can not be exactly rendered. The Greek verb φεύγειν means either "to flee" or "to be exiled."

did, in fear of the court, and pronouncing condemnation on yourself beforehand. Yes, to be sure, an ordinance was passed for your recall; how and for what reasons I do not say, but at any rate it was passed, and you did not set foot in Italy before the recall was granted. But Antony both went away to Cæsar to inform him what had been done and returned, without asking for any decree, and finally effected peace and friendship with him for all those that were found in Italy. And the rest, too, would have had a share in it, if they had not taken your advice and fled. Now in view of those circumstances do you dare to say he led Cæsar against his country and stirred up the civil war and became more than any one else responsible for the subsequent evils that befell us? Not so, but you, who gave Pompey legions that belonged to others and the command, and undertook to deprive Cæsar even of those that had been given him: it was you, who agreed with Pompey and the consuls not to accept the offers made by Cæsar, but to abandon the city and the whole of Italy: you, who did not see Cæsar even when he entered Rome, but had run off to Pompey and into Macedonia. Not even to him, however, did you prove of any assistance, but you neglected what was going on, and then, when he met with misfortune, you abandoned him. Therefore you did not aid him at the outset on the ground that he had the juster cause, but after setting in motion the dispute and embroiling affairs you lay in wait at a safe distance for a favorable turn; you at once deserted the man who failed, as if that somehow proved him guilty, and went over to the

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—12—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) victor, as if you deemed him more just. And in addition to your other defects you are so ungrateful that not only are you not satisfied to have been preserved by him, but you are actually displeased that you were not made master of the horse.

—13— "Then with this on your conscience do you dare to say that Antony ought not to have held the office of master of the horse for a year, and that Cæsar ought not to have remained dictator for a year? But whether it was wise or necessary for these measures to be framed, at any rate they were both passed, and they suited us and the people. Censure these men, Cicero, if they have transgressed in any particular, but not, by Jupiter, those whom they have chosen to honor for showing themselves worthy of so great a reward. For if we were forced by the circumstances that then surrounded us to act in this way and contrary to good policy, why do you now lay this upon Antony's shoulders, and why did you not oppose it then if you were able? Because, by Jupiter, you were afraid. Then shall you, who were at that time silent, obtain pardon for your cowardice, and shall he, because he was preferred before you, submit to penalties for his excellence? Where did you learn that this was just, or where did you read that this was lawful?

—14— "'But he did not rightly use his position as master of horse.' Why? 'Because,' he answers, 'he bought Pompey's possessions.' How many others are there who purchased numberless articles, no one of whom is blamed? That was the purpose in confiscating certain

articles and exposing them in the market and proclaiming them by the voice of the public crier, to have somebody buy them. 'But Pompey's goods ought not to have been sold.' Then it was we who erred and did wrong in confiscating them; or (to clear your skirts and ours) it was at least Cæsar who acted irregularly, he who ordered this to be done: yet you did not censure him at all. I maintain that in this charge he is proven to be absolutely beside himself. He has brought against Antony two quite opposite accusations,— one, that after helping Cæsar in very many ways and receiving in return vast gifts from him he was then required under compulsion to surrender the price of them, and the second, that he inherited naught from his father, spent all that he had like Charybdis (the speaker is always bringing in some comparison from Sicily, as if we had forgotten that he had been exiled there), and paid the price of all that he purchased. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"So in these charges this remarkable orator is convicted of violently contradicting himself and, by Jupiter, again in the following statements. At one time he says that Antony took part in everything that was done by Cæsar and by this means became more than any one else responsible for all our internal evils, and again he charges him with cowardice, reproaching him with not having shared in any other exploits than those performed in Thessaly. And he makes a complaint against him to the effect that he restored some of the exiles and finds fault with him because he did not secure the recall of his uncle; as if any one believes that —15—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) he would not have restored him first of all, if he had been able to recall whomsoever he pleased, since there was no grievance on either side between them, as this speaker himself knows. Indeed, though he told many wretched lies about Antony, he did not dare to say anything of that kind. But he is utterly reckless about letting slip anything that comes to his tongue's end, as if it were mere breath.

—16— "Why should one follow this line of refutation further? Turning now to the fact that he goes about with such a tragic air, and has but this moment said in the course of his remarks that Antony rendered the sight of the master of the horse most oppressive by using everywhere and under all circumstances the sword, the purple, the lictors, and the soldiers at once, let him tell me clearly how and in what respect we have been wronged by this. He will have no statement to make; for if he had had, he would have sputtered it out before anything else. Quite the reverse of his charge is true. Those who were quarreling at that time and causing all the trouble were Trebellius and Dolabella: Antony did no wrong and was active in every way in our behalf, so much so that he was entrusted by us with guarding the city against those very men, and not only did this remarkable orator not oppose it (he was there) but even approved it. Else let him show what syllable he uttered on seeing the licentious and accursed fellaw (to quote from his abuse), besides doing nothing that the occasion required, securing also so great authority from you. He will have nothing to show. So

it looks as if not a word of what he now shouts aloud was ventured at that time by this great and patriotic orator, who is everywhere and always saying and repeating: 'I alone am contending for freedom, I alone speak freely for the democracy; I cannot be restrained by favor of friends or fear of enemies from looking out for your advantage; I, even if it should be my lot to die in speaking in your behalf, will perish very gladly.' And his silence was very natural, for it occurred to him to reflect that Antony possessed the lictors and the purple-bordered vesture in accordance with the customs of our ancestors in regard to masters of horse, and that he was using the sword and the soldiers perforce against the rebels. For what most excessive outrages would they not have committed but for his being hedged about with these protections, when some of them so despised him as it was? B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"That these and all his other acts were correct and most thoroughly in accord with Cæsar's intention the facts themselves show. The rebellion went no further, and Antony, far from paying a penalty for his course, was subsequently appointed consul. Notice, I beg of you, how he administered this office of his. You will find, if you scrutinize the matter minutely, that its tenure proved of great value to the city. His traducer, knowing this, could not endure his jealousy but dared to slander him for those deeds which he would have longed to do himself. That is why he introduced the matter of his stripping and anointing and those ancient fables, not because there was any pertinence in them —17—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) now, but in order to obscure by external noise his opponent's consummate skill and success. Yet this same Antony, O thou earth and ye gods (I shall call louder than you and invoke them with greater justice), saw that the city was already in reality under a tyranny through the fact that all the legions obeyed Cæsar and all the people together with the senate submitted to him to such an extent that they voted among other measures that he should be dictator for life and use the appurtenances of a king. Then he showed Cæsar his error most convincingly and restrained him most prudently, until the latter, abashed and afraid, would not accept either the name of king or the diadem, which he had in mind to bestow upon himself even against our will. Any other man would have declared that he had been ordered to do it by his master, and putting forward the compulsion as an excuse would have obtained pardon for it,— yes, indeed, he would, when you think of what kind of votes we had passed at that time and what power the soldiers had secured. Antony, however, because he was thoroughly acquainted with Cæsar's disposition and accurately aware of all he was preparing to do, by great good judgment succeeded in turning him aside from his course and retarding his ambitions. The proof of it is that afterward he no longer behaved in any way like a monarch, but mingled publicly and unprotected with us all; and that accounts most of all for the possibility of his meeting the fate that he did.

—18— "This is what was done, O Cicero or Cicerulus or

Ciceracius or Ciceriscus or Græculus[1] or whatever you like to be called, by the uneducated, the naked, the anointed man: and none of it was done by you, the clever, the wise, the user of much more olive oil than wine, you who let your clothing drag about your ankles not, by Jupiter, as the dancers do, who teach you intricacies of reasoning by their poses, but in order to hide the ugliness of your legs. Oh no, it's not through modesty that you do this, you who delivered that long screed about Antony's habits. Who is there that does not see these soft clothes of yours? Who does not scent your carefully combed gray locks? Who is there unaware that you put away your first wife who had borne you two children, and at an advanced age married another, a mere girl, in order that you might pay your debts out of her property? And you did not even retain her, to the end that you might keep Cærellia fearlessly, whom you debauched when she was as much older than yourself as the maiden you married was younger, and to whom you write such letters as a jester at no loss for words would write if he were trying to get up an amour with a woman seventy years old. This, which is not altogether to my taste, I have been induced to say, Conscript Fathers, in the hope that he should not go away without getting as good as he sent in the discussion. Again, he has ventured to reproach Antony for a little kind of banquet, because he, as he says, drinks water, his purpose being to sit up at night and compose speeches against us,— though he brings

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

1 Various diminutive endings, expressing contempt.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) up his son in such drunkenness that the latter is sober neither night nor day. Furthermore he undertook to make derogatory remarks about Antony's mouth, this man who has shown so great licentiousness and impurity throughout his entire life that he would not keep his hands off even his closest kin, but let out his wife for hire and deflowered his daughter.

—19— "These particulars I shall leave as they stand and return to the point where I started. That Antony against whom he has inveighed, seeing Cæsar exalted over our government, caused him by granting what seemed personal favors to a friend not to put into effect any of the projects that he had in mind. Nothing so diverts persons from objects which they may attain without caring to secure them righteously, as for those who fear such results to appear to endure the former's conduct willingly. These persons in authority have no regard for their own consciousness of guilt, but if they think they have been detected, they are ashamed and afraid: thereafter they usually take what is said to them as flattery and believe the opposite, and any action which may result from the words as a plot, being suspicious in the midst of their shame. Antony knew this thoroughly, and first of all he selected the Lupercalia and that procession in order that Cæsar in the relaxation of his spirit and the fun of the affair might be rebuked with immunity, and next he selected the Forum and the rostra that his patron might be shamed by the very places. And he fabricated the commands from the populace, in order that

hearing them Cæsar might reflect not on what Antony was saying at the time, but on what the Roman people would order a man to say. How could he have believed that this injunction had really been laid upon any one, when he knew that the people had not voted anything of the kind and did not hear them shouting out. But it was right for him to hear this in the Roman Forum, where we had often joined in many deliberations for freedom, and beside the rostra from which we had sent forth thousands and thousands of measures in behalf of the democracy, and at the festival of the Lupercalia, in order that he should remember Romulus, and from the mouth of the consul that he might call to mind the deeds of the early consuls, and in the name of the people, that he might ponder the fact that he was undertaking to be tyrant not over Africans or Gauls or Egyptians, but over very Romans. These words made him turn about; they humiliated him. And whereas if any one else had offered him the diadem, he might have taken it, he was then stopped short by that speech and felt a shudder of alarm. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"These, then are the deeds of Antony: he did not uselessly break a leg, in order himself to escape, nor burn off a hand, in order to frighten Porsenna, but by his cleverness and consummate skill he put an end to the tyranny of Cæsar better than any spear of Decius and better than the sword of Brutus. But you, Cicero, —20— what did you effect in your consulship, not to mention wise and good things, that was not deserving of the greatest punishment? Did you not throw our city into

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) uproar and party strife when it was quiet and harmonious, and fill the Forum and Capitol with slaves, among others, that you had called to your aid? Did you not ruin miserably Catiline, who was overanxious for office, but otherwise guilty of no violence? Did you not pitiably destroy Lentulus and his followers, who were not guilty, not tried, and not convicted, in spite of the fact that you are always and everywhere prating interminably about the laws and about the courts? If any one should take these phrases from your speeches, there is nothing left. You censured Pompey because he conducted the trial of Milo contrary to legalized precedent: yet you afforded Lentulus no privilege great or small that is enjoined in these cases, but without a speech or trial you cast him into prison, a man respectable, aged, whose ancestors had given many great pledges that he would be friendly to his country, and who by reason of his age and his character had no power to do anything revolutionary. What trouble did he have that would have been cured by the change of condition? What blessing did he possess that would not certainly be jeopardized by rebellion? What arms had he collected, what allies had he equipped, that a man who had been consul and was prætor should be so pitilessly and impiously cast into a cell without being allowed to say a word of defence or hear a single charge, and die there like the basest criminals? For this is what this excellent Tullius most of all desired,—that in [the Tullianum,] the place that bears his name, he might put to death the grandson of that Lentulus

who once became the head of the senate. What would he have done if he had obtained authority to bear arms, seeing that he accomplished so many things of such a nature by his words alone? These are your brilliant achievements, these are your great exhibitions of generalship; and not only were you condemned for them by the rest, but you were so ready to vote against your own self in the matter that you fled before your trial came on. Yet what greater demonstration of your bloodguiltiness could there be than that you came in danger of perishing at the hands of those very persons in whose behalf you pretended you had done this, that you were afraid of the very ones whom you said you had benefited by these acts, and that you did not wait to hear from them or say a word to them, you clever, you extraordinary man, you aider of other people, but secured your safety by flight as if from a battle? And you are so shameless that you have undertaken to write a history of these events that I have related, whereas you ought to have prayed that no other man even should give an account of any of them: then you might at least derive this advantage, that your doings should die with you and no memory of them be transmitted to posterity. Now, gentlemen, if you want to laugh, listen to his clever device. He set himself the task of writing a history of the entire existence of the city (for he pretends to be a sophist and poet and philosopher and orator and historian), and he began not from the founding of it, like the rest who are similarly busied, but from his own consulship,

— 21 —
B. C. 43
(*a. u.* 711)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) so that he might proceed backwards, making that the beginning of his account, and the kingdom of Romulus the end.

—22— "Tell me now, you who write such things and do such things, what the excellent man ought to say in popular address and do in action: for you are better at advising others about any matter whatsoever than at doing your own duty, and better at rebuking others than at reforming yourself. Yet how much better it were for you instead of reproaching Antony with cowardice to lay aside yourself that effeminacy both of spirit and of body, instead of bringing a charge of disloyalty against him to cease yourself from doing anything disloyal or playing the deserter, instead of accusing him of ingratitude to cease yourself from wronging your benefactors! For this, I must tell you, is one of his inherent defects, that he hates above all those who have done him any favor, and is always fawning upon somebody else but plotting against these persons. To leave aside other instances, he was pitied and preserved by Cæsar and enrolled among the patricians, after which he killed him,— no, not with his own hand (he is too cowardly and womanish), but by persuading and making ready others who should do it. The men themselves showed that I speak the truth in this. When they ran out into the Forum with their naked blades, they invoked him by name, saying 'Cicero!' repeatedly, as you all heard. His benefactor, Cæsar, then, he slew, and as for Antony from whom he obtained personally safety and a priesthood

when he was in danger of perishing at the hands of the soldiers in Brundusium, he repays him with this sort of thanks, by accusing him for deeds with which neither he himself nor any one else ever found any fault and attacking him for conduct which he praises in others. Yet he sees this Cæsar, who has not attained the age yet to hold office or have any part in politics and has not been chosen by you, sees him equipped with power and standing as the author of a war without our vote or orders, and not only has no blame to bestow, but pronounces laudations. So you perceive that he investigates neither what is just with reference to the laws nor what is useful with reference to the public weal, but simply manages everything to suit his own will, censuring in some what he extols in others, spreads false reports against you, and calumniates you gratuitously. For you will find that all of Antony's acts after Cæsar's demise were ordered by you. To speak about the disposition of the funds and the examination of the letters I deem to be superfluous. Why so? Because first it would be the business of the one who inherited his property to look into the matter, and second, if there was any truth in the charge of malfeasance, it ought to have been stopped then on the moment. For none of the transactions was carried on underhandedly, Cicero, but they were all recorded on tablets, as you yourself affirm. If Antony committed his many wrongs so openly and shamelessly as you say, and plundered the whole of Crete on the pretext that in accord with Cæsar's letters it had been left

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—23—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) free after the governorship of Brutus, though the latter was later given charge of it by us, how could you have kept silent and how could any one else have borne it? But these matters, as I said, I shall pass over; for the majority of them have not been mentioned individually, and Antony is not present, who could inform you exactly of what he has done in each instance. As to Macedonia and Gaul and the remaining provinces and legions, yours are the decrees, Conscript Fathers, according to which you assigned to the various governors their separate charges and delivered to Antony Gaul, together with the soldiers. This is known also to Cicero. He was there and helped vote for all of them just like you. Yet how much better it would have been for him then to speak in opposition, if any item of business was not going as it should, and to instruct you in these matters that are now brought forward, than to be silent at the time and allow you to make mistakes, and now nominally to censure Antony but really to accuse the senate!

—24— "Any sensible person could not assert, either, that Antony forced you to vote these measures. He himself had no band of soldiers so as to compel you to do anything contrary to your inclinations, and further the business was done for the good of the city. For since the legions had been sent ahead and united, there was fear that when they heard of Cæsar's assassination they might revolt, put some inferior man at their head, and begin to wage war again: so it seemed good to you, taking a proper and excellent course, to place in com-

mand of them Antony the consul, who was charged with the promotion of harmony, who had rejected the dictatorship entirely from the system of government. And that is the reason that you gave him Gaul in place of Macedonia, that he should stay here in Italy, committing no harm, and do at once whatever errand was assigned him by you. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"This I have said to you that you may know that you decided rightly. For Cicero that other point of mine was sufficient,— namely, that he was present during all these proceedings and helped us to pass the measures, though Antony had not a soldier at the time and could not have brought to bear on us pressure in the shape of any terror that would have made us neglect a single point of our interest. But even if you were then silent, tell us now at least: what ought we to have done under the circumstances? Leave the legions leaderless? Would they have failed to fill both Macedonia and Italy with countless evils? Commit them to another? And whom could we have found more closely related and suited to the business than Antony, the consul, the director of all the city's affairs, the one who had taken such good care of harmony among us, the one who had given countless examples of his affection for the State? Some one of the assassins, perhaps? Why, it wasn't even safe for them to live in the city. Some one of the party opposed to them? Everybody suspected those people. What other man was there surpassing him in esteem, excelling him in experience? Or are you vexed that we did not choose you? What kind of administration —25—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) would you have given? What would you not have done when you got arms and soldiers, considering that you occasioned so many and so great instances of turmoil in your consulship as a result of these elaborate antitheses, which you have made your specialty, of
—26— which alone you were master. But I return to my point that you were present when it was being voted and said nothing against it, but assented to all the measures as being obviously excellent and necessary. You did not lack opportunity to speak; indeed you roared out considerable that was beside the purpose. Nor were you afraid of anybody. How could you, who did not fear the armed warrior, have quailed before the defenceless man? Or how have feared him alone when you do not dread him in the possession of many soldiers? Yes, you also give yourself airs for absolutely despising death, as you affirm.

"Since these facts are so, which of the two, senators, seems to be in the wrong, Antony, who is managing the forces granted him by us, or Cæsar, who is surrounded with such a large band of his own? Antony, who has departed to take up the office committed to him by us, or Brutus, who prevents him from setting foot in the country? Antony, who wishes to compel our allies to obey our decrees, or they, who have not received the ruler sent them by us but have attached themselves to the man who was voted against? Antony, who keeps our soldiers together, or the soldiers, who have abandoned their commander? Antony, who has introduced not one of these soldiers granted him by us into the

city, or Cæsar, who by money persuaded those who had long ago been in service to come here? I think there is no further need of argument to answer the imputation that he does not seem to be managing correctly all the duties laid upon him by us, and to show that these men ought to suffer punishment for what they have ventured on their own responsibility. Therefore you also secured the guard of soldiers that you might discuss in safety the present situation, not on account of Antony, who had caused no trouble privately nor intimidated you in any way, but on account of his rival, who both had gathered a force against him and has often kept many soldiers in the city itself. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

"I have said so much for Cicero's benefit, since it was he who began unfair argument against us. I am not generally quarrelsome, as he is, nor do I care to pry into others' misdeeds, as he continually gives himself airs for doing. Now I will tell you what advice I have to give, not favoring Antony at all nor calumniating Cæsar or Brutus, but planning for the common advantage, as is proper. I declare that we ought not yet to make an enemy of either of these men in arms nor to enquire exactly what they have been doing or in what way. The present crisis is not suitable for this action, and as they are all alike our fellow-citizens, if any one of them fails the loss will be ours, or if any one of them succeeds his aggrandizement will be a menace to us. Wherefore I believe that we ought to treat them as friends and citizens and send messengers to all of them alike, bidding them lay down their arms and put —27—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) themselves and their legions in our hands, and that we ought not yet to wage war on any one of them, but after their replies have come back approve those who are willing to obey us and fight against the disobedient. This course is just and expedient for us,— not to be in a hurry or do anything rashly, but to wait and after giving the leaders themselves and their soldiers an opportunity to change their minds, then, if in such case there be need of war, to give the consuls charge of it.

—28— "And you, Cicero, I advise not to show a womanish sauciness nor to imitate Bambalio even in making war[1] nor because of your private enmity toward Antony to plunge the whole city publicly again into danger. You will do well if you even become reconciled to him, with whom you have often enjoyed friendly intercourse. But even if you continue embittered against him, at least spare us, and do not after acting as the promoter of friendship among us then destroy it. Remember that day and the speech which you delivered in the precinct of Tellus, and yield a little to this goddess of Concord under whose guidance we are now deliberating, and avoid discrediting those statements and making them appear as if not uttered from a sincere heart, or by somebody else on that occasion. This is to the advantage of the State and will bring you most renown. Do not think that audacity is either glorious or safe, and do not feel sure of being praised just for saying that you despise death. Such men all suspect and

[1] The MS. reading is not wholly satisfactory here. Bekker, by a slight change, would produce (after "Bambalio"): "nor by declaring war because of," etc.

hate as being likely to venture some deed of evil through desperation. Those whom they see, however, paying greatest attention to their own safety they praise and laud, because such would not willingly do anything that merited death. Do you, therefore, if you honestly wish your country to be safe, speak and act in such a way as will both preserve yourself and not, by Jupiter, involve us in your destruction!" B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—29—

Such language from Calenus Cicero would not endure. He himself always spoke his mind intemperately and immoderately to all alike, but he never thought he ought to get a similar treatment from others. On this occasion, too, he gave up considering the public interest and set himself to abusing his opponent until that day was spent, and naturally for the most part uselessly. On the following day and the third many other arguments were adduced on both sides, but the party of Cæsar prevailed. So they voted first a statue to the man himself and the right to deliberate among the ex-quæstors as well as of being a candidate for the other offices ten years sooner than custom allowed, and that he should receive from the City the money which he had spent for his soldiers, because he had equipped them at his own cost for her defence: second, that both his soldiers and those that had abandoned Antony should have the privilege of not fighting in any other war and that land should be given them at once. To Antony they sent an embassy which should order him to give up the legions, leave Gaul, and withdraw into Macedonia — and to his fol-

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) lowers they issued a proclamation to return home before a given day or to know that they would occupy the position of enemies. Moreover they removed the senators who had received from him governorships over the provinces and resolved that others should be sent in their place. These measures were ratified at that time. Not long after, before learning his decision, they voted that a state of rebellion existed, changed their senatorial garb, gave charge of the war against him to the consuls and Cæsar (a kind of pretorian office), and ordered Lepidus and Lucius Munatius Plancus, who was governing a portion of Transalpine Gaul, to render assistance.

—30— In this way did they themselves furnish an excuse for hostility to Antony, who was without this anxious to make war. He was pleased to receive news of the decrees and forthwith violently reproached the envoys with not treating him rightly or fairly as compared with the youth (meaning Cæsar). He also sent others in his turn, so as to put the blame of the war upon the senators, and make some counter-propositions which saved his face but were impossible of performance by Cæsar and those who sided with him. He intended not to fulfill one of their demands, well aware that they too would not take up with anything that he submitted. He promised, however, that he would do all that they had determined, that he himself might have a refuge in saying that he would have done it, while at the same time his opponent's party would be before him in becoming responsible for the war, by refusing the terms

he laid before them. In fine, he said that he would abandon Gaul and disband his legions, if they would grant these soldiers the same rewards as they had voted to Cæsar's and would elect Cassius and Marcus Brutus consuls. He brought in the names of these men in his request with the purpose that they should not harbor any ill-will toward him for his operations against their fellow-conspirator Decimus. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

Antony made these offers knowing well that neither of them would be acted upon. Cæsar would never have endured that the murderers of his father should become consuls or that Antony's soldiers by receiving the same as his own should feel still more kindly toward his rival. Nor, as a matter of fact, were his offers ratified, but they again declared war on Antony and gave notice to his associates to leave him, appointing a different day. All, even such as were not to take the field, arrayed themselves in military cloaks, and they committed to the consuls the care of the city, attaching to the decree the customary clause "to the end that it suffer no harm." And since there was need of large funds for the war, they all contributed the twenty-fifth part of the property they owned and the senators also four asses[1] per tile of all the houses in the city that they themselves owned or dwelt in belonging to others. The very wealthy besides donated no little more, while many cities and many individuals manu- —31—

1 The Greek word is ὀβολός, a coin which in the fifth century B. C. would have amounted to considerably more than the Roman *as;* but as time went on the value of the ὀβολός diminished indefinitely, so that glossaries eventually translate it as *as* in Latin.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) factured gratuitously weapons and other necessary accoutrements for a campaign. The public treasury was at that time so empty that not even the festivals which were due to fall during that season were celebrated, except some small ones out of religious scruple.

—32— These subscriptions were given readily by those who favored Cæsar and hated Antony. The majority, however, being oppressed by the campaigns and the taxes at once were irritated, particularly because it was doubtful which of the two would conquer but quite evident that they would be slaves of the conqueror. Many of those, therefore, that wished Antony well, went straight to him, among them tribunes and a few prætors: others remained in their places, one of whom was Calenus, but did all that they could for him, some things secretly and other things with an open defence of their conduct. Hence they did not change their costume immediately, and persuaded the senate to send envoys again to Antony, among them Cicero: in doing this they pretended that the latter might persuade him to make terms, but their real purpose was that he should be removed from their path. He too reflected on this possibility and becoming alarmed would not venture to expose himself in the camp of Antony. As a result none of the other envoys set out either.

—33— While this was being done portents of no small moment again occurred, significant for the City, and for the consul Vibius himself. In the last assembly before they set out for the war a man with the so-called sacred disease[1] fell down while Vibius was speaking. Also a bronze statue of him which stood at the porch of his

[1] I. e., epilepsy.

house turned around of itself on the day and at the hour that he started on the campaign, and the sacrifices customary before war could not be interpreted by the seers by reason of the quantity of blood. Likewise a man who was just then bringing him a palm slipped in the blood which had been shed, fell, and defiled the palm. These were the portents in his case. Now if they had befallen him when a private citizen, they would have pertained to him alone, but since he was consul they had a bearing on all alike. They included the following incidents: the figure of the Mother of the Gods on the Palatine formerly facing the east turned around of its own accord to the west; that of Minerva held in honor near Mutina, where the most fighting was going on, sent forth after this a quantity of blood and milk; furthermore the consuls took their departure just before the Feriæ Latinæ; and there is no case where this happened that the forces fared well. So at this time, too, both the consuls and a vast multitude of the people perished, some immediately and some later, and also many of the knights and senators, including the most prominent. For in the first place the battles, and in the second place the assassinations at home which occurred again as in the Sullan régime, destroyed all the flower of them except those actually concerned in the murders. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—34— Responsibility for these evils rested on the senators themselves. For whereas they ought to have set at their head some one man of superior judgment and to have coöperated with him continuously, they failed to do

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) this, but made protégés of a few whom they strengthened against the rest, and later undertook to overthrow these favorites as well, and consequently they found no one a friend but all hostile. The comparative attitude of men toward those who have injured them and toward their benefactors is different, for they remember a grudge even against their wills but willingly forget to be thankful. This is partly because they disdain to appear to have been kindly treated by any persons, since they will seem to be the weaker of the two, and partly because they are irritated at the idea that they will be thought to have been injured by anybody with impunity, since that will imply cowardice on their part. So those senators by not taking up with some one person, but attaching themselves to one and another in turn, and voting and doing now something for them, now something against them, suffered much because of them and much also at their hands. All the leaders had one purpose in the war,— the abolition of the popular power and the setting up of a sovereignty. Some were fighting to see whose slaves they should be, and others to see who should be their master; and so both of them equally wrought havoc, and each of them won glory according to fortune, which varied. The successful wariors were deemed shrewd and patriotic, and the defeated ones were called both enemies of their country and pestilential fellows.

This was the state that the Roman affairs had at that time reached: I shall now go on to describe the separate —35— events. There seems to me to be a very large amount

of self-instruction possible, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of the former by the latter, and then proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

The precise reason for Antony's besieging Decimus in Mutina was that the latter would not give up Gaul to him, but he pretended that it was because Decimus had been one of Cæsar's assassins. For since the true cause of the war brought him no credit, and at the same time he saw the popular party flocking to Cæsar to avenge his father, he put forward this excuse for the conflict. That it was a mere pretext for getting control of Gaul he himself made plain in demanding that Cassius and Marcus Brutus be appointed consuls. Each of these two utterances, of the most opposite character as they were, he made with an eye to his own advantage. Cæsar had begun a campaign against his rival before the war was granted him by the vote, but had done nothing worthy of importance. When he learned of the decrees passed he accepted the honors and was glad, especially because when he was sacrificing at the time of receiving the distinction and authority of prætor the livers of all the victims, twelve in number, were found to be double. He was impatient, to be sure, at the fact that envoys and proposals had been sent also to Antony, instead of unrelenting war being declared against him at once, and most of all because he ascertained that the consuls had forwarded some private despatch to his rival about harmony, that when some letters sent by the latter to certain sena-

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) tors had been captured these officials had handed them to the persons addressed, concealing the transaction from him, and that they were not carrying on the war zealously or promptly, making the winter their excuse. However, as he had no means of making known these facts,— for he did not wish to alienate them, and on the other hand he was unable to use any persuasion or force,— he stayed quiet himself in winter quarters in Forum Cornelium, until he became frightened about —36— Decimus. The latter had previously been vigorously fighting Antony off. On one occasion, suspecting that some men had been sent into the city by him to corrupt the soldiers, he called all those present together and after giving them a few hints proclaimed by herald that all the men under arms should go to one side of a certain place that he pointed out and the private citizens to the other side of it: in this way he detected and arrested Antony's followers, who were isolated and did not know which way to turn. Later he was entirely shut in by a wall; and Cæsar, fearing he might be captured by storm or capitulate through lack of provisions, compelled Hirtius to join a relief party. Vibius was still in Rome raising levies and abolishing the laws of Antony. Accordingly, they started out and without a blow took possession of Bononia, which had been abandoned by the garrisons, and routed the cavalry who later confronted them: by reason of the river, however, near Mutina and the guard beside it they found themselves unable to proceed farther. They wished, notwithstanding, even so to make known their presence to Decimus, that he might not in undue season make terms, and at first they tried sending signals from the

tallest trees. But since he did not understand, they scratched a few words on a thin sheet of lead, and rolling it up like a piece of paper gave it to a diver to carry across under water by night. Thus Decimus learned at the same time of their presence and their promise of assistance, and sent them a reply in the same fashion, after which they continued uninterruptedly to communicate all their plans to each other. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

Antony, therefore, seeing that Decimus was not inclined to yield, left him to the charge of his brother Lucius, and himself proceeded against Cæsar and Hirtius. The two armies faced each other for a number of days and a few insignificant cavalry battles occurred, with honors even. Finally the Celtic cavalry, of whom Cæsar had gained possession along with the elephants, withdrew to Antony's side again. They had started from the camp with the rest and had gone on ahead as if intending to engage separately those of the enemy who came to meet them; but after a little they turned about and unexpectedly attacked those following behind (who did not stand their ground), killing many of them. After this some foraging parties on both sides fell to blows and when the remainder of each party came to the rescue a sharp battle ensued between the two forces, in which Antony was victorious. Elated by his success and in the knowledge that Vibius was approaching he assailed the antagonists' fortification, thinking possibly to destroy it beforehand and make the rest of the conflict easier. They, in consideration of their disaster and the hope which Vibius inspired, kept guard but would not come out for battle. Hence Antony left behind there a certain portion of his army —37—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) with orders to come to close quarters with them and so make it appear as much as possible that he himself was there and at the same time to take good care that no one should fall upon his rear. After issuing these injunctions he set out secretly by night against Vibius, who was approaching from Bononia. By an ambush he succeeded in wounding the latter severely, in killing the majority of his soldiers and confining the rest within their ramparts. He would have annihilated them, had he proceeded to besiege them for any time at all. As it was, after accomplishing nothing at the first assault he began to be alarmed lest while he was delaying he should receive some setback from Cæsar and the rest; so he again turned against them. Wearied by the journey both ways and by the battle he was also in doubt whether he should find that his opponents had conquered the force hostile to them; and in this condition he was confronted by Hirtius and suffered a decisive defeat. For when Hirtius and Cæsar perceived what was going on, the latter remained to keep watch over the camp while the former set out
—38— against Antony. Upon the latter's defeat not only Hirtius was saluted as imperator by the soldiers and by the senate, but likewise Vibius, though he had fared badly, and Cæsar who had done no fighting even. To those who had participated in the conflict and had perished there was voted a public burial, and it was resolved that the prizes of war which they had taken while alive should be restored to their fathers and sons.

Following this official action Pontius Aquila, one of

the assassins and a lieutenant of Decimus, conquered in battle Titus Munatius Plancus, who opposed him; and Decimus, when a certain senator deserted to Antony, so far from displaying anger toward him sent back all his baggage and whatever else he had left behind in Mutina, the result being that the affection of many of Antony's soldiers grew cool, and some of the nations which had previously sympathized with him proceeded to rebel: Cæsar and Hirtius, however, were elated at this, and approaching the fortifications of Antony challenged him to combat; he for a time was alarmed and remained quiet, but later when some reinforcements sent by Lepidus came to him he took courage. Lepidus himself did not make it clear to which of the two sides he sent the army: he thought well of Antony, who was a relative, but had been summoned against him by the senate; and for these reasons he made plans to have a refuge in store with both parties, by not giving to Marcus Silanus, the commander, orders that were in the least clear. But he, doubtless knowing well his master's frame of mind, went on his own responsibility to Antony. So when the latter had been thus assisted he became bold and made a sudden sally from the gates: there was great slaughter on both sides, but at last he turned and fled. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) —39—

Up to this time Cæsar was being strengthened by the people and the senate, and because of this expected that among other honors to be bestowed he would be forthwith appointed consul. It happened that Hirtius perished in the occupation of Antony's camp and

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) Vibius died of his wounds not long after, so that Cæsar was charged with having caused their death that he might succeed to the office. But the senate had previously, while it was still uncertain which of the two would prevail, done away with all the privileges which formerly, granted to any person beyond the customs of the forefathers, had paved the way to sovereignty: they voted that this edict should apply to both parties, intending by it to anticipate the victor, while laying the blame upon the other, who should be defeated. First they forbade any one to hold office more than a year, and second that any superintendent of grain supplies or commissioner of food should be chosen. When they ascertained the outcome, they rejoiced at Antony's defeat, changed their raiment once more, and celebrated a solemn thanksgiving for sixty[1] days. All those arrayed on his side they held in the light of enemies, and took possession of their property as they did of the
—40— leader's. Nor did they propose that Cæsar any longer should receive any great reward, but even undertook to overthrow him, by allowing Decimus to secure all the prizes for which he was hoping. They voted Decimus not only the right of sacrifice but a triumph and gave him charge of the rest of the war and of the legions,— those of Vibius and others. Upon the soldiers that had been besieged with him they resolved

1 Sturz changes this reading of *sixty* days to *fifty*, comparing Appian, Civil Wars, Book Three, chapter 74. Between the two authorities it is difficult to decide, and the only consideration that would incline one to favor Appian is the fact that he says this period of fifty days was unusually long ("more than the Romans had ever voted upon vanquishing the Celtæ or winning any war"). Boissevain remarks that Dio is not very careful about such details.

that eulogies should be bestowed and all the other rewards which had formerly been offered to Cæsar's men, although these troops had contributed nothing to the victory, but had merely beheld it from the walls. Aquila, who had died in the battle, they honored with an image, and restored to his heirs the money which he had expended from his own purse for the equipment of Decimus's soldiers. In a word, practically every advantage that had been given Cæsar against Antony was voted to others against the man himself. And to the end that no matter how much he might wish it he should not be able to do any harm, they armed all his enemies against him. To Sextus Pompey they entrusted the fleet, to Marcus Brutus Macedonia, and to Cassius Syria together with the war against Dolabella. They would certainly have further deprived him of the forces that he had, but they were afraid to vote this openly, owing to their knowledge that his soldiers were devoted to him. Still, even so, they strove to set his followers at variance with one another and with him. They did not wish to approve and honor all of them, for fear they should fill them with too great conceit, nor again to dishonor and neglect all, for fear they should alienate them the more and as a consequence force them to agree together. Hence they adopted a middle course, and by approving some of them and others not, by allowing some to wear an olive garland at the festivals and others not, and furthermore by voting to some money to the extent of twenty-five hundred denarii and to others not a farthing, they hoped to bring about

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

B. C. 43
(*a. u.* 711)
—41—

a clash between them and by that means weaken them. Those charged with these commissions also they sent not to Cæsar but to the men in the field. He became enraged at this, but nominally allowed the envoys to mix with the army without his presence, though he sent word beforehand that no answer should be given and that he himself should be at once sent for. So when he came into the camp and joined them in listening to the despatches, he succeeded in conciliating them much more by that very action. Those who had been preferred in honor were not so delighted at this precedence as they were suspicious of the affair, particularly as a result of Cæsar's influence. And those who had been slighted were not at all angry at their comrades, but added their doubts of the sincerity of the decrees, imputing their dishonor to all and sharing their anger with them. The people in the City, on learning this, though frightened did not even so appoint him consul, for which he was most anxious, but granted him the distinction of consular honors, so that he might now record his vote along with the ex-consuls. When he took no account of this, they voted that he should be made a prætor of the first rank and subsequently also consul. In this way did they think they had handled Cæsar cleverly as if he were in reality a mere youth and child, as they were always repeating. He, however, was exceedingly vexed at their general behavior and especially at this very fact that he was called child, and so made no further delay, but turned against their camps and powers. With Antony he

secretly arranged a truce, and he assembled the men who had escaped from the battle, whom he himself had conquered and the senate had voted to be enemies, and in their presence made many accusations against both the senate and the people. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

The people in the City on hearing this for a time held him in contempt, but when they heard that Antony and Lepidus had become of one mind they began again to court his favor,— for they were in ignorance of the propositions he had made to Antony,— and assigned to him charge of the war against the two. Cæsar was accordingly ready to accept even this if he could be made consul for it. He was working in every way to be elected, through Cicero among others, and so earnestly that he promised to make him his colleague. When he was not even then chosen, he made preparations, to be sure, to carry on war, as had been decreed, but meanwhile arranged that his own soldiers (of their own motion, of course) should suddenly take an oath not to fight against any legion that had been Cæsar's. This had a bearing on Lepidus and Antony, since the majority of their adherents were of that class. So he waited and sent as envoys to the senate on this business four hundred of the soldiers themselves. —42—

This was the excuse that they had for an embassy, but in addition they demanded the money that had been voted them and urged that Cæsar be appointed consul. While the senators were postponing their reply, which required deliberation, as they said, they asked (naturally on the instructions from Cæsar) that amnesty —43—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) be granted to some one who had embraced Antony's cause. They were not really anxious to obtain it, but wanted to test the senators and see if they would grant the request, or, if such were not the issue, whether to pretend to be displeased about it would serve as a starting-point for indignation. They failed to gain their petition, for while no one spoke against it there were many preferring the same request on behalf of others and thus among a mass of similar representations their demand also was rejected on some plausible excuse. Then they openly showed their anger, and one of them issued from the senate-chamber and grasping a sword (they had gone in unarmed) said: "If you do not grant the consulship to Cæsar, this shall grant it." And Cicero interrupting him answered: "If you exhort in this way, he will get it." Now for Cicero this instrument had destruction in readiness. Cæsar did not censure the soldier's act, but made a complaint because they had been obliged to lay aside their arms on entering the senate and because one of them was asked whether they had been sent by the legions or by Cæsar. He summoned in haste Antony and Lepidus (whom he had attached to him through friendship for Antony), and he himself, pretending to have been forced to such measures by his soldiers, set out with all

—44— of them against Rome. Some[1] of the knights and others who were present they suspected were acting as spies and they consequently slew them, besides injuring the lands of such as were not in accord with them

[1] Adopting Reiske's reading, *τινας*.

and doing much other damage with this excuse. The senators on ascertaining their approach sent them their money before they came near, hoping that when the invaders received that they might retire, and when they still pressed on they appointed Cæsar consul. Nothing, however, was gained by this step. The soldiers were not at all grateful to them for what they had done not willingly but under compulsion, but were even more emboldened, in the idea that they had thoroughly frightened them. Learning of this the senate altered its policy and bade the host not approach the city but remain over one hundred and fifty stadia from it. They themselves also changed their garb again and committed to the prætors the care of the city, as had been the custom. And besides garrisoning other points they occupied Janiculum in advance with the soldiers that were at hand and with others from Africa. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

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While Cæsar was still on the march this was the condition of things; and all the people who were at that time in Rome with one accord sought a share in the proceedings, as the majority of men are wont to be bold until they come in sight and have a taste of dangers. When, however, he arrived in the suburbs, they were alarmed, and first some of the senators, later many of the people, went over to his side. Thereupon the prætors also came down from Janiculum and surrendered to him their soldiers and themselves. Thus Cæsar took possession of the city without a blow and was appointed consul also by the people, though two proconsuls were chosen to hold the elections; it was

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) impossible, according to precedent, for an interrex to be created for so short a period merely to superintend the comitia, because many men who held the curule offices were absent from the city. They endured having the two proconsuls named by the prætor urbanus rather than to have the consuls elected under his direction, because now these proconsular officials would limit their activities to the elections and consequently would appear to have been invested with no powers outlasting them.[1] This was of course done under pressure of arms. Cæsar, that he might appear not to have used any force upon them, did not enter the assembly, — as if it was his presence that any one feared instead of his power.

—46— Thus he was chosen consul, and there was given him as a fellow-official — perhaps one ought to say *under*-official — Quintus Pedius. He was very proud of this fact that he was to be consul at an earlier age than it had ever been the lot of any one else, and further that on the first day of the elections, when he had entered the Campus Martius, he saw six vultures, and later while haranguing the soldiers twelve others. For, comparing it with Romulus and the omen that had befallen the latter, he began to expect that he should obtain his sovereignty. He did not, however, simply on the ground that he had already been given the distinction of the consular honors, assume distinction as being

[1] Compare here Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*, 2^2, 644, 2 or 2^3, 663, 3), who says that the only objection to be found with this arrangement was that since the prætor urbanus could not himself conduct the comitia, he ought not properly to have empowered others to do so.

consul for the second time. This custom was since then observed in all similar cases to our own day. The emperor Severus was the first to change it; for he honored Plautianus with the consular honors and afterward introduced him to the senate and appointed him consul, proclaiming that he was entering the consulship the second time. In imitation of him the same thing was done in other instances. Cæsar, accordingly, arranged affairs in general in the city to suit his taste, and gave money to the soldiers, to some what had been voted from the funds prescribed, and to the rest individually from his private funds, as the story went, but in reality from the public store. B. C. 43 (a. u. 711)

In this way and for the reasons mentioned did the soldiers receive the money on that occasion. But some of them got a wrong idea of the matter and thought it was compulsory for absolutely all the citizen forces at all times to be given the twenty-five hundred denarii, if they went to Rome under arms. For this reason the followers of Severus who had come to the city to overthrow Julianus behaved most terrifyingly both to their leader himself and to us, while demanding it. And they were won over by Severus with two hundred and fifty denarii, while people in general were ignorant what claim was being set up.

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Cæsar while giving the soldiers the money also expressed to them his fullest and sincerest thanks. He did not even venture to enter the senate-chamber without a guard of them. To the senate he showed gratitude, but it was all fictitious and pretended. For he

B. C. 43
(*a. u.* 711)

was accepting as if it were a favor received from willing hands what he had attained by violence. And they actually took great credit to themselves for their behavior, as if they had given him the office voluntarily; and moreover they granted to him whom previously they had not even wished to choose consul the right after his term expired to be honored, as often as he should be in camp, above all those who were consuls at one time or another. To him on whom they had threatened to inflict penalties, because he had gathered forces on his own responsibility without the passing of any vote, they assigned the duty of collecting others: and to the man for whose disenfranchisement and overthrow they had ordered Decimus to fight with Antony they added Decimus's legions. Finally he obtained the guardianship of the city, so that he was able to do everything that he wished according to law, and he was adopted into Cæsar's family in the regular way, as a consequence changing his name. He had, as some think, been even before this accustomed to call himself Cæsar, as soon as this name was bequeathed to him together with the inheritance. He was not, however, exact about his title, nor did he use the same one in dealing with everybody until at this time he had ratified it in accordance with ancestral custom, and was thus named, after his famous predecessor, Gaius Julius Cæsar Octavianus. For it is the custom when a person is adopted for him to take most of his appellation from his adoptor but to keep one of his previous names slightly altered in form. This is the status of the mat-

ter, but I shall call him not Octavianus but Cæsar, because this name has prevailed among all such as secure dominion over the Romans. He took another one in addition, namely *Augustus,* and therefore the subsequent emperors assume it. That one will be given when it comes up in the history, but until then the title Cæsar will be sufficient to show that Octavianus is indicated. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

This Cæsar, then, as soon as he had conciliated the soldiers and enslaved the senate, turned himself to avenging his father's murder. As he was afraid of somehow causing an upheaval among the populace in the pursuit of this business he did not make known his intention until he had seen to the payment of the bequests made to them. When they had been made docile by means of the money, although it belonged to the public funds and had been collected on the pretext of war, then at length he began to follow up the assassins. In order that this procedure of his might not appear to be characterized by violence but by justice, he proposed a law about their trial and tried the cases in their absence. The majority of them were out of town and some even held governorships over provinces. Those who were present also did not come forward, by reason of fear, and withdrew unobserved. Consequently they were convicted by default, and not only those who had been the actual murderers of Cæsar and their fellow-conspirators, but many others who, so far from plotting against Cæsar, had not even been in the city at the time. This action was directed —48—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) chiefly against Sextus Pompey. The latter though he had had no share whatever in the attack was nevertheless condemned because he had been an enemy. Those adjudged guilty were debarred from fire and water and their property was confiscated. The provinces,— not only those which some of them were governing, but all the rest,— were committed to the friends of Cæsar.

—49— Among those held liable was also Publius Servilius Casca, the tribune. He had suspected Cæsar's purpose in advance, before he entered the city, and had quietly slipped away. For this act he was at once removed from his office, on the charge of having left the city contrary to precedent, by the populace convened by his colleague Publius Titius; and in this way he was condemned. When Titius not long after died, the proverbial fate that had been observed from of old was once more in evidence. No one up to that time who had expelled a colleague had lived the year out: but first Brutus after the expulsion of Collatinus died in his turn, then Gracchus was stabbed after expelling Octavius, and Cinna who put Marullus and Flavus out of the way not long after perished. This has been the general experience.

Now the assassins of Cæsar had many accusers who were anxious to ingratiate themselves with his son, and many who were persuaded so to act by the rewards offered. They received money from the estate of the convicted man and the latter's honors and office, if he had any, and exemption from further service in the army, applicable to themselves and their children and grandchildren. Of the jurors

the majority voted against the accused out of fear of Cæsar and a wish to please him, generally hinting that they were justified in doing this. Some cast their votes in consideration of the law enacted about punishing the culprits, and others in consideration of the arms of Cæsar. And one, Silicius Corona, a senator, voted outright to acquit Marcus Brutus. He made a great boast of this at the time and secretly received approval from the rest: that he was not immediately put to death gained for Cæsar a great reputation for toleration, but later he was executed as the result of a proscription. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

After accomplishing this Cæsar's next step was naturally a campaign against Lepidus and Antony. Antony on fleeing from the battle described had not been pursued by Cæsar on account of the war being entrusted to Decimus; and the latter had not pursued because he did not wish a rival to Cæsar to be removed from the field. Hence the fugitive collected as many as he could of the survivors of the battle and came to Lepidus, who had made preparations to march himself into Italy in accordance with the decree, but had again been ordered to remain where he was. For the senators, when they ascertained that Silanus had embraced Antony's cause, were afraid that Lepidus and Lucius Plancus might also coöperate with him, and sent to them to say that they had no further need of them. To prevent their suspecting anything ulterior and consequently causing trouble they ordered them to help in building homes for the men once driven out of Vienna (in Gallia Narbonensis) by the Allobroges and —50—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) then located between the Rhone and the Arar, at their confluence. Therefore they submitted, and founded the so-called Lugudunum, now known as Lugdunum. They might have entered Italy with their arms, had they wished, for the decrees by this time exerted a very weak influence upon such as had troops, but, with an eye to the outcome of the war Antony was conducting, they wished to appear to have yielded obedience to the senate and incidentally to strengthen their position.

—51— Indeed, Lepidus censured Silanus severely for making an alliance with Antony, and when the latter himself came would not hold conversation with him immediately, but sent a despatch to the senate containing an accusation of his own against him, and for this stand he received praise and command of the war against Antony. Hence the first part of the time he neither admitted Antony nor repelled him, but allowed him to be near and to associate with his followers; he would not, however, hold a conference with him. But when he ascertained Antony's agreement with Cæsar, he then came to terms with both of them himself. Marcus Juventius,[1] his lieutenant, learned what was being done and at first tried to alter his purpose; then, when he did not succeed in persuading him, he made away with himself in the sight of the soldiers. For this the senate voted eulogies and a statue to Juventius and a public funeral, but Lepidus they deprived of his image which stood upon the rostra and made him an enemy. They also set a certain day for his comrades and threatened

[1] *M. Juventius Laterensis.*

them with war if they should not abandon him before that day. Furthermore they changed their clothing again,— they had resumed citizen's apparel in honor of Cæsar's consulship,— and summoned Marcus Brutus and Cassius and Sextus to proceed against them. When the latter seemed likely to be too slow in responding, they committed the war to Cæsar, being ignorant of the conspiracy existing. He nominally received it, in spite of having made his soldiers give voice to a sentiment previously mentioned,[1] but accomplished no corresponding results. This was not because he had formed a compact with Antony and through him with Lepidus,— little he cared for that fact,— but because he saw they were powerful and knew their purposes were linked by the bands of kinship, and he could not use force with them; and besides he cherished hopes of bringing about through them the downfall of Cassius and Brutus, who were already very influential, and subsequently of wearing them out one against the other. Accordingly, even against his will he kept his covenant with them and directed his efforts to effecting a reconciliation for them with the senate and with the people. He did not himself propose the matter, lest some suspicion of what had really taken place should arise, but he set out as if to make war on them, while Quintus urged, as if it were his own idea, that amnesty and restoration be granted them. He did not secure this, however, until the senate had communicated it to

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

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1 This refers to the latter half of chapter 42, where Cæsar binds his soldiers by oath never to fight against any of their former comrades.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) the supposedly ignorant Cæsar and he had unwillingly agreed to it, compelled, as he alleged, by the soldiers.

—53— While this was being done Decimus at first set forth in the intention of making war upon the pair, and associated with him Lucius Plancus, since the latter had been appointed in advance as his colleague for the following year. Learning, however, of his own condemnation and of their reconciliation he wished to lead a campaign against Cæsar, but was abandoned by Plancus who favored the cause of Lepidus and Antony. Then he decided to leave Gaul and hasten into Macedonia on land through Illyricum to Marcus Brutus, and sent ahead some of the soldiers while he was engaged in finishing some business he had in hand. But they embraced Cæsar's cause, and the rest were pursued by Lepidus and Antony and then were won over through the agency of others. So, being deserted, he was seized by a personal foe. When he was about to be executed he complained and lamented so loudly that one Helvius Blasio, who was kindly disposed to him from association on campaigns, in his sight voluntarily slew himself first.

—54— So Decimus afterward died also. Antony and Lepidus left lieutenants in Gaul and themselves proceeded to join Cæsar in Italy, taking with them the larger and the better part of their armies. They did not trust him very far and wished not to owe him any favor, but to seem to have obtained amnesty and restoration on their own merits and by their own strength, and not through him. They also hoped to become masters of

whatever they desired, of Cæsar and the rest in the City, by the size of their armies. With such a feeling they marched through the country, according it friendly treatment. Still, it was damaged by their numbers and audacity no less than if there had been a war. They were met near Bononia by Cæsar with many soldiers: he was exceedingly well prepared to defend himself against them, if they should offer any violence. Yet at this time he found no need of arms to oppose them. They really hated one another bitterly, but because they had just about equal forces and desired one another's assistance to take vengeance first on the rest of their enemies, they entered upon a simulated agreement. They came together to confer, not alone but bringing an equal number of soldiers, on a little island in the river that flows past Bononia, with the understanding that no one else should be present on either side. First they withdrew to a distance from the various followers and searched one another carefully to make sure that no one had a dagger hidden under his arm. Then they considered at leisure different points and in general made a solemn compact for securing sovereignty and overthrowing enemies. But to prevent its appearing that they were headed straight toward an oligarchy and so envy and opposition arise on the part of the people at large, the three were to be chosen in common as a kind of commissioners and correctors for the administration and settlement of affairs. This office was not to be perpetual, but for five years, under the general proviso that they

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—55—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) should manage all questions, whether they made any communication about them to the people and the senate or not, and give the offices and other honors to whomsoever they pleased. The private arrangement, however, in order that they should not be thought to be appropriating the entire sovereignty, was that both Libyas, Sardinia, and Sicily should be given to Cæsar, all of Spain and Gallia Narbonensis to Lepidus, and the rest of Gaul south and north of the Alps to Antony to rule. The former was called Gallia Togata, as I have said, because it seemed to be more peaceful than the other divisions, and because the dwellers there already employed Roman citizen-garb: the other was termed Gallia Comata because the Gauls there mostly let their hair grow long, and were in this way distin-
—56— guished from the others. So they made these allotments, for the purpose of securing the strongest provinces themselves and giving others the impression that they were not striving for the whole. A further agreement was that they should cause assassinations of their enemies, that Lepidus after being appointed consul in Decimus's stead should keep guard over Rome and the remainder of Italy, and that the others should make an expedition against Brutus and Cassius. They also pledged themselves to this course by oath. After this, in order to let the soldiers hear and be witnesses of the terms they had made, they called them together and made known to them in advance all that it was proper and safe to tell them. Meanwhile the soldiers of Antony, of course at the latter's direction, committed to

Cæsar's charge the daughter of Fulvia (Antony's wife), whom she had by Clodius,— and this in spite of Cæsar's being already betrothed to another. He, however, did not refuse her; for he did not think this intermarriage would hinder him at all in the designs which he had against Antony. Among other points for his reflection was his knowledge that his father Cæsar had not failed to carry out all of his plans against Pompey, in spite of the relationship between the two. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
47

The following is contained in the Forty-seventh of Dio's Rome:

How Cæsar, Antony, and Lepidus came to Rome and instituted a reign of slaughter (chapters 1–19).

About Brutus and Cassius and what they did before the battle of Philippi (chapters 20–36).

How Brutus and Cassius were defeated by Cæsar and perished (chapters 37–49).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Gaius Vibius Pansa and Aulus Hirtius, together with one additional year, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated:

M. Æmilius M. F. Lepidus cos. (II), L. Munatius L. F. Plancus. (B. C. 42 = a. u. 712.)

After forming these compacts and taking mutual —1— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)
oaths they hastened to Rome under the assumption that they were all going to rule on equal terms, but each one had the intention of getting the entire power himself. Yet they had learned in advance very clearly before this, but most plainly at this time, what would be the future. In the case of Lepidus a serpent coiled about a centurion's sword and a wolf that entered his camp and his tent while he was eating dinner and knocked down the table indicated at once power and disappointment as a result of power: in that of Antony milk flowing about the ramparts and a kind of chant echoing about at night signified gladness of heart and destruction succeeding it. These portents befell them before they entered Italy. In Cæsar's case at the very time after the covenant had been made an eagle settled upon his tent and killed two crows that attacked it and tried to pluck out its feathers,— a sign which granted him victory over his two rivals.

So they came to Rome, first Cæsar, then the others, —2—
each one separately, with all their soldiers, and immediately through the tribunes enacted such laws as pleased them. The orders they gave and force that they used thus acquired the name of law and furthermore brought them supplications; for they required to be besought earnestly when they were to pass any measures. Consequently sacrifices were voted for

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) them as if for good fortune and the people changed their attire as if they had secured prosperity, although they were considerably terrified by the transactions and still more by omens. For the standards of the army guarding the city were covered with spiders, and weapons were seen reaching up from earth to heaven while a great din resounded from them, and in the shrines of Æsculapius bees gathered in numbers on the roof and crowds of vultures settled on the temple
—3— of the Genius Populi and on that of Concord. And while these conditions still remained practically unchanged, those murders by proscription which Sulla had once caused were put into effect and the whole city was filled with corpses. Many were killed in their houses, many in the streets, and scattered about in the fora and near the temples: the heads of such were once more attached to the rostra and their trunks flung out to be devoured by the dogs and birds or cast into the river. Everything that had been done before in the days of Sulla found a counterpart at this time, except that only two white tablets were posted, one for the senators and one for the rest. The reason for this I have not been able to learn from any one else nor to find out myself. The cause which one might have imagined, that fewer were put to death, is least of all true: for many more names were listed, because there were more leaders concerned. In this respect, then, the case differed from the murders that had earlier taken place: but that the names of those prominent were not posted with the rabble, but separately, appeared very

nonsensical to the men who were to be murdered in the same way. Besides this no few other very unpleasant conditions fell to their lot, although the former régime, one would have said, had left nothing to be surpassed. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

But in Sulla's time those guilty of such murderous measures had some excuse in their very hardihood: they were trying the method for the first time, and not with set intentions; hence in most cases they behaved less maliciously, since they were acting not according to definite plans but as chance dictated. And the victims, succumbing to sudden and unheard of catastrophes, found some alleviation in the unexpectedness of their experience. At this time, on the other hand, they were executing in person or beholding or at least understanding thoroughly by fresh descriptions merely deeds that had been dared before; in the intervals, expecting a recurrence of similar acts, some were inventing various new methods to employ, and others were becoming afflicted by new fears that they too should suffer. The perpetrators resorted to most unusual devices in their emulation of the outrages of yore and their consequent eagerness to add, through the resources of art, novel features to their attempts. The others reflected on all that they might suffer and hence even before their bodies were harmed their spirits were thoroughly on the rack, as if they were already undergoing the trial. Another reason for their faring worse on this occasion than before was that previously only Sulla's own enemies and the foes of the leaders associated with him were destroyed: among his friends —4—

—5—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) and the people in general no one perished at his bidding; so that except the very wealthy,— and these can never be at peace with the stronger element at such a time,— the remainder took courage. In this second series of assassinations, however, not only the men's enemies or the rich were being killed, but also their best friends and quite without looking for it. On the whole it may be said that almost nobody had incurred the enmity of those men from any private cause that should account for his being slain by them. Politics and compromises regarding posts of authority had created both their friendships and their violent hatreds. All those that had aided or assisted one of the group in any way the others held in the light of an enemy. So it came about that the same persons had become friends to some one of them, and enemies to the entire body, so that while each was privately quelling his antagonists, they destroyed the dearest friends of all in general. In the course of their joint negotiations[1] they made a kind of account of who was on their side and who was opposed, and no one was allowed to take vengeance on one of his own enemies who was a friend of another without giving up some friend in his turn: and because of their anger over what was past and their suspicion of the future they cared nothing about the preservation of an associate in comparison with ven-

1 *πραγμάτων* here is somewhat uncertain and might give the sense "as a result of the troubles in which they had been involved, one with another." Sturz and Wagner appear to have viewed it in that light: Boissée and friends consulted by the translator choose the meaning found in the text above.

geance on an adversary, and so gave them up without much protest. Thus they offered one another staunch friends for bitter enemies and implacable foes for close comrades; and sometimes they exchanged even numbers, at others several for one or fewer for more, altogether carrying on the transactions as if at a market, and overbidding one another as at an auction room. If some one was found just equivalent to another and the two were ranked alike, the exchange was a simple one; but all whose value was raised by some excellence or esteem or relationship could be despatched only in return for several. As there had been civil wars, lasting a long time and embracing many events, not a few men during the turmoil had come into collision with their nearest relatives. Indeed, Lucius Cæsar, Antony's uncle, had become his enemy, and Lepidus's brother, Lucius Paulus, hostile to him. The lives of these were saved, but many of the rest were slaughtered even in the houses of their very friends and relatives, from whom they especially expected protection and honor. And in order that no person should feel less inclined to kill any one out of fear of being deprived of the rewards (remembering that in the time of Sulla Marcus Cato, who was quæstor, had demanded of some of the murderers all they had received for their work), they proclaimed that the name of no proscribed person should be registered in the public records. On this account they slew ordinary citizens more readily and made away with the prosperous, even though they had no dislike for a single one of them.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) —6—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) For since they stood in need of vast sums of money and had no other source from which to satisfy the desire of their soldiers, they affected a kind of common enmity against the rich. Among the other transgressions they committed in the line of this policy was to declare a mere child of age, so that they might kill him as already exercising the privileges of a man.

—7— Most of this was done by Lepidus and Antony. They had been honored by the former Cæsar for a very long time and as they had been in office and holding governorships most of the period they had many enemies. It appeared as if Cæsar had a part in the business merely because of his sharing the authority, for he himself was not at all anxious to kill any large number. He was not naturally cruel and had been brought up in his father's ways. Moreover, as he was young and had just entered the political arena, there was no inevitable necessity for his bitterly hating many persons, and he wished to have people's affection. This is indicated by the fact that from the time he broke off his joint rulership with his colleagues and held the power alone he did nothing of the sort. And at this time he not only refrained from destroying many but preserved a large number. Those also who betrayed their masters or friends he treated most harshly and those who helped anybody most leniently. An instance of it occurs in the case of Tanusia, a woman of note. She concealed her husband Titus Vinius, who was proscribed, at first in a chest at the house of a freedman named Philopœmen[1] and so made it appear that he had been killed.

[1] The name of this freedman as given by Appian (Civil Wars, IV, 44) is Philemon; but Suetonius (Life of Augustus, chapter 27) agrees with Dio in writing Philopœmen.

Later she waited for a national festival, which a relative of hers was to direct, and through the influence of his sister Octavia brought it about that Cæsar alone of the three entered the theatre. Then she sprang up and informed him of the deception, of which he was still ignorant, brought in the very chest and led from it her husband. Cæsar, astonished, released all of them (death being the penalty also for such as concealed any one) and enrolled Philopœmen among the knights. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—8— He, then, saved the lives of as many as he could. Lepidus allowed his brother Paulus to escape to Miletus and toward others was not inexorable. But Antony killed savagely and relentlessly not only those whose names had been posted, but likewise those who had attempted to assist any of them. He had their heads in view when he happened to be eating and sated himself to the fullest extent on this most unholy and pitiable sight. Fulvia also put to death many herself both by reason of enmity and on account of their money, and some with whom her husband was not acquainted. When he saw the head of one man, he exclaimed: "I didn't know about him!" Cicero's head also being brought to them (he had been overtaken and slain while trying to flee), Antony uttered many bitter reproaches against him and then ordered it to be exposed on the rostra more prominently than the rest, in order that he might be seen in the place from which he used to be heard inveighing against him,— together with his right hand, just as it had been cut off. Before it was taken away Fulvia took it in her hands and after

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) abusing it spitefully and spitting upon it, set it on her knees, opened the mouth, and pulled out the tongue, which she pierced with the brooches that she used for her hair, at the same time uttering many brutal jests. Yet even this pair saved some persons from whom they got more money than they could expect to obtain by their death. But in order that the places for their names on the tablets might not be empty, they inscribed others in their stead. Except that Antony did release his uncle at the earnest entreaty of his mother Julia he performed no other praiseworthy act.

—9— For these causes the murders had great variety of detail, and the rescues that fell to the lot of some were of many kinds. Numbers were ruined by their most intimate friends, and numbers were saved by their most inveterate foes. Some slew themselves and others were given freedom by the very pursuers, who approached as if to murder them. Some who betrayed masters or friends were punished and others were honored for this very reason: of those who helped others to survive some paid the penalty and others received rewards. Since there was not one man but three, who were acting in all cases each according to his own desire and for his private advantage, and since the same persons were not enemies or friends of the whole group, since, also, two of them might be anxious for some one to be saved whom the third wished to destroy, or for some one to perish whom the third wished to survive, many complicated situations resulted, according as they felt good-will or hatred to-

ward any one. I, accordingly, shall omit an accurate and detailed description of all the events,— it would be a vast undertaking and would not add much to the history,— but shall relate what I deem to be most worthy of remembrance. Here is one. —10— B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

A slave had hidden his master in a cave, and then, when even so through another's information he was likely to perish, this slave changed clothes with him and wearing his master's apparel confronted the pursuers as the man himself and was slain. So they were turned aside, thinking they had despatched the desired man, but he when they had departed made his escape to some other place.

Or a second. Another slave had likewise changed his entire accoutrement with his master, and entered a covered litter which he made the other help to carry. When they were overtaken the one in the litter was killed without being even looked at, and the master, as a baggage-carrier, was saved. Those services were rendered by those servants to their benefactors in return for some kindness previously received.

There was also a branded runaway who so far from betraying the man who had branded him very willingly preserved him. He was detected in carrying him away and was being pursued, when he killed somebody who met him by chance and gave the latter's clothes to his master. Having then placed him upon a pyre he himself took his master's clothing and ring and going to meet the pursuers pretended that he had killed the man while fleeing. Because of his spoils and the marks

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) of the branding he was believed and both saved the person in question and was himself honored.

The names connected with the above anecdotes have not been preserved. But in the case of Hosidius Geta his son arranged a funeral for him as though already dead and preserved him in that way. Quintus Cicero, the brother of Marcus, was secretly led away by his child and saved, so far as his rescuer's responsibility went. The boy concealed his father so well that he could not be discovered and when tormented for it by all kinds of torture did not utter a syllable. His father, learning what was being done, was filled at once with admiration and pity for the boy, and therefore came voluntarily to view and surrendered himself to the slayers.

—11— This gives an idea of the greatness of the manifest achievements of virtue and piety at the time. It was Popillius Lænas who killed Marcus Cicero, in spite of the latter's having done him favors as his advocate; and in order that he might depend not wholly on hearsay but also on the sense of sight to establish himself as the murderer of the orator, he set up an image of himself wearing a crown beside his victim's head, with an inscription that gave his name and the service rendered. By this act he pleased Antony so much that he secured more than the price offered. Marcus Terentius Varro was a man who had given no offence, but as his appellation was identical with that of one of the proscribed, except for one name, he was afraid that this might lead him to suffer such a fate as did Cinna.

Therefore he issued a statement making known this fact; he was tribune at the time. For this he became the subject of much idle amusement and laughter. The uncertainty of life, however, was evidenced by the very fact that Lucius Philuscius, who had previously been proscribed by Sulla and had escaped, had his name now inscribed again on the tablet and perished, whereas Marcus Valerius Messala, condemned to death by Antony, not only continued to live in safety but was later appointed consul in place of Antony himself. Thus many survive from inextricable difficulties and no fewer are ruined through a spirit of confidence. Hence a man ought not to be alarmed to the point of hopelessness by the calamities of the moment, nor to be elated to heedlessness by temporary exultation, but by placing his hope of the future half-way between both to make reliable calculations for either event. This is the way it befell at that time: very many of those not proscribed were involved in the downfall of others on account of spite or money, and very many whose names were proclaimed not only survived but returned to their homes again, and some of them even held offices. They had a refuge, of course, with Brutus and Cassius and Sextus, and the majority directed their flight toward the last mentioned. He had been chosen formerly to command the fleet and had held sway for some time on the sea, so that he had surrounded himself with a force of his own, though he was afterward deprived of his office by Cæsar. He had occupied Sicily, and then, when the order of proscription was passed against him, too, and a host of assassinations took place, he aided

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

—12—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) greatly those who were in like condition. Anchoring near the coast of Italy he sent word to Rome and to the other cities offering among other things to those who saved anybody double the reward advertised for murdering the same and promising to the men themselves a reception and assistance and money and honors.

—13— Therefore great numbers came to him. I have not even now recorded the precise total of those who were proscribed or slaughtered or who escaped, because many names originally inscribed on the tablets were erased and many were later inscribed in their place, and of these not a few were saved while many outside of these succumbed. It was not even allowed anybody to mourn for the victims, but several perished from this cause also. And finally, when the calamities broke through all the pretence they could assume and no one even of the most stout-hearted could any longer wear an air of indifference to them, but in all their work and conversation their countenances were overcast and they were not intending to celebrate the usual festival at the beginning of the year, they were ordered by a public notice to appear in good spirits, on pain of death if they should refuse to obey. So they were forced to rejoice over the common evils as over blessings. Yet why need I have mentioned it, when they voted to those men (the triumvirs, I mean) civic crowns and other distinctions as to benefactors and saviors of the State? They did not think of being held to blame because they were killing a few, but wished to receive additional praise for not putting more out of the way. And to the populace they once openly stated that they had emu-

lated neither the cruelty of Marius and Sulla so as to incur hatred, nor the mildness of Cæsar so as to be despised and as a result become objects of a conspiracy. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

Such were the conditions of the murders; but many other unusual proceedings took place in regard to the property of persons left alive. They actually announced, as if they were just and humane rulers, that they would give to the widows of the slain their dowries, to the male children a tenth, and to the female children a twentieth of the property of each one's father. This was not, however, granted save in a few cases: of the rest all the possessions without exception were ruthlessly plundered. In the first place they levied upon all the houses in the City and those in the rest of Italy a yearly rent, which was the entire amount from dwellings which people had let, and half from such as they occupied themselves, with reference to the value of the domicile. Again, from those who had lands they took away half of the proceeds. Besides, they had the soldiers get their support free from the cities in which they were wintering, and distributed them to various rural districts, pretending that they were sent to take charge of confiscated territory or that of persons who still opposed them. For this last class they had termed likewise enemies because they had not changed their attitude before the appointed day. So that the whole country outside the towns was also pillaged. The autocrats allowed the soldiers to do this to the end that, having their pay before the work, they might devote all their energy to their commanders' interests, and promised to give them cities and lands. And with this in view they further assigned to them persons to divide —14—

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) the land and settle them. The mass of the soldiers was made loyal by this course: of the more prominent they tempted some with the goods of those that had been despatched by lowering the price on certain articles and granting others to them free, and others they honored with the offices and priesthoods of the victims. The commanders, to make sure that they themselves should get the finest both of lands and buildings and give their followers what they pleased, gave notice that no one else should frequent the auction room unless he wanted to buy something: whoever did so should die. And they handled bona fide purchasers in such a way that the latter discovered nothing and paid the very highest price for what they wanted, and consequently had no desire to buy again.

—15— This was the course followed in regard to possessions. As to the offices and priesthoods of such as had been put to death they distributed them not in the fashion prescribed by law but however it suited them. Cæsar resigned the office of consul, giving up willingly that which he had so desired as to make war for it, and his colleague gave up his place, whereupon they appointed Publius Ventidius, though prætor, and one other; and to the former's prætorship they promoted one of the ædiles. Afterward they removed all the prætors (who held office five days longer than Ventidius) and sent them to be governors of the provinces, while they installed others in their places. Some laws were abolished and others introduced instead. And, in brief, they ordered everything else just as seemed good to them. They did not, to be sure, lay claim to titles which were offensive and had been therefore done

away with, but they managed matters according to their own wish and desire, so that Cæsar's sovereignty by comparison appeared all gold. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

In addition to transacting that year the business mentioned, they voted a temple to Serapis and Isis. When Marcus Lepidus and Lucius Plancus became consuls tablets were again exposed, not bringing death to any one any longer, but defrauding the living of their property. They were collecting funds because they were in need of more money, due to the fact that they owed large sums to large numbers of soldiers, were expending considerable on works undertaken by the latter, and thought they should lay out far more still on wars in prospect. The fact that those taxes which had been formerly abrogated were now again put in force or established on a new basis, and the institution of joint contributions, many of which kept being levied on the land and on the servants, displeased people moderately, it can not be denied. But to have those who were in the slightest degree still prosperous, not only of the senators or knights but even among the freedmen, and men and women alike, bulletined on the tablets and another tenth of their wealth confiscated disturbed all beyond measure. For it was only nominally that a tenth of his property was exacted from each one: in reality not so much as a tenth was left. They were not ordered to contribute a stated amount according to the value of their possessions, but they had the duty of estimating their own goods and then, being accused of not having made a fair estimate, they lost the rest besides. If any still escaped this somehow, yet they were brought into straits by the assessments, and as

—16— B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

—17—

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) they were terribly destitute of money they too were in a way deprived of everything. Moreover, the following device, distressing to hear but most distressing in practice, was put into operation. Whoever of them wished was allowed by abandoning his property afterward to make a requisition for one-third of it, which meant getting nothing and also having trouble. For when they were being openly and violently despoiled of two-thirds, how should they get back one-third, especially since goods were being sold for an infinitesimal price? In the first place, since many wares were being advertised for sale at once and the majority of men were without gold or silver, and the rest did not dare to buy because it would look as if they had something and they would place in jeopardy the remnant of their wealth, the prices were relaxed: in the second place, everything was sold to the soldiers far below its value. Hence no one of the private citizens saved anything worth mentioning. In addition to other drains they surrendered servants for the fleet, buying them if they had none, and the senators repaired the roads at their individual expense. Only those who wielded arms enjoyed superlative wealth. *They,* to be sure, were not satisfied with their pay, though it was in full, nor with their outside perquisites, though of vast extent, nor with the very large prizes bestowed for the murders, nor with the acquisition of lands, which was made almost without cost to them. But in addition some would ask for and receive all the property of the dying, and others still forced their way into the families of such as were old and childless. To such an extent were they filled with greed and shamelessness that one man asked

from Cæsar himself the property of Attia, Cæsar's mother, who had died at the time and had been honored by a public burial. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

—18— While these three men were behaving in this wise, they were also magnifying the former Cæsar to the greatest degree. As they were all aiming at sole supremacy and were all striving for it, they vindictively pursued the remainder of the assassins, apparently in the idea that they were preparing from afar immunity for themselves in what they were doing, and safety; and everything which tended to his honor they readily took up, in expectation of some day being themselves deemed worthy of similar distinctions: for this reason they glorified him by the decrees which had been passed, and by others which they now added to them. On the first day of the year they themselves took an oath and made others swear that they would consider binding all his acts; this action is still taken in the case of all officials who successively hold power, or again of those who lived in his era, and have not been dishonored. They also laid the foundation of a hero-shrine in the Forum, on the spot where he had been burned, and escorted a kind of image of him at the horse-races together with a second statue of Venus. In case news of a victory came from anywhere they assigned the honor of a thanksgiving to the victor by himself and to Cæsar, though dead, by himself. They compelled everybody to celebrate his birthday wearing laurel and in good spirits, passing a law that all others, who neglected it, were accursed before Jupiter and be-

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) fore him, while any senators or their sons should forfeit twenty-five myriads of denarii. Now it happened that the Ludi Apollinares fell on the same day, and they therefore voted that his natal feast should be held on the previous day,[1] because (they said) there was an oracle of the Sibyl forbidding a festival to be celebrated during that twenty-four hours to any god except —19— Apollo. Besides granting him these privileges they regarded the day on which he had been murdered (on which there was always a regular meeting of the senate) as a dies nefas. The room in which he had been murdered they closed immediately and later transformed it into a privy. They also built the Curia Julia, called after him, next to the so-named Comitium, as had been voted. Besides, they forbade any likeness of him, because he was in very truth a god, to be carried at the funerals of his relatives, which ancient custom was still being observed. And they enacted that no one who took refuge in his shrine to secure immunity should be banished or stripped of his goods,— a right given to no one of the gods even, save to such as had a place in the days of Romulus. Yet after men began to gather there the place had inviolability in name without its effects; for it was so fenced about that no one at all could any longer enter it.

[1] In B. C. 208 the Ludi Apollinares were set for July thirteenth, but by the year B. C. 190 they occupied three days, and in B. C. 42 the entire period of the sixth to the thirteenth of July was allotted to their celebration. Now Cæsar's birthday fell on July twelfth and the day before that, July eleventh, would have conflicted quite as much with the festival of Apollo. Hence this expression "the previous day" must mean July fifth. (See Fowler's Roman Festivals, p. 174.)

In addition to those gifts to Cæsar they allowed the vestal virgins to employ one lictor each, because one of them had been insulted, owing to not being recognized, while returning home from dinner toward evening. The offices in the City they assigned for a greater number of years in advance, thus at the same time giving honor through the expected offices to those fitted for them and retaining a grasp on affairs for a longer time by means of those who were to hold sway. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

When this had been accomplished, Lepidus remained there, as I have said, to take up the administration of the City and of the rest of Italy, and Cæsar and Antony started on their campaign. Brutus and Cassius had at first, after the compact made by them with Antony and the rest, gone into the Forum and discharged the activities of prætorship with the same diligence as before. But when some began to be displeased at the killing of Cæsar, they withdrew, pretending to be in haste to reach the governorships abroad to which they had been appointed. Cassius, who was prætor urbanus,[1] had not yet finished his duties in connection with the Ludi Apollinares. However, though absent he accomplished that task most brilliantly through the medium of his fellow-prætor Antony, and did not himself —20— B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

1 There seems to be an error here made either by Dio or by some scribe in the course of the ages. For, according to many reliable authorities (Plutarch, Life of Brutus, chapter 21; Appian, Civil Wars, Book Three, chapter 23; Cicero, Philippics, II, 13, 31, and X, 3, 7; id., Letters to Atticus, Book Fifteen, letters 11 and 12), it was Brutus and not Cassius who was prætor urbanus and had the games given in his absence. Therefore the true account, though not necessarily the true reading, would say that "*Brutus* was prætor urbanus," and (below) that he "lingered in Campania with *Cassius*."
See also Cobet, Mnesmosyne, VII, p. 22.

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710) sail away from Italy at once, but lingered with Brutus in Campania, to watch the course of events. And in their capacity as prætors they sent a certain number of letters to Rome to the people, until such time as Cæsar Octavianus began to aspire to public position and to win the affections of the populace. Then, in despair of the republic and fear of him, they set sail. The Athenians gave them a splendid reception; for though they were indeed honored by nearly everybody else for what they had done, the inhabitants of this city voted them bronze images beside that of Harmodius and that

—21— of Aristogeiton, as having emulated them. Meanwhile, learning that Cæsar was making progress they neglected the Cretans and Bithynians, to whom they were directing their course, for among them they saw no aid forthcoming worthy the name: but they turned to Syria and to Macedonia, which did not, to be sure, appertain to them in the least, because they were teeming with money and troops for the occasion. Cassius proceeded to the Syrian country, because its inhabitants were acquainted with him and friendly as a result of his campaign with Crassus, while Brutus united Greece and Macedonia. The inhabitants would have followed him anywhere because of the glory of his deeds and in the hope of similar achievements, and they were further influenced by the fact that he had acquired numerous soldiers, some survivors of the battle of Pharsalus, who were still at this time wandering about in that region, and others who either by reason of disease or because of want of discipline had been left behind from

the contingent that took the field with Dolabella. Money came to him, too, from Trebonius in Asia. So without the least effort, perhaps because it contained no force worth mentioning, he by this means gained the country of Greece. He reached Macedonia at the time that Gaius Antonius had just arrived and Quintus Hortensius, who had governed it previously, was about to lay down his office. However, he experienced no trouble. The departing official embraced his cause at once, and Antonius was weak, being hindered by Cæsar's supremacy in Rome from performing any of the duties belonging to his office. The neighboring territory of Illyricum was governed by Vatinius, who came thence to Dyrrachium and occupied it in advance. He was a political adversary of Brutus, but could not injure him at all, for his soldiers, who disliked him and furthermore despised him by reason of a disease, went over to the other side. Brutus, taking charge of these, led an expedition against Antonius, who was in Apollonia: the latter came out to meet him, whereupon Brutus won over his soldiers and confined him within the walls, whither he fled before him. After this Antonius was by betrayal taken alive, but no harm was done to him. Close upon this success the victor acquired all of Macedonia and Epirus, and then despatched a letter to the senate, stating what had been accomplished, and placing himself, the provinces, and the soldiers at its disposal. The senators, who by chance already felt suspicious of Cæsar, praised him strongly and bade him govern all that region. When, then, he had confirmed

B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

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B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) his leadership by the decree, he himself felt more encouraged and he found his subjects ready to support him unreservedly. For a time he communicated with Cæsar, when the latter appeared to be hostile to Antony, urging him to resist his enemy and be reconciled with him (Brutus), and he was making preparations to sail to Italy because the senate summoned him. After Cæsar, however, had matters thoroughly in hand in Rome, and proceeded openly to take vengeance on his father's slayers, Brutus remained where he was, deliberating how he should successfully ward off the other's attack when it occurred: and besides managing admirably the other districts as well as Macedonia, he calmed the minds of his legions when they had been

—23— thrown into a state of discontent by Antonius. For the latter, although his conqueror had not even deprived him of a prætor's perquisites, did not enjoy keeping quiet in safety and honor, but connived at a revolt among the soldiers of Brutus. Being discovered at this work before he had done any great harm, he was stripped of his prætor's insignia, and delivered to be guarded without confinement that he might not cause an uprising. Yet not even then did he remain quiet, but concocted more schemes of rebellion than ever, so that some of the soldiers came to blows with one another and others started for Apollonia after Antonius himself, in the intention of rescuing him. This, however, they were unable to do: Brutus had learned in advance from some intercepted letters what was to be done and by putting him into an enclosed chair got him

out of the way on the pretence that he was moving a sick man. The soldiers, not being able to find the object of their search, in fear of Brutus seized a point of high ground commanding the city. Brutus induced them to come to an understanding, and by executing a few of the most audacious and dismissing others from his service he set matters in such a light that the men arrested and killed those sent away, on the ground that they were most responsible for the sedition, and asked for the surrender of the quæstor and the lieutenants of Antonius. Brutus did not give up any of the latter, but put them aboard boats with the avowed intention of drowning them, and so conveyed them to safety. Fearing, however, that when they should hear the next news of more terrifying transactions in Rome they might change their attitude, he delivered Antonius to a certain Gaius Clodius to guard, and left him at Apollonia. Meanwhile Brutus himself took the largest and strongest part of the army and retired into upper Macedonia, whence he later sailed to Asia, to the end that he might remove his men as far as possible from Italy and support them on the subject territory there. Among other allies whom he won over at this time was Deiotarus, although he was of a great age and had refused assistance to Cassius. While he was delaying here a plot was formed against him by Gellius Poplicola, and Mark Antony sent some men to attempt to rescue his brother. Clodius, accordingly, as he could not guard his prisoner safely, killed him, either on his own responsibility, or according to instructions from Bru-

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

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B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

tus. For the story is that at first the latter made his safety of supreme importance, but later, learning that Decimus had perished, cared nothing more about it. Gellius was detected, but suffered no punishment. Brutus released him because he had always held him to be among his best friends and knew that his brother, Marcus Messala, was on very close terms with Cassius. The man had also attacked Cassius, but had suffered no evil in that case, either. The reason was that his mother Polla learned of the plot in advance, and being very fearful lest Cassius should be overtaken by his fate (for she was very fond of him) and lest her son should be detected, voluntarily informed Cassius of the plot herself beforehand, and received the preservation of her son as a reward. His easy escapes, however, did not improve him at all, and he deserted his

—25— benefactors to join Cæsar and Antony. As soon as Brutus learned of the attempt of Mark Antony and of the killing of his brother, he feared that some other insurrection might take place in Macedonia during his absence, and immediately hastened to Europe. On the way he took charge of the territory which had belonged to Sadalus (who died childless and left it to the Romans), and invaded the country of the Bessi, to see if he could at the same time recompense them for the trouble they were causing and surround himself with the name and reputation of imperator, which would enable him to fight more easily against Cæsar and Antony. Both projects he accomplished, being chiefly aided by Rhascuporis, a certain prince. After going

thence into Macedonia and making himself master of everything there, he withdrew again into Asia. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

Brutus besides doing this had stamped upon the coins which were being minted his own likeness and a helmet and two daggers, indicating by this and by the inscription that in company with Cassius he had liberated his country. At that same period Cassius had crossed over to Trebonius in Asia ahead of Dolabella, and after securing money from him and a number of the cavalry whom Dolabella had sent before him into Syria attached to his cause many others of the Asiatics and Cilicians. As a result he brought Tarcondimotus[1] and the people of Tarsus into the alliance, though they were reluctant. For the Tarsians were so devoted to the former Cæsar (and out of regard for him to the second also) that they had changed the name of their city to Juliopolis after him. This done, Cassius went to Syria, and without striking a blow assumed entire direction of the nations and the legions. The situation in Syria at that time was this. Cæcilius Bassus, a knight, who had made the campaign with Pompey and in the retreat had arrived at Tyre, continued to spend his time there, incognito, On 'Change. Now Sextus was governing the Syrians, for Cæsar, since he was quæstor and also a relative of his, had entrusted to his care all Roman interests in that quarter on the occasion of his own march from Egypt against Pharnaces. So

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B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 710)

1 That this is the right form of the name is proved by the evidence of coins, etc. In Cæsar's Civil War, Book Three, chapter 4, the same person is meant when it is said that *Tarcondarius Castor* and Dorylaus furnished Pompey with soldiers.

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 710) Bassus at first remained quiet, satisfied to be allowed to live: when, however, some similar persons had associated themselves with him and he had attracted to his enterprise various soldiers of Sextus who at various times came there to garrison the city, and likewise many alarming reports kept coming in from Africa about Cæsar, he was no longer pleased with existing circumstances but raised a rebellion, his aim being either to help the followers of Scipio and Cato and the Pompeians or to clothe himself in some authority. Sextus discovered him before he had finished his preparations, but he explained that he was collecting this body as an auxiliary force for Mithridates of Pergamum against Bosporus; his story was believed, and he was released. So after this he forged an epistle, which he pretended had been sent to him by Scipio, in which he announced that Cæsar had been defeated and had perished in Africa and stated that the governorship of Syria had been assigned to him. His next step was to use the forces he had in readiness for occupying Tyre and from there he approached the camp of Sextus. In the attack on the latter which followed Bassus was defeated and wounded. Consequently, after this experience, he no longer employed violent tactics, but sent messages to his opponent's soldiers, and in some way or other so prevailed over some of them that they took upon themselves the murder of
—27— Sextus. With the latter out of the way the usurper gained possession of all his army except some few. The soldiers wintering in Apamea withdrew before he

reached them toward Cilicia, and were pursued but were not won over. Bassus returned to Syria, where he was named commander, and he conquered Apamea so as to have it as a base for warfare. He enlisted not only the free but the slave fighting population, gathered money, and accumulated arms. While he was thus engaged one Gaius Antistius invested the position he was holding, and the two had a nearly even struggle in which neither party succeeded in gaining any great advantage. Thereupon they parted, without any definite truce, to await the bringing up of allies. The troops of Antistius were increased by such persons in the vicinity as favored Cæsar and soldiers that had been sent by him from Rome, those of Bassus by Alchaudonius the Arabian. The latter was the leader who had formerly made an arrangement with Lucullus, as I mentioned,[1] and later joined with the Parthian against Crassus. On this occasion he was summoned by both sides, but entered the space between the city and the camps and before making any answer auctioned off his services; and as Bassus offered more money he assisted him, and in the battle wrought great havoc with his arrows. The Parthians themselves, too, came at the invitation of Bassus, but on account of the winter failed to remain with him for any considerable time, and hence did not accomplish anything of importance. This commander, then, had his own way for a time, but was later again held in check by Marcius Crispus[2] and Lucius Staius Murcus.

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1 See Book Thirty-six, chapter 2 (end).

2 *Q. Marcius Crispus.* (The MSS. give the form *Marcus*, but the identity of this commander is made certain by Cicero, Philippics, XI, 12, 30, and several other passages.)

—28— Things were in this condition among them when
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(*a. u.* 710) Cassius came on the scene and at once conciliated all the cities through the reputation of what he had done in his quæstorship and his other fame, and attached the legions of Bassus and of the rest without additional labor. While he was encamped in one spot with all of them a great downpour from the sky suddenly occurred, during which wild swine rushed into the camp through all the gates at once, overturning and mixing up everything there. Some, accordingly, inferred from this that his power was only temporary and that disaster was subsequently coming. Having secured possession of Syria he set out into Judea on learning that the followers of Cæsar left behind in Egypt were approaching. Without effort he enlisted both them and the Jews in his undertaking. Next he sent away without harming in the least Bassus and Crispus and such others as did not care to share the campaign with him; for Staius he preserved the rank with which he had come there and besides entrusted to him the fleet.

Thus did Cassius in brief time become strong: and he sent a despatch to Cæsar about reconciliation and to the senate about the situation, couched in similar language to that of Brutus. Therefore the senate confirmed his governorship of Syria and voted for the war with Dola-
—29— bella. The latter had been appointed to govern Syria and had started out while consul, but he proceeded only slowly through Macedonia and Thrace into the province of Asia and delayed there also. While he was still there he received news of the decree, and did not go

forward into Syria but remained where he was, treating Trebonius in such a way as to make him believe most strongly that Dolabella was his friend. Trebonius had his free permission to take food for his soldiers and to live on intimate terms with him. When his dupe became in this way imbued with confidence and ceased to be on his guard, Dolabella by night suddenly seized Smyrna, where the other was, slew him, and hurled his head at Cæsar's image, and thereafter occupied all of Asia. When the Romans at home heard of this they declared war against him; for as yet Cæsar had neither conquered Antony nor obtained a hold upon affairs in the City. The citizens also gave notice to Dolabella's followers of a definite day before which they must leave off friendship with him, in order to avoid being regarded also in the light of enemies. And they instructed the consuls to carry on opposition to him and the entire war as soon as they should have brought their temporary business to a successful conclusion (not knowing yet that Cassius held Syria). But in order that he should not gain still greater power in the interval they gave the governors of the neighboring provinces charge of the matter. Later they learned the news about Cassius, and before anything whatever had been done by his opponents at home they passed the vote that I cited. Dolabella, accordingly, after becoming in this way master of Asia came into Cilicia while Cassius was in Palestine, took over the people of Tarsus with their consent, conquered a few of Cassius's guards who were at Ægeæ, and invaded Syria.

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B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 710) From Antioch he was repulsed by the contingent guarding the place, but gained Laodicea without a struggle on account of the friendship which its inhabitants felt for the former Cæsar. Upon this he spent some days in acquiring new strength,— the fleet among other reinforcements came to him speedily from Asia,— and crossed over into Aradus with the object of getting both money and ships from the people also. There he was intercepted with but few followers and ran into danger. He had escaped from this when he encountered Cassius marching toward him, and gave battle, which resulted in his own defeat. He was then shut up and besieged in Laodicea, where he was entirely cut off from the land, to be sure (Cassius being assisted by some Parthians among others), but retained some power through the Asiatic ships and the Egyptian ones which Cleopatra had sent him, and furthermore by means of the money which came to him from her. So he carried on marauding expeditions until Staius got together a fleet, and sailing into the harbor of Laodicea vanquished the ships that moved out to meet him, and barred Dolabella from the sea also. Then, prevented on both sides from bringing up supplies, he was led by lack of necessaries to make a sortie. However, he was quickly hurled back within the fortress, and seeing that it was being betrayed he feared that he might be taken alive, and so despatched himself. His example was followed by Marcus Octavius, his lieutenant. These were deemed worthy of burial by Cassius, although they had cast out Trebonius unburied. The

men who had participated in the campaign with them and survived obtained both safety and amnesty, in spite of having been regarded as enemies by the Romans at home. Nor yet did the Laodiceans suffer any harm beyond being obliged to contribute money. But for that matter no one else, though many subsequently plotted against Cassius, was chastised. B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 710)

While this was going on the people of Tarsus had attempted to keep from the passage through the Taurus Tillius Cimber, an assassin of Cæsar who was then governing Bithynia and was hurrying forward to help Cassius. Out of fear, however, they abandoned the spot and at the time made a truce with him, because they thought him strong, but afterward they perceived the small number of his soldiers and neither took him into their city nor furnished him provisions. He constructed a kind of fort over against them and set out for Syria, believing it to be of more importance to aid Cassius than himself to destroy their city. They then made an attack upon this and got possession of it, after which they started for Adana, a place on their borders always at variance with them, giving as an excuse that it was following the cause of Cassius. The latter, when he heard of it, first, while Dolabella was still alive sent Lucius Rufus against them, but later came himself, to find that they had already capitulated to Rufus without a struggle. Upon them he inflicted no severe penalty save to take away all their money, private and public. As a result, the people of Tarsus received praise from the triumvirate, who now held sway in Rome, and —31— B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) were inspired with hope of obtaining some return for their losses. Cleopatra also, on account of the detachment she had sent to Dolabella, was granted the right to have her son called King of Egypt. This son, whom she named Ptolemy, she also pretended was sprung from Cæsar, and she was therefore wont to address him as Cæsarion.

—32— Cassius when he had settled matters in Syria and in Cilicia came to meet Brutus in Asia. For when they learned of the union of the triumvirs and what the latter were doing against them, they came together there and made common cause more than ever. As they had a like responsibility for the war and looked forward to a like danger and did not even now recede from their position regarding the freedom of the people, and as they were eager also to overthrow their opponents, three in number and the authors of such deeds, they could plan and accomplish everything in common with much greater zest. To be brief, they resolved to enter Macedonia and to hinder the others from crossing over there, or else to cross into Italy before the others started. Since the men were said to be still settling affairs in Rome and it was thought likely that they should have their hands full with Sextus, lying in wait near by, they did not carry out their plans immediately. Instead, they went about themselves and sent others in various directions, winning over such as were not yet in accord with them, and gathering money and soldiers.

—33— In this way nearly all the rest, even those who had before paid no attention to them, at once made agree-

ments with them; but Ariobarzanes, the Rhodians, and the Lycians, though they did not oppose them, were still unwilling to form an alliance with them. These were therefore suspected by Brutus and Cassius of favoring their antagonists, since they had been well treated by the former Cæsar, and fear was entertained by the two leaders lest when they themselves departed this group should cause some turmoil and lead the rest to revolt. Hence they determined to turn first in the direction of these doubtful parties, hoping that since they were far stronger in point of weapons and were willing to bestow favors ungrudgingly they might soon either persuade or force them to join. The Rhodians, who had so great an opinion of their seamanship that they anticipated Cassius by sailing to the mainland and displayed to his army the fetters they were bringing with the idea that they were going to capture many alive, were yet conquered by him, first in a naval battle near Myndus and later close to Rhodes itself. The commanding officer was Staius, who overcame their skill by the number and size of his ships. Thereupon Cassius himself crossed over to their island, where he met with no resistance, possessing, as he did, their goodwill because of the stay he had made there in the interests of his education. And he did them no hurt except to appropriate their ships and money and holy and sacred vessels,— all save the chariot of the Sun. Afterward he arrested and killed Ariobarzanes. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

Brutus overcame in battle the public army of the Lycians which confronted him near the borders, and —34—

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(*a. u.* 712)

entering the citadel at the same time as the fugitives captured it at a single stroke; the majority of the cities he brought to his side, but Xanthus he shut up in a state of siege. Suddenly the inhabitants made a sortie, and themselves rushed in with them, and once inside arrows and javelins at once rendered his position very dangerous. He would, indeed, have perished utterly, had not his soldiers pushed their way through the very fire and unexpectedly attacked the assailants, who were light-armed. These they hurled back within the walls and themselves rushed in with them, and once inside cast some of the fire on several houses, terrifying those who saw what was being done, and giving those at a distance the impression that they had simply captured everything. The result was that the natives of their own accord helped set fire to the rest, and most of them slew one another. Next Brutus came to Patara and invited the people to conclude friendship; but they would not obey, for the slaves and the poorer portion of the free population, who had received in advance for their services the former freedom, the latter remission of debts, prevented any compact being made. So at first he sent them the captive Xanthians, to whom many of them were related by marriage, in the hope that through these he might bring them to terms. When they yielded none the more, in spite of his giving to each man gratuitously his own kin, he erected a kind of salesroom in a safe spot under the very wall, where he led each one of the prominent men past and auctioned him off, to see if by this means at least he

could gain the Patareans. They were as little inclined as ever to make concessions, whereupon he sold a few and let the rest go. When those within saw this, they no longer were stubborn, but forthwith attached themselves to his cause, regarding him as an upright man; and they were punished only in a pecuniary way. The people of Myra took the same action when after capturing their general at the harbor he then released him. Similarly in a short time he secured control of the rest. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

When both had effected this they came again into Asia; and all the suspicious facts they had heard from slanderous talk which will arise under such conditions they brought up in common, one case at a time, and, after they were settled, hastened into Macedonia. They had been anticipated by Gaius Norbanus and Decidius Saxa, who had crossed over into Ionium before Staius reached there, had occupied the whole country as far as Pangæum, and had encamped near Philippi. This city is located close beside Mount Pangæum and close beside Symbolon. Symbolon is a name they give the place for the reason that the mountain mentioned corresponds (*symballei*) to another that rises in the interior; and it is between Neapolis and Philippi. The former was near the sea, across from Thasos, while the latter has been built within the mountains on the plain. Saxa and Norbanus happened to have occupied the shortest path across, therefore Brutus and Cassius did not even try to get through that way, but went around by a longer path,— the so-called Crenides.[1] Here, too, they encountered a guard, but overpowered it, got inside the —35—

[1] I. e., "The Springs,"— a primitive name for Philippi itself.

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) mountains, approached the city along the high ground, and there encamped each one apart,— if we are to follow the story. As a matter of fact they bivouacked in one spot. In order that the soldiers might preserve better discipline and be easier to manage, the camp was made up of two separate divisions: but as all of it, including the intervening space, was surrounded by a ditch and a rampart, the entire circuit belonged to —36— both, and from it they derived safety in common. They were far superior in numbers to their adversaries then present and by that means got possession of Symbolon, having first ejected the inhabitants. In this way they were able to bring provisions from the sea, over a shorter stretch of country, and had only to make a descent from the plain to get them. For Norbanus and Saxa did not venture to offer them battle with their entire force, though they did send out horsemen to make sorties, wherever opportunity offered. Accomplishing nothing, however, they were rather careful to keep their camp well guarded than to expose it to danger, and sent in haste for Cæsar and Antony. These leaders on learning that Cassius and Brutus were for some time busy with the Rhodians and the Lycians had thought that their adversaries would have more fighting on their hands there, and so instead of hastening had sent Saxa and Norbanus forward into Macedonia. On finding out that their representatives were caught they bestowed praise on the Lycians and Rhodians, promising to make them a present of money, and they themselves at once set out from the city. Both, how-

ever, encountered a delay of some time,— Antony near Brundusium, because blocked by Staius, and Cæsar near Rhegium, having first turned aside to meet Sextus, who held Sicily and was making an attempt on Italy. When it seemed to them to be impossible to dislodge him, and the case of Cassius and Brutus appeared to be more urgent, they left a small part of their army to garrison Italy and with the major portion safely crossed the Ionian sea. Cæsar fell sick and was left behind at Dyrrachium, while Antony marched for Philippi. For a time he was a source of some strength to his soldiers, but after laying an ambush for some of the opposite party that were gathering grain and failing in his attempt he was no longer of good courage himself. Cæsar heard of it and feared either possible outcome, that his colleague should be defeated in a separate attack or again that he should conquer: in the former event he felt that Brutus and Cassius would attain power, and in the latter that Antony would have it all himself; therefore he made haste though still unwell. At this action the followers of Antony also took courage. And since it did not seem safe for them to refuse to encamp together, they brought the three divisions together to one spot and into one stronghold. While the opposing forces were facing each other sallies and excursions took place on both sides, as chance dictated. For some time, however, no ordered battle was joined, although Cæsar and Antony were exceedingly anxious to bring on a conflict. Their forces were stronger than those of their adversaries, but they

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B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) were not so abundantly supplied with provisions, because their fleet was away fighting Sextus and they were therefore not masters of the sea.

—38— Hence these men for the reasons specified and because of Sextus, who held Sicily and was making an attempt on Italy, were excited by the fear that while they delayed he might capture Italy and come into Macedonia. Cassius and Brutus had no particular aversion to a battle,— they had the advantage in the number of soldiers, though the latter were deficient in strength,— but some reflection on their own condition and that of their opponents showed them that allies were being added to their own numbers every day and that they had abundant food by the help of the ships; consequently they put off action in the hope of gaining their ends without danger and loss of men. Because they were lovers of the people in no pretended sense and were contending with citizens, they consulted the interests of the latter no less than those of their own associates, and desired to afford preservation and liberty to both alike. For some time, therefore, they waited, not wishing to provoke a contest with them. The troops, however, being composed mostly of subject nations, were oppressed by the delay and despised their antagonists who, apparently out of fear, offered within the fortifications the sacrifice of purification, which regularly precedes struggles. Hence they urged a battle and spread a report that if there should be more delay, they would abandon the camp and disperse; and at this the leaders, though against their will, went to meet the foe.

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B. C. 42
(*a. u.* 712)

You might not unnaturally guess that this struggle proved tremendous and surpassed all previous civil conflicts of the Romans. This was not because these contestants excelled those of the old days in either the number or the valor of the warriors, for far larger masses and braver men than they had fought on many fields, but because on this occasion they contended for liberty and for democracy as never before. And they came to blows with one another again later just as they had previously. But the subsequent struggles they carried on to see to whom they should belong: on this occasion the one side was trying to bring them into subjection to sovereignty, the other side into a state of autonomy. Hence the people never attained again to the absolute right of free speech, in spite of being vanquished by no foreign nation (the subject population and the allied nations then present on both sides were merely a kind of complement of the citizen army): but the people at once gained the mastery over and fell into subjection to itself; it defeated itself and was defeated; and in that effort it exhausted the democratic element and strengthened the monarchical. I do not say that the people's defeat at that time was not beneficial. (What else can one say regarding those who fought on both sides than that the Romans were conquered and Cæsar was victorious?) They were no longer capable of concord in the established form of government; for it is impossible for an unadulterated democracy that has grown to acquire domains of such vast size to have

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) the faculty of moderation. After undertaking many similar conflicts repeatedly, one after another, they would certainly some day have been either enslaved or ruined.

—40— We may infer also from the portents which appeared to them on that occasion that the struggle between them was clearly tremendous. Heaven, as it is ever accustomed to give indications before most remarkable events, foretold to them accurately both in Rome and in Macedonia all the results that would come from it. In the City the sun at one time appeared diminished and grew extremely small, and again showed itself now huge, now tripled in form, and once shone forth at night. Thunderbolts descended on many spots, and most significantly upon the altar of Jupiter Victor; flashes darted hither and thither; notes of trumpets, clashing of arms, and cries of camps were heard by night from the gardens of Cæsar and of Antony, located close together beside the Tiber. Moreover a dog dragged the body of a dog to the temple of Ceres, where he dug the earth with his paws and buried it. A child was born with hands that had ten fingers, and a mule gave birth to a prodigy of two species. The front part of it resembled a horse, and the rest a mule. The chariot of Minerva while returning to the Capitol from a horse-race was dashed to pieces, and the statue of Jupiter at Albanum sent forth blood at the very time of the Feriæ from its right shoulder and right hand. These were advance indications to them from Heaven, and the rivers also in their land gave out en-

tirely or began to flow backward. And any chance deeds of men seemed to point to the same end. During the Feriæ the prefect of the city celebrated the festival of Latiaris,[1] which neither belonged to him nor was ordinarily observed at that time, and the plebeian ædiles offered to Ceres contests in armor in place of the horse-race. This was what took place in Rome, where certain oracles also both before the events and pertaining to them were recited, tending to the downfall of the democracy. In Macedonia, to which Pangæum and the territory surrounding it are regarded as belonging, bees in swarms pervaded the camp of Cassius, and in the course of its purification some one set the garland upon his head wrong end foremost, and a boy while carrying a Victory in some procession, such as the soldiers inaugurate, fell down.[2] But the thing which most of all portended destruction to them, so that it became plain even to their enemies, was that many vultures and many other birds, too, that devour corpses gathered only above the heads of the conspirators, gazing down upon them and squawking and screeching with terrible and bloodcurdling notes. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

To that party these signs brought evil, while the others, so far as we know, were visited by no omen, but —41—

1 Iuppiter Latiaris was the protecting deity of Latium, and his festival is practically identical with the *Feriæ Latinæ*. Roscher (II, col. 688) thinks that Dio has here confused the præfectus urbi with a special official (dictator feriarum Latinarum causa) appointed when the consuls were unable to attend. Compare Book Thirty-nine, chapter 30, where our historian does not commit himself to any definite name for this magistrate.

2 "While carrying a golden Victory slipped and fell" is the phrase in the transcript of Zonaras.

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) saw some such visions as the following in dreams. A Thessalian dreamed that the former Cæsar had bidden him tell Cæsar that the battle would occur on the second day after that one, and that he should resume some of the insignia which his predecessor wore while dictator: Cæsar therefore immediately put his father's ring on his finger and wore it often afterward. That was the vision which that man saw, whereas the physician who attended Cæsar thought that Minerva enjoined him to lead his patient, though still in poor health, from his tent and place him in line of battle: and by this act he was saved. In most cases safety is the lot of such as remain in the camp and of those in the fortifications, while danger accompanies those who proceed into the midst of weapons and battles; but this was reversed in the case of Cæsar. It was quite visibly the result of his leaving the rampart and mingling with the fighting men that he survived, although from sickness he stood with difficulty even without his arms.

—42— The engagement was of the following nature. No arrangement had been made as to when they should enter battle, yet as if by some compact they all armed themselves at dawn, advanced into the square intervening between them quite leisurely, as though they were competitors in games, and there were quietly marshaled. When they stood opposed advice was given partly to the entire bodies and partly to individuals of both forces by the generals and lieutenants and subalterns. They made many suggestions touching the immediate danger and many adapted to the future,—

words such as men would speak who were to encounter danger on the moment and were endeavoring to anticipate troubles to come. For the most part the speeches were very similar, inasmuch as on both sides alike there were Romans together with allies. Still, there was a difference. The officers of Brutus offered their men the prizes of liberty and democracy, of freedom from tyrants and freedom from masters; they pointed out to them the excellencies of equality in government, and all the unfairness of monarchy that they themselves had experienced or had heard in other cases; they called to the attention of the soldiers the separate details of each system and besought them to strive for the one, but to reject the other, to feel a passion for the one, and to take care not to endure the other. The opposing officers urged their army to take vengeance on the assassins, to possess the property of their antagonists, to be filled with a desire to rule all of their race, and (the clause which inspired them most) they promised to give them five thousand denarii apiece. Thereupon they first sent around their watchwords,— the followers of Brutus using "Liberty," and the others whatever happened to be given out,— and then one trumpeter on each side sounded the first note, followed by the blare of the remainder. Those in front sounded the "at rest" and the "ready" signal on their trumpets in a kind of circular spot, and then the rest came in who were to rouse the spirit of the soldiers and incite them to the onset. Then there was suddenly a great silence, and after waiting a little the leaders

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B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) issued a clear command and the lines on both sides joined in a shout. After that with a yell the heavy-armed dashed their spears against their shields and hurled the former at each other, while the slingers and the archers sent their stones and missiles. Then the two bodies of cavalry trotted forward and the contingents shielded with breastplates following behind

—44— joined in hand to hand combat. They did a great deal of pushing and a great deal of stabbing, looking carefully at first to see how they should wound others and not be wounded themselves; they desired both to kill their antagonists and to save themselves. Later, when their charge grew fiercer and their spirit flamed up, they rushed together without stopping to consider, and paid no more attention to their own safety, but would even sacrifice themselves in their eagerness to destroy their adversaries. Some threw away their shields and seizing hold of those arrayed opposite them either strangled[1] them in their helmets and struck them from the rear, or snatched away their defence in front and delivered a stroke on their breasts. Others took hold of their swords and then ran their own into the bodies of the men opposite, who had been made as good as unarmed. And some by exposing some part of their bodies to be wounded could use the rest more readily. Some clutched each other in an embrace that prevented the possibility of striking, but they perished in the intertwining of swords and bodies. Some died of one blow, others of many, and neither had any perception

[1] Reading ἤγχον (as Boissevain) in preference to ἦγον or εἶλκον.

of their wounds, dying too soon to feel pain, nor lamented their taking off, because they did not reach the point of expressing grief. One who killed another thought in the excessive joy of the moment that he could never die. Whoever fell lost consciousness and had no knowledge of his state. Both sides remained stubbornly in their places and neither side retired or pursued, but there, just as they were, they wounded and were wounded, slew and were slain, until late in the day. And if all had contested with all, as may happen under such circumstances, or if Brutus had been arrayed against Antony and Cassius against Cæsar, they would have proved equally matched. As it was, Brutus forced the invalid Cæsar from his path, while Antony overruled Cassius, who was by no means his equal in warfare. At this juncture, because not all were conquering the other side at once, but both parties were in turn defeated and victorious, the results[1] were practically the same. Both had conquered and had been defeated, each had routed their adversaries and had been routed, pursuits and flights had fallen to the lot of both alike and the camps on both sides had been captured. As they were many they occupied a large expanse of plain, so that they could not see each other distinctly. In the battle each one could recognize only what was opposite him, and when the rout took place each side fled the opposite way to its own fortifications, situated at a distance from each other, without stopping to look back. Because of this fact and of the

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1 Accepting Reiske's interpretative insertion, τέλος.

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) immeasurable quantity of dust that rose they were ignorant of the termination of the battle, and those who had conquered thought they had been victorious over everything, and those who were defeated deemed they had been worsted everywhere. They did not learn what had happened until the ramparts had been laid in ruins, and the victors on each side on retiring to their own headquarters encountered each other.

—46— So far, then, as the battle was concerned, both sides both conquered thus and were defeated. At this time they did not resume the conflict, but as soon as they had retired and beheld each other and recognized what had taken place, they both withdrew, not venturing anything further. They had beaten and had proved inferior to each other. This was shown first by the fact that the entire ramparts of Cæsar and Antony and everything within them had been captured. (That proved practically the truth of the dream, for if Cæsar had remained in his place, he would certainly have perished with the rest.) It was shown again in the fate of Cassius. He came away safe from the battle, but stripped of his fortifications he had fled to a different spot, and suspecting that Brutus, too, had been defeated and that several of the victors were hastening to attack him he made haste to die. He had sent a certain centurion to view the situation and report to him where Brutus was and what he was doing. This man fell in with some horsemen whom Brutus had dispatched to seek his colleague, turned back with them and proceeded leisurely, with the idea that there was

no hurry, because no danger presented itself. Cassius, seeing them afar off, suspected they were enemies and ordered Pindarus, a freedman, to kill him. The centurion on learning that his leader's death was due to his dilatoriness slew himself upon his body. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

Brutus immediately sent the body of Cassius secretly to Thasos. He shrank from burying it upon the ground, for fear the army would be filled with grief and dejection at sight of the preparations. The remainder of his friend's soldiers he took under his charge, consoled them in a speech, won their devotion by a gift of money to make up for what they had lost, and then transferred his position to their enclosure, which was more suitable. From there he started out to harass his opponents in various ways, especially by assaulting their camp at night. He had no intention of joining issue with them again in a set battle, but had great hopes of overcoming them without danger by the lapse of time. Hence he tried regularly to startle them in various ways and disturb them by night, and once by diverting the course of the river he washed away considerable of their wall. Cæsar and Antony were getting short of both food and money, and consequently gave their soldiers nothing to replace what had been seized and carried off. Furthermore, the force that was sailing to them in transports from Brundusium had been destroyed by Staius. Yet they could not safely transfer their position to any other quarter nor return to Italy, and so, even as late as this, they set all their hopes upon their weapons,— hopes not merely of —47—

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) victory but even of preservation. They were eager to meet the danger before the naval disaster became noised abroad among their opponents and their own

—48— men. As Brutus evinced an unwillingness to meet them in open fight, they somehow cast pamphlets over his palisade, challenging his soldiers either to embrace their cause (promises being attached) or to come into conflict if they had the least particle of strength. During this delay some of the Celtic force deserted from their side to Brutus, and Amyntas, the general of Deiotarus, and Rhascuporis deserted to them. The latter, as some say, immediately returned home. Brutus was afraid, when this happened, that there might be further similar rebellion and decided to join issue with them. And since there were many captives in his camp, and he neither had any way to guard them during the progress of the battle, and could not trust them to refrain from doing mischief, he despatched the majority of them, contrary to his own inclination, being a slave in this matter to necessity; but he was the more ready to do it because of the fact that his opponents had killed such of his soldiers as had been taken alive. After doing this he armed his men for battle. When the opposing ranks were arrayed, two eagles that flew above the heads of the two armies battled together and indicated to the combatants the outcome of the war. The eagle on the side of Brutus was beaten and fled: and similarly his heavy-armed force, after a contest for the most part even, was defeated, and then when many had fallen his cavalry, though it fought nobly, gave way.

Thereupon the victors pursued them, as they fled, this way and that, but neither killed nor captured any one; and then they kept watch of the separate contingents during the night and did not allow them to unite again. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

Brutus, who had reached in flight a steep and lofty spot, undertook to break through in some way to the camp. In this he was unsuccessful, and on learning that some of his soldiers had made terms with the victors he had no further hope, but despairing of safety and disdaining capture he himself also took refuge in death. He uttered aloud this sentence of Heracles: —49—

> "Unhappy Virtue, thou wert but a name, while I,
> Deeming thy godhead real, followed thee on,
> Who wert but Fortune's slave." [1]

Then he called one of the bystanders to kill him. His body received burial by Antony,— all but his head, which was sent to Rome: but as the ships encountered a storm during the voyage across from Dyrrachium that was thrown into the sea. At his death the mass of his soldiers, on amnesty being proclaimed for them, immediately transferred their allegiance. Portia perished by swallowing red-hot charcoal. Most of the prominent men who had held any offices or belonged to the assassins or the proscribed, straightway killed themselves, or, like Favonius, were captured and destroyed: the remainder at this time escaped to the sea and thereafter joined Sextus.

[1] Among the Fragmenta Adespota in Nauck's *Fragmenta Tragicorum Græcorum* this is No. 374.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
48

The following is contained in the Forty-eighth of Dio's Rome:

How Cæsar contended with Fulvia and Lucius Antonius (chapters 1–16).

How Sextus Pompey occupied Sicily (chapters 17–23).

How the Parthians occupied the country to the edge of the Hellespont (chapters 24–26).

How Cæsar and Antony reached an agreement with Sextus (chapters 27–38).

How Publius Ventidius conquered the Parthians and recovered Asia (chapters 39–42).

How Cæsar began to make war upon Sextus (chapters 43–48).

About Baiæ (chapters 49–54).

Duration of time five years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated:

L. Antonius M. F. Pietas, P. Servilius P. F. Isauricus consul (II). (B. C. 41 = a. u. 713.)

Cn. Domitius M. F. Calvinus [consul] (II), C. Asinius|| Cn. F. Pollio. (B. C. 40 = a. u. 714.)

L. Marcius L. F. Censorinus, C. Calvisius||[1]C. F. Sabinus. (B. C. 39 = a. u. 715.)

Appius Claudius C. F. Pulcher, C. Norbanus C. F. Flaccus. (B. C. 38 = a. u. 716.)

M. Vipsanius L. F. Agrippa, L. Canínius L. F. Gallus. (B. C. 37 = a. u. 717.)

[1] The names within these parallel lines are wanting in the MS., but were inserted by Reimar on the basis of chapter 34 of this book, and slightly modified by Boissevain.

So perished Brutus and Cassius, slain by the swords —1— B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)
with which they had despatched Cæsar. The rest also who had shared in the plot against him were all except a very few destroyed, some previously, some at this time, and some subsequently. Justice and the Divine Will seemed to sweep onward and lead forward to such a fate the men who had killed their benefactor, one who had attained such eminence in both excellence and good fortune. Cæsar and Antony for the moment secured an advantage over Lepidus, because he had not shared the victory with them; yet they were destined ere long to turn their arms against each other. It is a difficult matter for three men or two that are equal in rank and have come into power over such vast interests as a result of war to be of one accord. Hence, whatever they had gained for a time while in harmony for the purpose of the overthrow of their adversaries they now began to set up as prizes in their rivalry with each other. They immediately redistributed the empire, so that Spain and Numidia fell to Cæsar, Gaul and Africa to Antony; they further agreed that in case Lepidus showed any vexation at this Africa should be evacuated for him. This was all they could allot be- —2—
tween them, since Sextus was still occupying Sardinia and Sicily, and other regions outside of Italy were in a state of turmoil. About the peninsula itself I need say nothing, for it has always remained a kind of

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) choice exception in such divisions: and not even now did they talk as if they were struggling to obtain it, but to defend it. So, leaving these other regions to be common property, Antony took it upon himself to settle affairs of nations that had fought against them and to collect the money which had been offered to the soldiers in advance: Cæsar was charged with curtailing the power of Lepidus, if he should make any hostile move, with conducting the war against Sextus, and with assigning to those of his campaigners who had passed the age limit the land which he had promised them; and these he forthwith dismissed. Furthermore he sent with Antony two legions of his followers, and his colleague sent word that he would give him in return an equal number of those stationed at that time in Italy. After making these compacts separately, putting them in writing, and sealing them, they exchanged the documents, to the end that if any transgression were committed, it might be proved from the very records. Thereupon Antony set out for Asia and

—3— Cæsar for Italy. Sickness attacked the latter violently on the journey and during the voyage, giving rise in Rome to an expectation of his death. They did not believe, however, that he was lingering so much by reason of ill health as because he was devising some harm, and consequently they expected to fall victims to every possible persecution. Yet they voted to these men many honors for their victory, such as would have been given assuredly to the others, had they conquered; in such crises it is ever the case that all

trample on the loser and honor the victor; and in particular they decided, though against their will, to celebrate thanksgivings during practically the entire year. This Cæsar ordered them outright to do in gratitude for vengeance upon the assassins. At any rate during his delay all sorts of stories were current, and all sorts of behavior resulted. For example, some spread a report that he was dead, and aroused delight in many breasts: others said he was planning some evil, and filled numerous persons with fear. Therefore some hid their property and took care to protect themselves, and others considered in what way they might make their escape. Others, and the majority, not being able to apprehend anything clearly by reason of their excessive fear, prepared to meet a certain doom. The confident element was extremely small, and its numbers few. In the light of the former frequent and diverse destruction of both persons and possessions they expected that anything similar or still worse might happen, because now they had been utterly vanquished. Wherefore Cæsar, in dread that they might take some rebellious step, especially since Lepidus was there, forwarded a letter to the senate urging its members to be of good cheer, and further promising that he would do everything in a mild and humane way, after the manner of his father. B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

This was what then took place. The succeeding year Publius Servilius and Lucius Antonius nominally became consuls, but in reality it was the latter and Fulvia. She, the mother-in-law of Cæsar and wife of Antony, —4— B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) had no respect for Lepidus because of his slothfulness, and herself managed affairs, so that neither the senate nor the people dared transact any business contrary to her pleasure. Actually, when Lucius himself was anxious to have a triumph over certain peoples dwelling in the Alps, on the ground that he had conquered them, for a time Fulvia opposed him and no one would grant it; but when her favor was courted and she permitted it, all voted for the measure: therefore it was nominally Antonius . . . over the people whom he said he had vanquished (in reality he had done nothing deserving a triumph nor had any command at all in those regions),— but in truth Fulvia . . . . . .[1] and had the procession. And she assumed a far prouder bearing over the affair than did he, because she had a truer cause; to give any one authority to hold a triumph was greater than to celebrate it by securing the privilege from another. Except that Lucius donned the triumphal apparel, mounted the chariot, and performed the other rites customary in such cases, Fulvia herself seemed to be giving the spectacle, employing him as her assistant. It took place on the first day of the year, and Lucius, just as Marius had done, exulted in the circumstance that he held it on the first day of the month that he began to be consul. Moreover he exalted himself even above his predecessor, saying that he had voluntarily laid aside the decorations of the

[1] Both MSS., the Mediceus and the Venetus, here exhibit a gap of three lines.

procession and had assembled the senate in his street dress, whereas Marius had done it unwillingly. He added that the latter had received a crown from almost nobody, whereas he obtained many, and particularly from the people, tribe by tribe, as had never been the case with any former triumphator. (It was done by the aid of Fulvia and by the money which he had secretly given some persons to spend.) B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

It was in this year that Cæsar arrived in Rome, and, after taking the usual steps to celebrate the victory, turned his attention to the administration and despatch of business. For Lepidus through fear of him and out of his general weakness of heart had not rebelled; and Lucius and Fulvia, on the supposition that they were relatives and sharers in his supremacy were quiet,—at least at first. As time went on they became at variance, the persons just mentioned because they did not get a share in the portion of lands to be assigned which belonged to Antony, and Cæsar because he did not get back his troops from the other two. Hence their kinship by marriage was dissolved and they were brought to open warfare. Cæsar would not endure the domineering ways of his mother-in-law, and, choosing to appear to be at odds with her rather than with Antonius, sent back her daughter, whom he declared on oath to be still a virgin. In pursuing such a course he was careless whether it should be thought that the woman had remained a virgin in his house so long a time for commonplace reasons, or whether it should seem that he had planned the situation considerably —5—

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) in advance, as a measure of preparation for the future. After this action there was no longer any friendship between them. Lucius together with Fulvia attempted to get control of affairs, pretending to be doing this in behalf of Marcus, and would yield to Cæsar on no point: therefore on account of his devotion to his brother he took the additional title of Pietas. Cæsar naturally found no fault with Marcus, not wishing to alienate him while he was attending to the nations in Asia, but reproached and resisted the pair, giving out that they were behaving in all respects contrary to their brother's desire and were eager for individual supremacy.

—6— In the land allotments both placed the greatest hope of power, and consequently the beginning of their quarrel was concerned with them. Cæsar for his part wished to distribute the territory to all such as had made the campaign with himself and Antony, according to the compact made with them after the victory, that by so doing he might win their good-will: the others demanded to receive the assignment that appertained to their party and settle the cities themselves, in order that they might get the power of these settlements on their side. It seemed to both to be the simplest method to grant the land of the unarmed to those who had participated in the conflict. Contrary to their expectation great disturbance resulted and the matter took the aspect of a war. For at first Cæsar was for taking from the possessors and giving to the veterans all of Italy (except what some old campaigner had received

as a gift or bought from the government and was now holding), together with the bands of slaves and other wealth. The persons deprived of their property were terribly enraged against him, and caused a change of policy. Fulvia and the consul now hoped to find more power in the cause of the others, the oppressed, and consequently neglected those who were to receive the fields, but turned their attention to that party which was of greater numbers and was animated by a righteous indignation at the deprivation they were suffering. Next they took some of them individually, aided and united them, so that the men who were before afraid of Cæsar now that they had got leaders became courageous and no longer gave up any of their property: they thought that Marcus, too, would approve their course. Among these, therefore, Lucius and Fulvia —7— secured a following, and still made no assault upon the adherents of Cæsar. Their attitude was not that there was no need for the soldiers to receive allotments, but they maintained that the goods of their adversaries in the combat were sufficient for them; especially they pointed out lands and furniture, some still being held intact, others that had been sold, of which they declared the former ought to be given to the men outright and in the second case the price realized should be presented to them. If even this did not satisfy them, they tried to secure the affection of them all by holding out hopes in Asia. In this way it quickly came about that Cæsar, who had forcibly robbed the possessors of any property and caused troubles and dangers on account of it

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) to all alike, found himself disliked by both parties; whereas the other two, since they took nothing from anybody and showed those who were to receive the gifts a way to the fulfillment of the pledges from already existing assets and without a combat, won over each of the bodies of men. As a result of this and through the famine which was trying them greatly at this time, because the sea off Sicily was in control of Sextus, and the Ionian Gulf was in the grasp of Gnæus Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cæsar found himself in a considerable dilemma. For Domitius was one of the assassins, and, having escaped from the battle fought at Philippi, he had got together a small fleet, had made himself for a time master of the Gulf, and was doing the greatest damage to the cause of his opponents.

—8— There was not only this to trouble Cæsar greatly but also the fact that in the disputes which had been inaugurated between the ex-soldiers and the senators as well as the rest of the multitude that possessed lands,— and these proved very numerous because the contestants were struggling for the greatest interests,— he could not attach himself to either side without danger. It was impossible for him to please both. The one side wished to run riot, the other to be unharmed: the one side to get the other's property, the other to hold what belonged to it. As often as he gave the preference to the interests of this party or that, according as he found it necessary, he incurred the hatred of the others: and he did not meet with so much gratitude for the favors he conferred as with anger for what he

failed to yield. Those benefited took all that was given them as their due and regarded it as no kindness, and the opposite party was wrathful because robbed of their own belongings. And as a result he continued to offend either this group or the other, at one time reproached with being a friend of the people and again with being a friend of the army. He could make no headway, and further learned by actual experience that arms had no power to hold those injured friendly toward him, and that it was possible for all such as would not submit to perish by the use of weapons, but out of the question for any one to be forced to love a person whom he will not. After this, though reluctantly, he stopped taking anything from the senators; previously he used to deem it his right to distribute everything that was theirs, asking seriously: "From what source else shall we pay the prizes of war to those who have served?"— as if any one had commanded him to wage war or to make such great promises. He also kept his hands off the valuables,— whatever costly objects women had for dowries, or others had less in value than the land individually given to the old soldiers. When this was done the senate and the rest, finding nothing taken from them, became fairly resigned to his rule, but the veterans were indignant, regarding his sparingness and the honor shown to the others to be their own dishonor and loss, since they were to receive less. They killed not a few of the centurions and the other intimates of Cæsar who tried to restrain them from mutiny, and came very near compassing their leader's

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

—9—

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) own destruction, using every plausible excuse possible for their anger. They did not cease their irritation till the land that belonged to their relatives and the fathers and sons of those fallen in battle but was held by somebody else was granted to these three classes freely. This measure caused the soldier element to become somewhat more conciliatory, but that very thing produced vexation again among the people. The two used to come in conflict and there was continual fighting amongst them, so that many were wounded and killed on both sides alike. The one party was superior by being equipped with weapons and having experience in wars, and the other by its numbers and the ability to pelt opponents from the roofs. Owing to this a number of houses were burned down, and to those dwelling in the city rent was entirely remitted to the extent of five hundred denarii, while for those in the rest of Italy it was reduced a fourth for one year. For they used to fight in all the cities alike, wherever they fell in with each other.

—10— When this took place constantly and soldiers sent ahead by Cæsar into Spain made a kind of uprising at Placentia and did not come to order until they received money from the people there, and they were furthermore hindered from crossing the Alps by Calenus and Ventidius, who held Farther Gaul, Cæsar became afraid that he might meet with some disaster and began to wish to be reconciled with Fulvia and the consul. He could not accomplish anything by sending messages personally and with only his own authorization, and so

went to the veterans and through them attempted to negotiate a settlement. Elated at this they took charge of those who had lost their land, and Lucius went about in every direction uniting them and detaching them from Cæsar, while Fulvia occupied Præneste, had senators and knights for her associates, and was wont to conduct all her deliberations with their help, even sending orders to whatever points required it. Why should any one be surprised at this, when she was girt with a sword, and used to pass the watchwords to the soldiers, yes, often harangued them,— an additional means of giving offence to Cæsar? The latter, however, had no way to overthrow them, being far inferior to them not only in troops, but in good-will on the part of the population; for he caused many distress, whereas they filled every one with hope. He had often privately through friends proposed reconciliation to them, and when he accomplished nothing, he sent envoys from the number of the veterans to them. He expected by this stroke pretty surely to obtain his request, to adjust present difficulties, and to gain a strength equal to theirs for the future. And even though he should fail of these aims, he expected that not he but they would bear the responsibility for their quarrel. This actually took place. When he effected nothing even through the soldiers, he despatched senators, showing them the covenants made between himself and Antony, and offering the envoys as arbitrators of the differences. But his opponents in the first place made many counter-propositions, demands with which Cæsar was sure not

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

— 11 —

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) to comply, and again, in respect to everything that they did said they were doing it by the orders of Mark Antony. So that when nothing was gained in this way either, he betook himself once more to the veterans.

—12— Thereupon these assembled in Rome in great numbers, with the avowed intention of making some communication to the people and the senate. But instead of troubling themselves about this errand they collected on the Capitol and commanded that the compacts which Antony and Cæsar made be read to them. They ratified these agreements and voted that they should be made arbitrators of the differences existing. After recording these acts on tablets and sealing them they delivered them to the vestal virgins to keep. To Cæsar, who was present, and to the other party by an embassy they gave orders to meet for adjudication at Gabii on a stated day. Cæsar showed his readiness to submit to arbitration, and the others promised to put in an appearance, but out of fear or else perhaps disdain did not come. (For they were wont to make fun of the warriors, calling them among other names *senatus caligatus* on account of their use of military boots.) So they condemned Lucius and Fulvia as guilty of some injustice, and gave precedence to the cause of Cæsar. After this, when the latter's adversaries had deliberated again and again, they took up the war once more and did not make ready for it in any quiet fashion. Chief among their measures was to secure money from all sources, even from temples. They took away all the votive offerings that could be turned into bullion, those

deposited in Rome itself as well as those in the rest of Italy that was under their control. Both money and soldiers came to them also from Gallia Togata, which had been included by this time in the domain of Italy, to the end that no one else, under the plea that it was a single district, should keep soldiers south of the Alps. B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

—13—

Cæsar, then, was making preparations, and Fulvia and Lucius were gathering hoards of supplies and assembling forces. Meanwhile both sent embassies and despatched soldiers and officers in every direction, and each managed to seize some places beforehand and was repulsed from others. The most of these transactions, and those connected with no great or important occurrence, I shall pass over, and briefly relate the points which are of chief value.

Cæsar made an expedition against Nursia, among the Sabini, and routed the garrison encamped before it but was repulsed from the city by Tisienus Gallus. Accordingly, he went over into Umbria and laid siege to Sentinum, but failed to capture it. Lucius had meanwhile been sending on one excuse and another soldiers to his friends in Rome, and then coming suddenly on the scene himself conquered the cavalry force that met him, hurled the infantry back to the wall, and after that took the city, since those that had been there for some days helped the defenders within by attacking the besiegers. Lepidus, to whom had been entrusted the guarding of the place, made no resistance by reason of his inherent slothfulness, nor did Servilius the consul, who was too easy-going. On ascertaining this

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) Cæsar left Quintus Salvidienus Rufus to look after the people of Sentinum, and himself set out for Rome. Hearing of this movement Lucius withdrew in advance, having had voted to him the privilege of going out on some war. Indeed, he delivered an address in soldier's costume, which no one else had done. Thus Cæsar was received into the capital without striking a blow, and when he did not capture the other by pursuit, he returned and kept a more careful watch over the city. Meantime, as soon as Cæsar had left Sentinum, Gaius Furnius the guarder of the fortifications had issued forth and pursued him a long distance, and Rufus unexpectedly attacked the citizens within, captured the town, plundered, and burned it. The inhabitants of Nursia came to terms and suffered no ill treatment; when, however, after burying those that had fallen in the battle which had taken place between themselves and Cæsar, they inscribed on their tombs that they had died contending for liberty, an enormous fine was imposed upon the people, so that they abandoned their city and entire country together.

—14— While they were so engaged, Lucius on setting out from Rome after his occupancy had proceeded toward Gaul: his road was blocked, however, and so he turned aside to Perusia, an Etruscan city. There he was cut off first by the lieutenants of Cæsar and later by Cæsar himself, and was besieged. The investing of the place proved a long operation: the situation is naturally a strong one and had been amply stocked with provisions; and horsemen sent out by him before he was entirely hemmed in harassed his antagonists greatly,

while many others, moreover, from various sections vigorously defended him. Many attempts were made upon the besieged individually and there was sharp fighting close to the walls, until the followers of Lucius in spite of being generally successful were nevertheless overcome by hunger. The leader and some others obtained pardon, but most of the senators and knights were put to death. And the story goes that they did not merely suffer death in a simple form, but were led to the altar consecrated to the former Cæsar and there sacrificed,— three hundred[1] knights and many senators, among them Tiberius Cannutius who formerly during his tribuneship had assembled the populace for Cæsar Octavianus. Of the people of Perusia and the rest there captured the majority lost their lives, and the city itself, except the temple of Vulcan and statue of Juno, was entirely destroyed by fire. This piece of sculpture was preserved by some chance and was brought to Rome in accordance with a vision that Cæsar saw in a dream: there it accorded those who desired to undertake the task permission to settle the city again and place the deity on her original site,— only they did not acquire more than seven and one-half stadia of the territory. B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

When that city had been captured during the consulship of Gnæus Calvinus and Asinius Pollio,— the former holding office the second time,— other posts in Italy partly perforce and partly voluntarily capitu- —15— B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

1 Owing to an inaccuracy of spelling in the MSS. this number has often been corrupted to "four hundred." The occurrence of "three hundred" in Suetonius's account of the affair (Life of Augustus, chapter 15) assures us, however, that this reading is correct.

B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714) lated to Cæsar. For this reason Fulvia with her children made her escape to her husband, and many of the other foremost men made their way some to him and some to Sextus in Sicily. Julia, the mother of the Antonii, went there at first and was received by Sextus with extreme kindness; later she was sent by him to her son Marcus, carrying propositions of friendship and with envoys whom she was to conduct to his presence. In this company which at that time turned its steps away from Italy to Antony was also Tiberius Claudius Nero. He was holding a kind of fort in Campania, and when Cæsar's party got the upper hand set out with his wife Livia Drusilla and with his son Tiberius Claudius Nero. This episode illustrated remarkably the whimsicality of fate. This Livia who then fled from Cæsar later on was married to him, and this Tiberius who then escaped with his parents succeeded him in the office of emperor.

— 16 — All this was later. At that time the inhabitants of Rome resumed the garb of peace, which they had taken off without any decree, under compulsion from the people; they gave themselves up to merrymaking, conveyed Cæsar in his triumphal robe into the city and honored him with a laurel crown, so that he enjoyed this decoration as often as the celebrators of triumphs were accustomed to use it. Cæsar, when Italy had been subdued and the Ionian Gulf had been cleared,— for Domitius despairing of continuing to prevail any longer by himself had sailed away to Antony,— made preparations to proceed against Sextus. When, however, he ascertained his power and the fact that he had

been in communication with Antony through the latter's mother and through envoys, he feared that he might get embroiled with both at once; therefore preferring Sextus as more trustworthy or else as stronger than Antony he sent him his mother Mucia and married the sister of his father-in-law, Lucius Scribonius Libo, in the hope that by the aid of his kindness and his kinship he might make him a friend. B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

Sextus, after he had originally left Spain according to his compact with Lepidus and not much later had been appointed admiral, was removed from his office by Cæsar. For all that he held on to his fleet and had the courage to sail to Italy; but Cæsar's adherents were already securing control of the country and he learned that he had been numbered among the assassins of Cæsar's father. Therefore he kept away from the mainland but sailed about among the islands, maintaining a sharp watch on what was going on and supplying himself with food without resort to crimes. As he had not taken part in the murder he expected to be restored by Cæsar himself. When, however, his name was exposed on the tablet and he knew that the edict of proscription was in force against him also, he despaired of getting back through Cæsar and put himself in readiness for war. He had triremes built, received the deserters, made an alliance with the pirates, and took under his protection the exiles. By these means in a short time he became powerful and was master of the sea off Italy, so that he made descents upon the harbors, cut loose the boats, and engaged in

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B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711)

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) pillage. As matters went well with him and his activity supplied him with soldiers and money, he sailed to Sicily, where he seized Mylæ and Tyndaris without effort but was repulsed from Messana by Pompeius Bithynicus, then governor of Sicily. Instead of retiring altogether from the place, he overran the country, prevented the importation of provisions, gained the ascendancy over those who came to the rescue,— filling some with fear of suffering a similar hardship, and damaging others by some form of ambuscade,— won over the quæstor together with the funds, and finally obtained Messana and also Bithynicus, by an agreement that the latter should enjoy equal authority with him. The governor suffered no harm, at least for the time being: the others had their arms and money taken from them. His next step was to win over Syracuse and some other cities, from which he gathered more soldiers and collected a very strong fleet. Quintus Cornificius also sent him quite a force from Africa.

— 18 — While he was thus growing strong, Cæsar for a time took no action in the matter, both because he despised him and because the business in hand kept him occupied. But when owing to the famine the deaths in the

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) City became numerous and Sextus commenced to make attempts on Italy also, Cæsar began to have a small fleet equipped and sent Salvidienus Rufus with a large force ahead to Rhegium. Rufus managed to repel Sextus from Italy and when the latter retired into Sicily he undertook to manufacture boats of leather, similar to those adapted to ocean sailing. He made a framework of light rods for the interior and stretched on the outside an uncured oxhide, making an affair like an

oval shield. For this he got laughed at and decided that it would be dangerous for him to try to use them in crossing the strait, so he let them go and ventured to undertake the passage with the fleet that had been equipped and had arrived. He was not able, however, to accomplish his purpose, for the number and size of his ships were no match for the skill and daring of the enemy. This took place in the course of Cæsar's expedition into Macedonia, and he himself was an eyewitness of the battle; the result filled him with chagrin, most of all because he had been defeated in this their first encounter. For this reason he no longer ventured, although the major part of his fleet had been preserved, to cross over by main force: he frequently tried to effect it secretly, feeling that if he could once set foot on the island, he could certainly conquer it with his infantry; after a time, since the vigilant guard kept in every quarter prevented him from gaining anything, he ordered others to attend to the blockade of Sicily and he himself went to meet Antony at Brundusium, whence with the aid of the ships he crossed the Ionian Gulf. Upon his departure Sextus occupied all of the island and put to death Bithynicus on the charge that the latter had plotted against him. He also produced a triumphal spectacle and had a naval battle of the captives in the strait close to Rhegium itself, so that his opponents could look on; in this combat he had wooden boats contend with others of leather, in the intention of making fun of Rufus. After this he built more ships and dominated the sea all round about, ac-

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

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B. C. 42
(*a. u.* 712)

quiring some renown, in which he took pride, based on the assumption that he was the son of Neptune, and that his father had once ruled the whole sea. So he fared as long as the resistance of Cassius and Brutus held out. When they had perished, Lucius Staius and others took refuge with him. He was at first glad to receive this ally and incorporated the troops that Staius led in his own force: subsequently, seeing that the new accession was an active and high-spirited man, he executed him on a charge of treachery. Then he acquired the other's fleet and the mass of slaves who kept arriving from Italy and gained tremendous strength. So many persons, in fact, deserted that the vestal virgins prayed in the name of the sacrifices that their desertions might be restrained.

—20—
B. C. 40
(*a. u.* 714)

For these reasons and because he gave the exiles a refuge, was negotiating friendship with Antony, and plundering a great portion of Italy, Cæsar felt a wish to become reconciled with him. When he failed of that he ordered Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa to wage war against him, and himself set out for Gaul. Sextus when he heard of that kept watch of Agrippa, who was busy superintending the Ludi Apollinares. This person was prætor at the time, holding a brilliant position in many ways because he was such an intimate friend of Cæsar, and for two days he had been conducting the horse-race and enjoyed the so-called "Troy contest," carried on by children of the nobility, which added to his glory. While he was so engaged Sextus crossed over into Italy and remained there carrying on marauding

expeditions until Agrippa arrived. Then, after leaving a garrison at certain points, he sailed back again. — Cæsar had formerly tried, as has been described, to get possession of Gaul through others, but had not been able on account of Calenus and the rest who followed Antony's fortunes. But now he occupied it in person, for he found Calenus dead of a disease and acquired his army without difficulty. Meanwhile, seeing that Lepidus was vexed at being deprived of the office that belonged to him, he sent him to Africa; for he proposed, by being the sole bestower of that position, instead of allowing Antony to share in the appointment, to gain in a greater degree Lepidus's attachment. B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

As I have remarked,[1] the Romans had two provinces in that part of Libya. The governors, before the union of the three men, were Titus Sextius over the Numidian region, and Cornificius with Decimus Lælius over the rest; the former was friendly to Antony, the latter two to Cæsar. For a time Sextius waited in the expectation that the others, who had a far larger force, would invade his domain, and prepared to withstand them there. When they delayed, he began to disdain them; and he was further elated by a cow, as they say, that uttered human speech bidding him lay hold of the prize before him, and by a dream in which a bull that had been buried in the city of Tucca seemed to urge him to dig up its head and carry it about on a spear-shaft, since by this means he should conquer. Without hesitation, then, especially when he found the bull in — 21 — B. C. 44 (*a. u.* 710)

[1] Compare Book Forty-three, chapter 9 (§ 4).

B. C. 43 (*a. u.* 711) the spot where the dream said it was, he invaded Africa first himself. At the beginning he occupied Adrymetum and some few other places, taken by surprise at his sudden assault. Then, while in an unguarded state because of this very success, he was ambushed by the quæstor, lost a large portion of his army, and withdrew into Numidia. His misfortune had happened to occur when he was without the protection of the bull's head, and he therefore ascribed his defeat to that fact and made preparations to take the field again. Meantime his opponents anticipated him by invading his domain. While the rest were besieging Cirta, the quæstor with the cavalry proceeded against him, overcame him in a few cavalry battles, and won over the other quæstor. After these experiences Sextius, who had secured some fresh reinforcements, risked battle again, conquered the quæstor in his turn, and shut up Lælius, who was overrunning the country, within his fortifications. He deceived Cornificius, who came to the defence of his colleague, making him believe that the latter had been captured, and after thus throwing him into a state of dejection defeated him. So Cornificius met his death in battle, and Lælius, who made a sally with the intention of taking the enemy in the rear, was

—22— also slain. When this had been accomplished, Sextius occupied Africa and governed both provinces without interference, until Cæsar according to the covenant made by him with Antony and Lepidus took possession of the office and assigned Gaius Fuficius Fango to take charge of the people; then the governor voluntarily

gave up the provinces. When the battle with Brutus and Cassius had been fought, Cæsar and Antony redistributed the world, Cæsar taking Numidia for his share of Libya, and Antony Africa. Lepidus, as I have stated,[1] had power among the three only in name, and often was not recorded in the documents even to this extent. When, therefore, this occurred Fulvia bade Sextius resume his rule of Africa. He was at this time still in Libya, making the winter season his plea, but in reality his lingering there was due to his certain knowledge that there would be some kind of upheaval. As he could not persuade Fango to give up the country, he associated himself with the natives, who detested their ruler; he had done evil in his office, for he was one of that mercenary force, many of whose members, as has been stated in my narrative,[2] had been elected even into the senate. At this turn of affairs Fango retired into Numidia, where he accorded harsh treatment to the people of Cirta because they despised him on seeing his condition. There was also one Arabio who was a prince among the barbarians dwelling close at hand, who had first helped Lælius and later attached himself to Sextius: him he ejected from his kingdom, when he refused to make an alliance with him. Arabio fled to Sextius and Fango demanded his surrender. When his request was refused, he grew angry, invaded Africa and did some damage to the country: but Sextius took the field against him, and he was defeated in conflicts

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

1 Compare the first chapter of this Book.

2 Compare Book Forty-three, chapter 47 (and see also XLVIII, 33, and LII, 41).

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) that were slight but numerous; consequently he retired again into Numidia. Sextius went after him and was in hopes of soon vanquishing him, especially with the aid of Arabio's horse, but he became suspicious of the latter and treacherously murdered him, after which he accomplished for the time being nothing further. For the cavalry, enraged at Arabio's death, left the Romans in the lurch and most of them took the side of

—23— Fango. After these skirmishes they concluded friendship, agreeing that the cause for war between them had been removed. Later Fango watched until Sextius, trusting in the truce, was free from fear, and invaded Africa. Then they joined battle with each other, and at first both sides conquered and were beaten. The one leader prevailed through the Numidian horsemen and the other through his citizen infantry, so that they plundered each other's camps, and neither knew anything about his fellow-soldiers. When as they retired they ascertained what had happened, they came to blows again, the Numidians were routed, and Fango temporarily fled to the mountains. During the night some hartbeestes ran across the hills, and thinking that the enemy's cavalry were at hand he committed suicide. Thus Sextius gained possession of nearly everything without trouble, and subdued Zama, which held out longest, by famine. Thereafter he governed both the provinces again until such time as Lepidus was sent. Against him he made no demonstration, either because he thought the step had the approval of Antony, or be-

cause he was far inferior to him in troops. He remained quiet, pretending that the necessity was a favor to himself. In this way Lepidus took charge of both provinces. B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

About this same period that the above was taking place, and after the battle the scene of which was laid at Philippi, Mark Antony came to the mainland of Asia and there by visiting some points himself and sending deputies elsewhere he levied contributions upon the cities and sold the positions of authority. Meanwhile he fell in love with Cleopatra, whom he had seen in Cilicia, and no longer gave a thought to honor but was a slave of the fair Egyptian and tarried to enjoy her love. This caused him to do many absurd things, one of which was to drag her brothers from the temple of Artemis at Ephesus and put them to death. Finally, leaving Plancus in the province of Asia and Saxa in Syria, he started for Egypt. Many disturbances resulted from this action of his: the Aradii, islanders, would not yield any obedience to the messengers sent by him to them after the money and also killed some of them, and the Parthians, who had previously been restless, now assailed the Romans more than ever. Their leaders were Labienus and Pacorus, the latter the son of King Orodes, and the former a child of Titus Labienus. I will narrate how he came among the Parthians and what he did in conjunction with Pacorus. He was by chance an ally of Brutus and Cassius and had been sent to Orodes before the battle to secure some help: he was detained by him a long time —24— B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712)

B. C. 42 (*a. u.* 712) and his presence ignored, because the king hesitated to conclude the alliance with him yet feared to refuse. Subsequently, when news of the defeat was brought and it appeared to be the intention of the victors to spare no one who had resisted them, he remained among the barbarians, choosing to live with them rather than perish at home. This Labienus, accordingly, as soon as he perceived Antony's relaxation, his passion, and his journeying into Egypt, persuaded the Parthian monarch to make an attempt upon the Romans. He said that their armies had been partly ruined, partly damaged, and that the remainder of the warriors were in revolt and would again be at war. Therefore he advised the king to subjugate Syria and the adjoining districts, while Cæsar was detained in Italy and with Sextus, and Antony abandoned himself to love in Egypt. He promised that he would act as leader in the war, and announced that in this way he could detach many of the provinces, inasmuch as they were hostile to the Romans owing to the latter's

—25— B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713) constant ill treatment of them. By such words Labienus persuaded Orodes to wage war and the king entrusted to him a large force and his son Pacorus, and with them invaded Phœnicia. They marched to Apamea and were repulsed from the wall, but won over the garrisons in the country without resistance. These had belonged to the troops that followed Brutus and Cassius. Antony had incorporated them in his own forces and at this time had assigned them to garrison Syria because they knew the country. So Labienus

easily won over these men, since they were well acquainted with him, all except Saxa, their temporary leader. He was a brother of the general and was quæstor, and hence he alone refused to join the Parthian invaders. Saxa the general was conquered in a set battle through the numbers and ability of the cavalry, and when later by night he made a dash from his entrenchments to get away, he was pursued. His flight was due to his fear that his associates might take up with the cause of Labienus, who labored to prevail upon them by shooting various pamphlets into the camp. Labienus took possession of these men and slew the greater part, then captured Apamea, which no longer resisted when Saxa had fled into Antioch, since he was believed to be dead; he later captured Antioch, which the fugitive had abandoned, and at last, pursuing him in his flight into Cilicia, seized the man himself and killed him. Upon his death Pacorus made himself master of Syria and subjugated all of it except Tyre. This city the Romans that survived and the natives who sided with them had occupied in advance, and neither persuasion nor force (for Pacorus had no fleet) could prevail against them. They accordingly remained secure from capture. The rest Pacorus gained and then invaded Palestine, where he removed from office Hyrcanus, to whom the affairs of the district had been entrusted by the Romans, and set up his brother Aristobulus[1] as ruler instead because of the enmity ex-

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

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1 This is an error either of Dio or of some copyist. The person made king of the Jews at this time was in reality Antigonus the son of Aristobulus and nephew of Hyrcanus. Compare chapter 41 of this book, and Book Forty-nine, chapter 22.

In this same sentence I read ἔχθος (as Boissevain and the MSS.) in place of ἔθος.

B. C. 41 (a. u. 713) isting between them. Meantime Labienus had occupied Cilicia and had obtained the allegiance of the cities of the mainland except Stratonicea; Plancus in fear of him had crossed over to the islands: most of these towns he took without conflict, but Mylasa and Alabanda with great peril. These cities had accepted garrisons from him, but murdered them on the occasion of a festival and revolted. For this he himself punished the people of Alabanda when he had captured it, and razed to the ground Mylasa, abandoned by the dwellers there. Stratonicea he besieged for a long time, but was unable to capture it in any way.

In satisfaction of the defections mentioned he continued to levy money and rob the temples; and he named himself imperator and Parthicus,— the latter being quite the opposite of the Roman custom, in that he took his title from those he had led against his countrymen: whereas regularly it would imply that he had —27— conquered the Parthians instead of citizens. Antony kept hearing of these operations as he did of whatever else was being done, such as matters in Italy, of which he was not in the least ignorant; but in each instance he failed to make a timely defence, for owing to passion and drunkenness he devoted no thought either to his allies or to his enemies. While he had been classed as a subordinate and was pursuing high prizes, he gave strict attention to his task: when, however, he attained power, he no longer gave painstaking care to any single matter but joined in the wanton life of Cleopatra

and the rest of the Egyptians until he was entirely undone. Rather late he was at last forced to bestir himself and sailed to Tyre with the announcement that he was going to aid it, but on seeing that the remainder of the country had been occupied before his coming, he deserted the inhabitants on the pretext that he had to wage war against Sextus. On the other hand he excused his dilatoriness with regard to the latter by bringing forward the activity of the Parthians. So on account of Sextus he gave no assistance to his allies and on account of his allies no assistance to Italy, but coasted along the mainland as far as Asia and crossed into Greece. There, after meeting his mother and wife, he made Cæsar his enemy and cemented a friendship with Sextus. After this he went over to Italy and got possession of Sipontum but besieged Brundusium, which refused to come to terms with him. B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

—28—

While he was thus engaged, Cæsar, who had already arrived from Gaul, had collected his forces and had sent Publius Servilius Rullus to Brundusium, and Agrippa against Sipontum. The latter took the city by storm, but Servilius was suddenly attacked by Antony who destroyed many and won over many others. The two leaders had thus broken out into open war and proceeded to send about to the cities and to the veterans, or to any place whence they thought they could get any aid. All Italy was again thrown into turmoil and Rome especially; some were already choosing one side or the other, and others were hesitating. While the chief figures themselves and those who were to follow

B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714) their fortunes were in a quiver of excitement, Fulvia died in Sicyon,— the city where she was staying. Antony was really responsible for her death through his passion for Cleopatra and the latter's lewdness. But at any rate, when this news was announced, both sides laid down their arms and effected a reconciliation, either because Fulvia had actually been the original cause of their variance or because they chose to make her death an excuse in view of the fear with which each inspired the other and the equality of their forces and hopes. The arrangement made allotted to Cæsar Sardinia, Dalmatia, Spain and Gaul, and to Antony all the districts that belonged to the Romans across the Ionian Sea, both in Europe and in Asia. The provinces in Libya were held by Lepidus, and Sicily by Sextus.

—29— The government they divided anew in this way and the war against Sextus they made a common duty, although Antony through messengers had taken oaths before him against Cæsar. And it was chiefly for this reason that Cæsar had schooled himself to receive under a general amnesty all those who had gone over to the enemy in the war with Lucius, Antony's brother, some among them, Domitius particularly, who had been of the assassins, as well as all those whose names had been posted on the tablets or had in any way coöperated with Brutus and Cassius and later embraced the cause of Antony. So great is the irony to be found in factions and wars; for those in power decide nothing according to justice, but determine on friend and foe as their temporary needs and advantages demand.

Therefore they regard the same men now as enemies, now as useful helpers, according to the occasion. B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

When they had reached this agreement in the camp outside Brundusium, they entertained each other, Cæsar in a soldierly, Roman fashion, and Antony with Asiatic and Egyptian manners. As it appeared that they had become reconciled, the soldiers who were at that time following Cæsar surrounded Antony and demanded of him the money which they had promised them before the battle of Philippi. It was for this he had been sent into Asia, to collect as much as possible. And when he failed to give them anything, they would certainly have done him some harm, if Cæsar had not restrained them by feeding them with new hopes. After this experience, to guard against further unruliness, they sent those soldiers who were clearly disqualified by age into the colonies, and then took up the war anew. For Sextus had come into Italy according to the agreement made between himself and Antony, intending with the latter's help to wage war against Cæsar: when he learned that they had settled their difficulties he himself went back into Sicily, but ordered Menas, a freedman of his on whom he placed great reliance, to coast about with a portion of the fleet and damage the interests of the other side. He, accordingly, inflicted injury upon considerable of Etruria and managed to capture alive Marcus Titius, the son of Titius who had been proscribed and was then with Sextus; this son had gathered ships for enterprises of his own and was blockading the province of Narbonensis. Titius under- —30—

B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714) went no punishment, being preserved for his father's sake and because his soldiers carried the name of Sextus on their shields: he did not, however, recompense his benefactor fairly, but fought him to the last ditch and finally slew him, so that his name is remembered among the most prominent of his kind. Menas besides the exploits mentioned sailed to Sardinia and had a conflict with Marcus Lurius, the governor there; and at first he was routed, but later when the other was pursuing him heedlessly he awaited the attack and contrary to expectations won a victory in turn. Thereupon his enemy abandoned the island and he occupied it. All the towns capitulated, save Caralis, which he took by siege: it was there that many fugitives from the battle had taken refuge. He released without ransom among others of the captives Helenus, a freedman of Cæsar in whom his master took especial delight: he thus laid up for himself with that ruler a kindness long in advance by way of preparing a refuge for himself, if he should ever need aught at Cæsar's hands.

—31— He was occupied as above described. And the people in Rome refused to remain quiet since Sardinia was in hostile hands, the coast was being pillaged, and they had been cut off from importation of grain, while famine and the great number of taxes of all sorts that were being imposed and the "contributions," in addition, that were laid upon such as possessed slaves irritated them greatly. As much as they were pleased with the reconciliation of Antony and Cæsar,— for

they thought that harmony between these men meant peace for themselves,— they were equally or more displeased at the war the two men were carrying on against Sextus. But a short time previously they had brought the two rulers into the city mounted on horses as if at a triumph, and had bestowed upon them the triumphal robe precisely similar to that worn by persons celebrating, had made them view the festivals from their chairs of state and had hastened to espouse to Antony, when once her husband was dead, Octavia the sister of Cæsar, though she was then pregnant. Now, however, they changed their behavior to a remarkable degree. At first forming in groups or gathering at some spectacle they urged Antony and Cæsar to secure peace, crying out a great deal to this effect. When the men in power would not heed them, they fell at odds with them and favored Sextus. They talked frequently in his behalf, and at the horse-races honored by a loud clapping of hands the statue of Neptune carried in the procession, evincing great pleasure at it. When for some days it was not brought in, they took stones and drove the officials from the Forum, threw down the images of Cæsar and Antony, and finally, on not accomplishing anything in this way even, rushed violently upon them as if to kill them. Cæsar, although his followers were wounded, rent his clothes and betook himself to supplicating them, whereas Antony presented a less yielding front. Hence, because the wrath of the populace was aroused to the highest pitch and it was feared that they would commit some violence,

B. C. 40
(*a. u.* 714)

B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714) the two rulers were forced unwillingly to make propositions of peace to Sextus.

—32— Meantime they removed the prætors and the consuls, though it was now near the close of the year, and appointed others instead, caring little that these would have but a few days to hold office. (One of those who at this time became consuls was Lucius Cornelius Balbus, of Gades, who so much surpassed the men of his generation in wealth and munificence that at his death he left a bequest of twenty-five denarii to each of the Romans.) They not only did this, but when an ædile died on the last day of the year, they chose another to fill out the closing hours. It was at this same time that the so-called Julian supply of water was piped into Rome and the festival that had been vowed for the successful completion of the war against the assassins was held by the consuls. The duties belonging to the so-called Septemviri were performed by the pontifices, since none of the former was present: this was also done on many other occasions.

—33— Besides these events which took place that year Cæsar gave a public funeral to his pedagogue Sphærus, who had been freed by him. Also he put to death Salvidienus Rufus, suspected of plotting against him. This man was of most obscure origin, and while he was a shepherd a flame had issued from his head. He had been so greatly advanced by Cæsar that he was made consul without even being a member of the senate, and his brother who died before him had been laid to rest across the Tiber, a bridge being constructed for this

very purpose. But nothing human is lasting, and he was finally accused in the senate by Cæsar himself and executed as an enemy of his and of the entire people; thanksgivings were offered for his downfall and furthermore the care of the city was committed to the triumvirs with the customary admonition, "that it should suffer no harm." In the year previous to this men belonging to the order of knights had slaughtered wild beasts at the horse-race which came in the course of the Ludi Apollinares, and an intercalary day was inserted, contrary to custom, in order that the market held every nine days should not fall on the first day of the following year,— something which was strictly forbidden from very early times. Naturally the day had to be subtracted again later, in order that the calendar should run according to the system devised by the former Cæsar. The domain of Attalus and of Deiotarus, who had both died in Gaul, was given to a certain Castor. Also the so-called Lex Falcidia, which has the greatest force even still in regard to the succession to inheritances, was enacted by Publius Falcidius, a tribune: its terms are that if an heir feels oppressed in any way, he may secure at least a fourth of the property left behind by surrendering the rest.

B. C. 40 (*a. u.* 714)

B. C. 41 (*a. u.* 713)

These were the events of the two years; the next season, when Lucius Marcius and Gaius Sabinus held the consulship, the acts of the triumvirs from the time they had formed a close combination received ratification at the hands of the senate, and certain further taxes were imposed by them, because the expenditures

—34—
B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715)

B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715) proved far greater than had been allowed for in the time of the former Cæsar. For they were expending vast sums, especially upon the soldiers, and were ashamed of being the only ones to lay out money contrary to custom. Then I might mention that Cæsar now for the first time shaved his beard, and held a magnificent entertainment himself besides granting all the other citizens a festival at public expense. He also kept his chin smooth afterward, like the rest; he was already beginning to conceive a passion for Livia, and for this reason divorced at once Scribonia, who had borne him a daughter. Hence, as the expenditures grew far greater than before, and the revenues were not anywhere sufficient but at this time came in in even smaller amounts by reason of the factional disputes, they introduced certain new taxes; and they enrolled in the senate as many persons as possible, not only from among the allies or soldiers, or sons of freedmen, but even slaves. At any rate one Maximus, when about to become quæstor, was recognized by his master and taken away. And he incurred no injury through having dared to stand for the office: but another who had been caught serving as a prætor, was hurled down the rocks of the Capitol, having been first freed, that there might be some legal justification for his punishment.[1]

—35— The expedition which Antony was getting in readiness against the Parthians afforded them some excuse for the mass of prospective senators. The same plea

[1] Hurling from the Tarpeian rock was a punishment that might be inflicted only upon freemen. Slaves would commonly be crucified or put out of the way by some method involving similar disgrace.

permitted them to extend all the offices for a number of years and that of consul to eight full years, rewarding some of those who had coöperated with them, and bringing others to trial. They chose not two annual consuls, as had been the custom, but now for the first time several, and on the very day of the elections. Formerly, to be sure, some had held office after others who had neither died nor been removed for disenfranchisement or in any other way: but those persons had become officials as suited those who had been elected for the entire year, whereas now no magistrate was chosen to serve for a year, but first one, then another would be appointed for different divisions of the entire time. Also the men first to enter upon office were accustomed to hold the title of the consulship through the entire year as is now done: the rest were accorded the same title by the dwellers in the capital themselves and by the people in the rest of Italy during each period of their office (as is also now the custom), but those in outside nations knew few or none of them and therefore called them lesser consuls. B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715)

This was the situation at home when the leaders first made proposals to Sextus through companions as to how and on what terms they could effect a reconciliation; afterward the parties concerned held a conference near Misenum. The two from the capital took their stand on the land, the other on a kind of mound constructed for his safety in the sea, by which it was purposely surrounded, not far from them. There was also present the entire fleet of Sextus and the entire infantry force —36—

B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715) of the other two; and not that merely, but the one command had been drawn up on the shore and the other on the ships, both fully armed, so that this very fact made it perfectly evident to all that it was from fear of their accoutrement and from necessity, that the two rulers were making peace because of the people and Sextus because of his adherents. The compact was framed upon the following conditions,— that the deserters from among the slaves should be free and that all those driven out, save the assassins, should be restored. The latter, of course, they had to exclude, but in reality several of them were destined to return. Sextus himself, indeed, was thought to have been one of them. It was recorded, at any rate, that all the rest save those mentioned should be allowed to return under a general amnesty and with a right to a quarter of their confiscated property; that tribuneships, prætorships and priesthoods should be given to some of them immediately; that Sextus himself should be chosen consul and be appointed augur, should obtain seventeen hundred and fifty myriads of denarii from his paternal estate, and should govern Sicily, Sardinia and Achæa for five years, not receiving deserters nor acquiring more ships nor keeping any garrisons in Italy, but bending his efforts to secure peace on the sea for the peninsula, and sending a stated amount of grain to the people of the City. They limited him to this period of time because they wished it to appear that they also were holding merely a temporary and not an unending authority.

—37—
B. C. 39
(*a. u.* 715)

After settling and drafting these compacts they deposited the documents with the priestesses,— the vestal virgins,— and then exchanged pledges and treated one another as friends. Upon this a tremendous and inextinguishable shout arose from the mainland and the ships at once. For many soldiers and many individuals who were present suddenly uttered a cry in unison because they were terribly tired of the war and vehemently desired peace. And the mountains resounded so that great panic and alarm were spread, and many died of fright at the very reverberation, while others perished by being trampled under foot and suffocated. Those who were in the small boats did not wait to reach the land itself but jumped out into the sea and the rest rushed out into the breakers. Meantime they embraced one another while swimming and threw their arms around one another's necks under water, making a diversified picture accompanied by diversified sounds. Some knew that their relatives and associates were living and seeing them present gave way to unrestrained joy. Others, thinking that those dear to them had died previously, saw them now unexpectedly and for a long time knew not what to do but were rendered speechless, distrusting their sight yet praying that it might be true; and they were not sure of them until they had called their names and had heard them say something. They rejoiced as if the men had been brought to life again, but as they were forced to share their pleasure with a multitude they did not continue without tears. Again, some who were unaware that their loved ones had per-

B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715) ished and thought they were alive and present sought for them and went about asking every one they met regarding them. As long as they could learn nothing they were like maniacs and were torn different ways, both hoping to find them and fearing that they were dead,— not able to despair in view of their desire nor to indulge in grief in view of their hope. On learning at last the truth they would tear their hair and rend their clothing, calling upon the lost by name as if they could hear anything and giving way to grief as if their friends were just dead and lying there somewhere. And if any of them were affected in no such way, they were at least disturbed by the experiences of the rest. They either rejoiced with somebody in joy or grieved with somebody in pain, and so, even if they were free from personal interest, yet they could not remain indifferent on account of their connection with the rest. As a result there was no possibility of their being either sated or ashamed, because they were all affected in the same way, and they spent the entire day as well as the greater part of the night in this behavior.

—38— After this the parties chiefly concerned as well as the rest received one another and inaugurated entertainments in turn, first Sextus on the ship and then Cæsar and Antony on the shore. Sextus so far surpassed them in power that he would not disembark to meet them on the mainland until they had gone aboard his boat. In the course of this proceeding, however, he refused to murder them both in the small boat with only a few followers, though he might easily have done so and

Menas advised it.[1] To Antony, who had possession of his ancestral home at Carinæ (the spot so named is in the city of Rome), he uttered a jest in the happiest manner, saying that he was entertaining them at Carinæ,— that is, on the "keels of ships," which is the meaning of the word in Latin. Nevertheless he did not act in any way as if he bore malice toward them, and on the following day he was feasted in turn and betrothed his daughter to Marcus Marcellus, the nephew of Cæsar. B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715)

This war, then, had been deferred: that of Labienus and the Parthians came to an end in the following way. Antony himself returned from Italy to Greece and delayed there a very long time, satisfying his desires and harming the cities, to the end that they should be delivered to Sextus in the weakest possible condition. He lived during this time in many ways contrary to the customs of his country. He called himself the younger Dionysus and insisted on being called so by others. When the Athenians in view of this and his other behavior betrothed Athena to him, he declared he accepted the marriage and he exacted from them a dowry of one hundred myriads. While he was occupied in this way he sent Publius Ventidius before him into Asia. The latter came upon Labienus before his presence was announced and terrified him by the suddenness of his approach and by his legions; for the Parthian leader was separated from the members of —39—

1 After "Menas advised it" Zonaras in his version of Dio has: "bidding him cut the ship's cable, if he liked, and sail away."

B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715) his tribe and had only soldiers from the neighborhood. Ventidius found that he would not even risk a conflict and so pushed him back and pursued him into Syria, taking the lightest part of his fighting force with him on the expedition. He overtook him near the Taurus range and allowed him to proceed no farther, and they encamped there quietly for several days. Labienus awaited the Parthians and Ventidius the heavy-armed

—40— soldiers. Both came at once during the same days and Ventidius through fear of the barbarian cavalry remained on the high ground, where he was encamped. The Parthians, because of their numbers and because they had conquered once before, despised their opponents and rode up to the hill at dawn, before joining Labienus; as no one came out to meet them, they attacked it, charging straight up the incline. When they were in that position the Romans rushed out and easily routed them, as it was down-hill. Many of the assailants were killed in conflict, but still more in turning back were confused with one another; for some had already been routed and others were coming up. The survivors took refuge not with Labienus but in Cilicia. Ventidius pursued them as far as the camp, and there, seeing Labienus, stopped. The latter marshaled his forces as if to offer him battle, but perceiving that his soldiers were dejected by reason of the flight of the barbarians he did not then venture any opposition and when night came he attempted to escape in some direction. Ventidius learned beforehand from deserters of the contemplated move and by posting am-

bushes killed many in the retreat and took possession of the rest, who were abandoned by Labienus. The latter by changing his dress reached safety and for some time escaped detection in Cilicia. Later he was captured by Demetrius, a freedman of the former Cæsar, who had at this time been assigned to Cyprus by Antony. He learned that Labienus was in hiding and made a search for him, which resulted in the fugitive's arrest. B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715)

After this Ventidius recovered Cilicia and attended himself to the administration of this district, but sent ahead Pompædius Silo with cavalry to Amanus. This is a mountain on the border between Cilicia and Syria, and contains a pass so narrow that a wall and gates were once built across it and the place received its name from that fact. Silo, however, found himself unable to occupy it and ran in danger of being annihilated by Phranapates, lieutenant of Pacorus, who was guarding the passage. And that would have been his fate, had not Ventidius by chance come upon him when he was fighting and defended him. He attacked the barbarians, who were not looking for his arrival and were likewise fewer in number, and slew Phranapates and many others. In this way he gained Syria deserted by the Parthians,— all except the district of the Aradii,— and subsequently without effort occupied Palestine, by scaring away from it King Antigonus. Besides accomplishing this he exacted large sums of money from the rest individually, and large sums also from Antigonus and Antiochus and Malchus the Na- —41—

B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715) bathæan, because they had given help to Pacorus. Ventidius himself received no reward for these achievements from the senate, since he was acting not with full powers, but as a lieutenant: Antony, however, obtained praise and thanksgivings. As for the Aradii, they were afraid that they might have to pay the penalty for what they had ventured against Antony, and would not come to terms though they were besieged by him for a time; later they were with difficulty captured by others.

About this same time an uprising took place in Parthian Illyricum, but was put down by Pollio after some conflicts. There was another on the part of the Ceretani in Spain, and they were subjugated by Calvinus after he had had some little preliminary successes and also a preliminary setback; this last was occasioned by his lieutenant, who was ambuscaded by the barbarians and deserted by his soldiers. Their leader undertook no operation against the enemy until he had punished them. Calling them together as if for some other purpose he had the rest of the army surround them; and out of two companies of a hundred he chose out every tenth man for punishment and chastised the centurion who was serving in the so-called primus pilus as well as many others. After doing this and gaining, like Marcus Crassus, a renown for his disciplining the army, he set out against his opponents and with no great difficulty vanquished them. He obtained a triumph in spite of the fact that Spain was assigned to Cæsar; for the rulers could at will grant the

—42—

honors to those who served as their lieutenants. The money customarily given by the cities for the purpose Calvinus took only from the Spanish towns, and of it he spent a part on the festival but the greater portion on the palace. It had been burned down and he built it up, adorning it splendidly at the dedication with various objects and with images, in particular, which he asked from Cæsar, implying that he would send them back. Though asked for them later, he did not return them, excusing himself by a witticism. Pretending that he had not enough assistants, he said: "Send some men and take them." Cæsar shrank from seizure of sacred things and hence allowed them to remain as votive offerings. B. C. 39 (*a. u.* 715)

This is what happened at that time. Now in the consulship of Appius Claudius and Gaius Norbanus, who were the first to have two quæstors apiece as associates, the populace revolted against the taxgatherers, who oppressed them severely, and came to blows with the men themselves, their assistants, and the soldiers that helped them to exact the money; and sixty-seven prætors one after another were appointed and held office. One who was chosen to be quæstor while still reckoned as a child then on the next day obtained the standing of a iuvenis: and another person who had been enrolled in the senate desired to fight in the arena. He was prevented, however, from doing this, and an act was passed prohibiting any senator from taking part in gladiatorial combats, any slave from serving as lictor, and any burning of dead bodies from being carried on within fifteen stadia of the city. —43— B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

B. C. 38
(*a. u.* 716)

Many things of a portentous nature had come to pass even before that time (such as olive oil spouting beside the Tiber), and many, also, precisely then. The tent of Romulus was burned as a result of some ritual which the pontifices were performing in it; a statue of Virtus, standing before some of the gates, fell upon its face; and certain persons rendered inspired by the Mother of the Gods declared that the goddess was angry with them. On this point the Sibylline books were consulted. They made the same statements and prescribed that the statue be taken down to the sea and purified with water from it. In obedience to the order the goddess went very far indeed out into the surges, where she remained an extremely long time and returned only quite late,— her action causing the Romans no little fear, so that they did not recover courage until four palm trees grew up round about her temple and in the Forum.

Besides these occurrences at the time Cæsar married
—44— Livia. She was the daughter of Livius Drusus, who had been among those proscribed by the tablet and had committed suicide after the defeat in Macedonia, and the wife of Nero, whom she had accompanied in his flight, as has been related. She was also in the sixth month with child from him. When Cæsar accordingly hesitated and enquired of the pontifices whether it was permissible to wed her while pregnant, they answered that if the origin of the fœtus were doubtful, the marriage should be put off, but if it were definitely admitted, nothing prevented an immediate consummation.

Perhaps they really found this among the ordinances of the forefathers, but certainly they would have said so, even had they not found it. The woman was given in marriage by her husband himself, as some father might do. And the following incident occurred at the marriage feast. One of the prattling boys, such as women frequently keep about them naked to play with,[1] on seeing Livia reclining in one place with Cæsar and Nero in another with some man, went up to her and said: "What are you doing here, mistress? For your husband," pointing him out, "is reclining over there." After these events, when the woman went to live with Cæsar, she gave birth to Claudius Drusus Nero. Cæsar took him and sent him to his father, making this entry in the records, that Cæsar returned to its father Nero the child borne by Livia, his own wife. Nero died not long after and left Cæsar himself as guardian to this boy and to Tiberius: the populace had a good deal to say about this, among other things that the prosperous have children in three months; and this saying passed into a proverb. B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

—45—

At just about the same time that this was going on in the city Bogud the Moor sailed to Spain, acting either on instructions from Antony or on his own motion, and did much damage, receiving also considerable injury in return: meantime the people of his own land in the neighborhood of Tingi rose against him, and so he evacuated Spain but failed to win back his own domain. For the adherents of Cæsar in Spain and

1 Suetonius (Life of Augustus, chapter 83) also mentions this fashion.

B. C. 38 (a. u. 716) Bocchus came to the aid of the rebels and proved too much for him. Bogud departed to join Antony, while Bocchus forthwith took possession of his kingdom, and this act was afterward confirmed by Cæsar. The Tingitanians were given citizenship.

At this time and even earlier Sextus and Cæsar had broken out into war; for since they had come to an agreement not of their own free will or choice but under compulsion, they did not abide by it any time at all, so to speak, but broke the truce at once and stood opposed. They were destined to come to war under any conditions, even if they had found no excuse; their alleged grievances, however, were the following. Menas, who was at this time still in Sardinia, as if he were a kind of prætor, had incurred the suspicion of Sextus by his release of Helenus and because he had been in communication with Cæsar, and he was slandered to some extent by his peers, who envied his position of power. He was therefore summoned by Sextus on the pretext that he should give an account of the grain and money of which he had charge; instead of obeying he seized and killed the men sent to him on this errand, and after negotiating with Cæsar surrendered to him the island, the fleet together with the army, and himself. Cæsar was glad to see him and declared that Sextus was harboring deserters contrary to the treaty, having triremes built, and keeping garrisons in Italy: and so far from giving up Menas on demand, he supported him in great honor, gave him the decoration of gold rings, and enrolled him in the order of the knights.

The matter of the gold rings is as follows. Of the ancient Romans no one,— not to mention such as had once been slaves,— who had grown up as a free citizen even, was allowed to wear gold rings, save senators and knights,— as has been stated. Therefore they are given to those freedmen whom the man in power may select; although they may use gold in other ways, this is still an additional honor and distinguishes them as superior, or as capable, through having been freed, of becoming knights. B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

Such is the matter in question. Sextus, having this as a reproach against Cæsar, and the further facts that Achæa had been impoverished and the rights agreed upon were not granted either to him or to the restored exiles, sent to Italy Menecrates, another freedman of his, and had him ravage Volturnum and other parts of Campania. Cæsar on learning this took the documents containing the treaty from the vestal virgins and sent for Antony and Lepidus. Lepidus did not at once obey. Antony came to Brundusium from Greece where, by chance, he still was: but before he met Cæsar, who was in Etruria, he became alarmed because a wolf had entered his headquarters and killed soldiers; so he sailed back to Greece again, making the urgency of the Parthian situation his excuse. Cæsar, however much he felt that he had been abandoned by his colleague with the purpose that he should face the difficulties of the war alone, nevertheless showed no anger openly. Sextus kept repeating that Antony was not for punishing him and set himself more zealously to the task —46—

B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716) in hand. Finally he sailed against Italy, landed at different points, inflicted much injury and endured much in return. Meantime off Cyme there was a naval battle between Menecrates and Calvisius Sabinus. In this several ships of Cæsar were destroyed, because he was arrayed against expert seafarers; but Menecrates out of rivalry attacked Menas and perished, making the loss of Sextus an equal one. For this reason the latter laid no claim to victory and Cæsar consoled himself over the defeat. He happened at this time to be in Rhegium, and the party of Sextus feared he would cross over into Sicily; and being somewhat disheartened, too, at the death of Menecrates, they set sail from Cyme. Sabinus pursued them as far as Scyllæum, the Italian promontory, without trouble. But, as he was rounding that point, a great wind fell upon him, hurling some of the ships against the promontory, sinking others out at sea, and scattering all the rest. Sextus on ascertaining this sent the fleet under command of Apollophanes against them. He, discovering Cæsar coasting along somewhere in these parts with the intention of crossing into Sicily along with Sabinus, made a dash upon him. Cæsar had the ships come to anchor, marshaled the heavy-armed soldiers upon them, and at first made a noble resistance. The ships were drawn up with prows facing outward and so offered no safe point for attack, but being shorter and higher could do more hurt to those that approached them, and the heavy-armed fighters, when they could come in conflict with the enemy, proved far superior.

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Apollophanes, however, transferred such as were wounded and were in difficulty from time to time to other ships assigned for the purpose, by backing water, and took on board fresh men; he also made constant charges and used missiles carrying fire, so that his adversary was at last routed, fled to the land, and came to anchor. When even then the pursuers pressed him hard, some of Cæsar's ships suddenly cut their anchors and unexpectedly offered opposition. It was only this and the fact that night interrupted operations that kept Apollophanes from burning some of the ships and towing all the rest away. B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

After this event an ill-fated wind on the following day fell upon Cæsar and Sabinus as they were anchored together and made their previous reverse seem small. The fleet of Sabinus suffered the less, for Menas, being an old hand on the sea, foresaw the storm. He immediately stationed his ships out at sea, letting them ride with slack anchors some distance apart, so that the ropes should not be stretched and break; then he rowed directly against the wind, and in this way no rope was strained, and he remained constantly in the same position, recovering by the use of the oars all the distance which he lost by the impetus of the wind. The remaining commanders, because they had gone through a severe experience the day before, and as yet had no precise knowledge of nautical matters, were cast out upon the shore close by and lost many ships. The night, which had been of the greatest aid to them before, was now among the chief agencies in promoting —48—

B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716) disaster. All through it the wind blew violently, tearing the vessels from their anchors and dashing them against the rocks. That of course was the end of them, and the sailors and marines likewise perished without hope of rescue, since the darkness prevented them from seeing ahead and they could not hear a word because of the uproar and the reverberation from the mountains, especially since the wind smote them in the face. So it was that Cæsar despaired of Sicily and was satisfied to guard the coast country: Sextus on the other hand was still more elated, believing himself in very truth to be the son of Neptune, and he put on a dark blue robe besides, as some relate, casting horses as well as men alive into the straits. He plundered and harassed Italy himself, sending Apollophanes to Libya. The latter was pursued by Menas, who overtook and injured him. The islands round about Sicily went over to the side of Sextus, whereupon Cæsar seized the territory of the Lipareans in advance and ejecting them from the island conveyed them to Campania, where he forced them to live in Neapolis so long as the war —49— should continue. Meantime he kept having boats made throughout almost all of Italy and collected slaves for rowers first from his friends, who were supposed to give willingly, and then from the rest,— senators and knights and well-to-do private citizens. He also assembled heavy-armed troops and gathered money from all citizens, allies, and subjects, both in Italy and abroad.

This year and the following he spent on the con-

struction of ships and the gathering and training of rowers. He himself oversaw and arranged these details and all other matters in Italy and in Gaul (where there was a slight uprising). To Agrippa he entrusted the equipment of the boats. He sent for this man, who was fighting against the revolted Gauls, at the time when he had been the second of the Romans to cross the Rhine for purposes of warfare, and he honored him by bestowing a triumph and bidding him to secure the building and training of the fleet. Agrippa,— he was consul with Lucius Gallus,— would not hold the triumph, deeming it disgraceful for him to exalt himself when Cæsar had fared poorly, but set to work heart and soul to fit out the fleet. All along the coasts of Italy vessels were taking shape; but since no shore was found safe for them to ride at anchor,— the majority of the coast land being still in those days without harbors,— he conceived and executed a magnificent enterprise which I shall describe at some length, showing its nature and the present characteristics of the locality where it took place. B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717)

At Cyme in Campania, between Misenum and Puteoli, there is a crescent-shaped spot. It is shut in by small hills, bare except in a few places, and the sea there forms a kind of triple bay. The first is outside and near the cities; the second is separated from it by a small passage; and the third, like a real harbor, is seen far back. The last named is called Avernus, and the middle bay Lucrinus: the outer one belongs to the Tyrrhenian Sea and takes its name from that water. —50—

B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717) In this roadstead within the other two, which had but narrow entrances then, Agrippa, by cutting channels close along the shore through the land separating Lucrinus from the sea on each side, produced harbors affording most safe anchorage for ships. While the men were working a certain image situated above Avernus, either of Calypso to whom this place, whither they say Odysseus also sailed, is devoted, or to some other heroine, was covered with sweat like a human body. —51— Now what this imported I cannot say; but I will go on to tell of everything else worth reporting which I saw in that place. These mountains close to the inner bodies of water have springs full of both fire and water in considerable quantity mixed together. Neither of the two elements is anywhere to be found by itself (that is, neither pure fire or cold water alone is to be seen) but from their association the water is heated and the fire moistened. The former on its way down the foothills to the sea runs into reservoirs and the inhabitants conduct the steam from it through pipes into rooms set up high, where they use the steam for vapor baths. The higher it ascends from the earth and from the water, the dryer it becomes. Costly apparatus has been installed for turning both the fire and the vapor to practical use; and they are very well suited for employment in the conduct of daily life and also for effecting cures.

Now besides these products that mountain makes an earth, the peculiar nature of which I am going to describe. Since the fire has not the power of burning

(for by its union with the water all its blazing qualities are extinguished) but is still able to separate and melt the substances with which it comes in contact, it follows that the oily part of the earth is melted by it, whereas the hard and what I might call the bony part of it is left as it was. Hence the masses of earth necessarily become porous and when exposed to the dry air crumble into dust, but when they are placed in a swirl of water and sand grow into a solid piece; as much of them as is in the liquid hardens and petrifies. The reason for this is that the brittle element in them is disintegrated and broken up by the fire, which possesses the same nature, but by the admixture of dampness is chilled, and so, being compressed all over, through and through, becomes indissoluble. Such is Baiæ, where Agrippa as soon as he had constructed the entrances collected ships and rowers, of which he fortified the former with armor and trained the latter to row on wooden benches. B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717)

Now the population of Rome was being disturbed by signs. Among the various pieces of news brought to them was one to the effect that many dolphins battled with one another and perished near Aspis, the African city. And in the vicinity of the City blood descended from heaven and was smeared all about by the birds. When at the Ludi Romani not one of the senators was entertained on the Capitol, as had been the custom, they took this, too, as a portent. Again, the incident that happened to Livia caused her pleasure, but inspired the rest with terror. A white bird carrying a —52—

B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717) sprig of fruited laurel had been thrown by an eagle into her lap. As this seemed to be a sign of no small importance, she took care of the bird and planted the laurel. The latter took root and grew, so that it amply supplied those who were afterward to celebrate triumphs; and Livia was destined to hold Cæsar's power in a fold of her robe and to dominate him in everything. —53— The rest, however, in the City had their peace of mind thoroughly shattered by this and the differences between officials. Not only the consuls and prætors but even the quæstors were arrayed against one another, and this lasted for some time. The reason was that all were anxious not so much to hold office a longer time at home as to be counted among the ex-officials and secure the outward honors and influence that belonged to that class. They were no longer chosen for any specified time, but took just long enough to enter upon the title of the office and resign, whenever it so seemed good to those in power. Many did both on the same day. Some actually had to abandon hope of offices through poverty, and in this I am not speaking of those then supporting Sextus, who had been disenfranchised as if by some principle of right. But we have the case of a certain Marcus Oppius who through lack of means desired to resign the ædileship,— both he and his father had been among the proscribed,— and the populace would not permit it, but contributed money for his various necessities of life and the expenses of his office. And the story goes that some criminals, too, really came into the theatre in masks

as if they were actors and left their money there with the rest. So this man was loved by the multitude while in life and at his death not long after was carried to the Campus Martius and there burned and buried. The senate was indignant at the utter devotion of the masses to him and took up his bones, on the plea that it was impious for them to lie in that consecrated spot; they were persuaded by the pontifices to make this declaration although they buried many other men there both before and after. B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717)

At this same period Antony came into Italy again from Syria. The reason he gave was that he intended to bear his share of the war against Sextus because of Cæsar's mishaps; he did not, however, stay by his colleague, but, having come to spy upon his actions rather than to accomplish anything, he gave him some ships and promised to send others, in return for which he received heavy-armed infantry and set sail himself, stating that he was going to conduct a campaign against the Parthians. Before he departed they presented to each other their mutual grievances, at first through friends and then personally. As they had no leisure for war together they became reconciled in a way, chiefly through the instrumentality of Octavia. In order that they might be bound by still more ties of relationship Cæsar betrothed his daughter to Antyllus, Antony's son, and Antony betrothed to Domitius, though he had been an assassin of Cæsar and had been proscribed to die, his own daughter, borne to him by Octavia. This was all mutual pretence. They had no intention of carrying out any of these unions, but were acting a part in view of the needs of the existing —54—

B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717) situation. Furthermore Antony sent Octavia herself at once from Corcyra to Italy, that she might not share his danger while he was warring against the Parthians. Besides the above negotiations at that time they removed Sextus from his priesthood as well as from the consulship to which he had been appointed, and granted themselves chief authority for another five years, since the first period had elapsed. After this Antony hastened to Syria and Cæsar gave his attention to the war. Nearly everything went as he wished, but Menas, who was naturally untrustworthy and always followed the fortunes of the stronger, and was further vexed because he held no office but had been made a subordinate of Sabinus, deserted again to Sextus.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
49

The following is contained in the Forty-ninth of Dio's Rome.

How Cæsar conquered Sextus and overthrew Lepidus (chapters 1–18).

How Ventidius conquered and slew Pacorus and expelled the Parthians, driving them across the Euphrates (chapters 19–21).

How Antony was defeated by the Parthians (chapters 22–33).

How Cæsar subjugated the Pannonians (chapters 34–38).

How Antony by guile captured Artavasdes, the king of Armenia (chapters 39–41).

How the Portico of Paulus was consecrated (chapter 42).

How Mauritania Cæsariensis became Roman property (chapters 43, 44).

Duration of time four years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated:

L. Gellius L. F. Poplicola, M. Cocceius Nerva. (B. C. 36 = a. u. 718.)

L. Cornificius L. F., Sextus Pompeius Sexti F. (B. C. 35 = a. u. 719.)

M. Antonius M. F. (II), L. Scribonius L. F. Libo. (B. C. 34 = a. u. 720.)

Cæsar (II), L. Volcacius L. F. Tullus. (B. C. 33 = a. u. 721.)

This happened in the winter when Lucius Gellius and Cocceius Nerva became consuls. Cæsar, when his fleet had been made ready and spring set in, started from Baiæ and coasted along Italy, having great hopes of encompassing Sicily on all sides. For he was sailing thither with many ships and those of Antony were already in the strait. Also Lepidus, though reluctantly, had promised to assist him. His greatest ground of confidence lay in the height of the vessels and the thickness of the timbers. They had been built unusually stout and unusually high so as to carry the largest number of marines possible; indeed, they were surmounted by towers, in order that the conflict might be waged from a higher point, as if from a wall: they were further intended to resist the rammings of antagonists and to bend aside their beaks by making the collision more violent. With such calculations Cæsar was hastening to Sicily. As he was passing the promontory of Palinurus, so-called, a great storm fell upon him. This destroyed many ships, and Menas coming upon the rest in confusion burned a number and towed away the rest. And had he not again changed sides on the promise of immunity and through some other hopes, besides betraying the whole fleet that he commanded by receiving some triremes that simulated desertion, Cæsar's voyage to Sicily on this occasion also would have proved fruitless. Menas's

— 1 —
B. C. 36
(*a. u.* 718)

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) action was due to the fact that he was not allowed by Sextus to fight against Lepidus and was under suspicion in nearly every way. Cæsar was then extremely glad to receive him, but trusted him no longer. He first repaired the damaged ships, freed the slaves that served on the triremes, and assigned the spare seamen (many of whom when their vessels were destroyed in the wreck had dived and escaped by swimming) to Antony's fleet, which was short of men. Then he came to Lipara, and leaving there Agrippa and the ships, returned to the mainland with the intention of transporting the infantry across into Sicily, when an opportunity should arise.

—2— On learning this Sextus himself lay quietly at anchor off Messana, watching for his attempt to cross, and ordered Democharès to anchor opposite Agrippa at Mylæ. This pair spent most of the time in testing each other's strength according as each one would temporarily give way a little; yet they did not dare to risk an engagement with their entire armaments. They were not acquainted with each other's forces and on both sides they figured everything about their opponents as being greater and more terrible than the reality. Finally Agrippa comprehended that it was not advantageous for him to delay,— for the adherents of Sextus, occupying a friendly position, had no need to hurry,— and taking the best of his ships set out for Mylæ to spy out the numbers of the enemy. As he could not see them all and no one of them manifested any inclination to come out into the open sea, he despised them, and on his return made preparations to sail against Mylæ on the following day with all his ships.

Democharès came to much the same conclusion. He had the idea that the ships which had approached him were the only ones, and seeing that they sailed very slowly by reason of their size he sent for Sextus by night and made preparations to assail Lipara itself. When day broke, they were sailing against each other, expecting to meet inferior numbers. As they came near together and each contrary to his expectations saw that his opponents were many more than he had thought, they were at first both alike thrown into confusion, and some even backed water. Then, fearing flight more than battle, because in the latter they hoped to prevail, but in the former they expected to be utterly destroyed, they moved toward each other and joined in conflict on the sea. The one side surpassed in the number of its ships, the other in the experience of its sailors: to the first the height of the vessels, the thickness of the catheads and the towers were a help, but charges straight ahead furthered the progress of the second, and the strength of Cæsar's marines was matched by the daring of their antagonists; for the majority of them, being deserters from Italy, were quite desperate. As a result, possessing the mutual advantages and deficiencies which I have mentioned, they had equal power contributed by their evenly balanced equipment, and so their contest was close for a very long period. The followers of Sextus alarmed their opponents by the way they dashed up the waves: and they knocked holes in some ships by assailing them with a rush and bursting open the parts outside the oars, but as they were

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

—3—

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) struck from the towers in the combat and brought alongside by grappling irons, they suffered no less harm than they inflicted. The Cæsarians, also, when they came into close conflict and had crossed over to the hostile ships, proved superior; but as the enemy leaped out into the sea whenever the boats sank, and by their swimming well and being lightly equipped succeeded easily in climbing upon others, the attackers were at a corresponding disadvantage. Meantime the rapidity with which the ships of the one party could sail proved an offset to the solidity of those on the other side, and the heavines of the latter counterbal-

—4— anced the agility of the former. Late in the day, near nightfall, Cæsar's party finally conquered, but instituted no pursuit: the reason as it appears to me and may be conjectured from probability was that they could not overtake the fleeing ships and were afraid of running aground in the shallows, with which they were unacquainted, near the coast. Some say that Agrippa because he was battling for Cæsar and not for himself thought it sufficient merely to rout his adversaries. For he had been in the habit of saying to his most intimate associates that the majority of those holding sovereign power wish no one to display more ability than themselves; and that they attended personally to nearly all such matters as afford them a conquest without effort, but assign the less favorable and more complicated business to others. And if they ever are forced to entrust some choice enterprise to their assistants, they are irritated and displeased at the lat-

ter's renown. They do not pray that these subordinates may be defeated and fare badly, yet they do not choose to have them win a complete success and secure glory from it. His advice therefore was that the man who intended to survive must relieve his masters of the annoyance incident to such undertakings and still reserve for them the successful completion of the work. As for me, I know that the above is regularly true and that Agrippa paid attention to it, but I am not setting down that on that particular occasion this was the cause of his failure to pursue. For he was not able, no matter how much he might have desired it, to follow up the foe. B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

—5— While the naval battle was in progress, Cæsar, as soon as he perceived that Sextus was gone from Messana and that the strait was destitute of guards, did not let slip this opportunity of the war but immediately embarked on Antony's vessels and crossed to Tauromenium. Yet this seizure of the opportunity was not accompanied by good fortune. No one prevented him from sailing or disembarking, and he constructed his camp, as he had done everything else, at leisure. When, however, the naval battle had ended, Sextus got back to Messana with speed, and learning of Cæsar's presence he quickly filled the ships with fresh warriors and assailed him with the vessels and also with his heavy-armed men on land. Cæsar did not come out to fight the latter, but sailed out against Sextus through contempt of the few opposing ships and because they had been previously defeated: then it was that he lost the majority of his fleet and barely avoided destruction himself. He could not even escape to his own men

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) that were in Sicily but was glad to reach the mainland in safety. He was himself then in security, but was mightily disturbed at seeing his army cut off on the island. His confidence was not restored until a fish of its own accord jumped out of the sea and fell at his feet. By this incident his spirits were invigorated, and he believed the soothsayers who had told him that he should make Sicily his slave.

—6— Cæsar in haste sent for Agrippa to render aid to them, and meantime they were being besieged. When provisions began to fail them and no rescuing force appeared, Cornificius their leader became afraid that if he stayed where he was he should in the course of time be compelled by hunger to yield to the besieging party; and he reflected that while he delayed there in that way none of the enemy would come into conflict with him, because he was stronger in point of heavy-armed infantry, but if he should go forward in any direction one of two things would happen,— either they would be attacked by the enemy and come off victorious, or, if their adversaries were unwilling to do this, they would retire to a place of safety, get a supply of provisions, and obtain some help from Cæsar or from Agrippa. Therefore he burned all the vessels which had survived from the sea-fight and had been cast up against the ramparts, and started out himself as if to proceed to Mylæ. Both cavalry and light-armed troops attacked him from a distance (not daring to come to close quarters) and proved frightfully troublesome to him. For the enemy came close, whenever there was good opportunity, and again turned back with rapidity. But his men, being heavy-armed, could not pursue

them in any way owing to the weight of their armor, and were endeavoring to protect the unarmed, who had been saved from the fleet. As a result they were continually suffering disastrously and could do no damage in return; for, in case they made a rush upon any group, they would put the foe to flight, but not being able to pursue farther they found themselves in a worse plight on their return, since by their sortie they had been isolated. They endured the greatest hardship throughout their entire journey, but chiefly in crossing the rivers. Then their adversaries hemmed them in as they were going along rapidly, in disorder, a few at a time, as usual on such occasions, and struck them in favorable spots that they saw exposed. They were shot at, moreover, whenever they encountered places that were muddy or where the current was strong, and when they happened to be stuck for a moment or were carried down stream. This the enemy —7— did for three whole days and on the last demoralized them completely, especially since Sextus with his heavy-armed contingent had been added to their attacking force. Consequently the Cæsarians no longer mourned such as were perishing but counted them fortunate to escape from further torment, and in their hopelessness wished that they, too, were among those already dead. The wounded were far more in number than those who died, and being struck from a distance with stones and javelins and receiving no blow from near at hand their wounds were in many places, and not as a rule favorably located. These men were themselves in

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) great distress and they caused the survivors far more trouble than did the enemy. For if they were carried they usually brought about the death of the men supporting them, and if they were left behind, they threw the whole army into dejection by their laments. The detachment would have perished utterly, had not the foe, though reluctantly, taken their hands off them. Agrippa, after winning the naval battle, had sailed back to Lipara, but when he learned that Sextus had fled to Messana and Democharès had gone off in some other direction, he crossed over to Sicily, occupied Mylæ and Tyndaris, and sent food and soldiers to the other party. Sextus, thinking that Agrippa himself would come likewise, became frightened and beat a hasty retreat before his approach, even abandoning some baggage and supplies in his fortifications. The followers of Cornificius obtained from these ample support and made their way in safety to Agrippa. Cæsar received them back with praises and gifts, although he had treated them after the victory of Agrippa in a very supercilious manner, thinking the latter had finished the war. Cornificius, indeed, prided himself so much upon his preservation of the soldiers, that in Rome, whenever he went out of his house to dine, he always returned home on the back of an elephant.

—8— Cæsar after this entered Sicily and Sextus encamped opposite him in the vicinity of Artemisium. They did not have any great battle at once, but indulged in a few slight cavalry skirmishes. While they were stationed

there in hostile array Sextus received as an accession Tisienus Gallus, and Cæsar Lepidus with his forces. Lepidus had encountered the storm which I mentioned, and also Democharès, and he had lost a number of ships: he did not come to Cæsar immediately, but on account of his reverse or to the end that his colleague should face difficulties by himself or in the wish to draw Sextus away from him he had made an assault on Lilybæum. Gallus was sent thither by Sextus and contended against him. From there both the contestants, as they accomplished nothing, went to Artemisium. Gallus proved a source of strength to Sextus, but Lepidus quarreled with Cæsar; he claimed the privilege of managing everything on equal terms with Cæsar as his fellow-commander, whereas he was employed by him entirely in the capacity of lieutenant: therefore he inclined to favor Sextus and secretly held communication with him. Cæsar suspected this, but dared not give expression to his doubts and alienate him openly, nor could he safely conceal his thoughts: he felt it would look suspicious if he should not consult him at all and that it would be dangerous to reveal all his plans. Hence he determined to dispose of the uncertainty as quickly as possible, before there was any rebellion, though for most reasons there was no need of particular haste. He had as much food and as much money as Sextus, and therefore hoped to overthrow him without effort before a great while. Still, when he had once reached this decision, he himself led out his land force and marshaled it in front of the camp,

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) while simultaneously Agrippa sailed close in and lay at anchor. Sextus, whose forces were far inferior to theirs, would not oppose them on either element. This lasted for several days. Finally, Pompey became afraid that he might be despised for his behavior and be deserted by his allies, hence he gave orders for the ships to weigh anchor; in these he reposed
—9— his chief trust. When the signal was raised and the trumpet gave the first call, all the boats joined battle near the land and the infantry force of both alike was marshaled at the very edge of the breakers, so that the spectacle was a most notable one. The whole sea in that vicinity was full of ships,—they were so many that they formed a long line,—and the land just back of it was occupied by the armed men, while that further removed, but adjoining, was taken up by the rest of the throng that followed each side. Wherefore, though the struggle seemed to be between the fighters on the ships alone, in reality the others too participated. For those on the ships contended more valiantly in order to exhibit their prowess to those beholding them, and the latter, in spite of being considerably separated from them, nevertheless in watching the men in action were themselves in a way concerned in the conflict. The battle was for a long time an even one, the fighting being precisely similar to that in previous encounters, and the men on shore followed it with minds equally intent. They were very hopeful of having the whole war settled by this engagement: yet they felt encouraged even

should that not prove the case, the one party expecting that if they should conquer then no further labor of importance would be theirs, and that if they should prevail on this occasion they would incur no further danger of defeat. Accordingly, in order that they might keep their eyes fixed upon the action and not incommode those taking part in it they were silent or employed but little shouting. Their cries were directed to the combatants or were addressed by way of invocation to the gods; such as got the upper hand received praise and such as gave way abuse, and besides uttering many exhortations to their warriors they shouted not a little against each other, wishing their own men to hear more easily what was said, and their opponents to catch familiar words less frequently. B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

While the two sides were equally matched, these were —10— the conditions among both parties alike and they even tried to show by gestures of the whole body that they could see and understand. When, however, the adherents of Sextus were routed, then in unison and with one impulse the one side raised the pæan and the others a wail of lamentation. The soldiers as if they too had shared defeat at once retired to Messana. Cæsar took up such of the vanquished as were cast on shore and went into the sea itself to set on fire all the vessels that ran aground in shoal water; thus there was no safety for such as continued to sail, for they would be disabled by Agrippa, nor for such as tried to land anywhere, for they were destroyed by Cæsar, except for a few that made good their escape to Messana. In this

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) hard position Democharès on the point of being taken slew himself and Apollophanes who had his ship unscathed and might have fled went over to Cæsar. The same was done by others,— by Gallus and all the cavalry that followed him and subsequently by some of the
—11— infantry. This most of all caused Sextus to despair of the situation, and he resolved to flee. He took his daughter and certain other persons, his money and the rest of his chief valuables, put them by night aboard of such ships as sailed best out of the number that had been preserved, and departed. No one pursued him, for his sailing had been secret and Cæsar was temporarily in the midst of great disturbance.

Lepidus had attacked Messana and on being admitted to the town set fire to some of it and pillaged other portions. When Cæsar on ascertaining this came up quickly and withstood him, he was alarmed and slipped out of the city, but encamped on a strong hill and made complaints about his treatment; he detailed all the slights he had received and demanded all that had been conceded to him according to their first compact and further laid claim to Sicily, on the ground that he had helped subdue it. He sent some men to Cæsar with these charges and challenged him to submit to arbitration: his forces consisted of troops which he had brought in from Libya and all of those who had been left behind in Messana; for he had been the first to enter it and had suggested to them some hopes
—12— of a change in the government. Cæsar made no answer to it, thinking that he had justice

all on his side and in his weapons, since he was stronger than his rival. He immediately set out, however, against him with some few followers, expecting to alarm him by his suddenness,—Lepidus not being of an energetic nature,—and to win over his soldiers. On account of the fewness of the men accompanying him they thought when he entered the camp that he was on a peaceful errand. But as his words were not at all to their liking, they became irritated and attacked him, even killing some of the men: he himself quickly received aid and was saved. After this he came against them once more with his entire army, shut them within their ramparts, and besieged them. This made them afraid of capture, and without creating any general revolt, through dread of Lepidus, they individually, a few at a time or one by one, deserted him and transferred their allegiance. In this way he too was compelled on his own initiative to array himself in mourning garments and become a suppliant of Cæsar. As a result Lepidus was shorn of all authority and could not even live in Italy without a guard. Of those who had been enlisted in the cause of Sextus, members of the senatorial or equestrian classes were punished, save a few, while in the case of the rank and file all free citizens were incorporated in the legions of Cæsar, and those that had been slaves were given back to their masters for vengeance: in case no master could be found for any one of them, he was impaled. Of the cities some voluntarily opened their gates to

B. C. 36
(*a. u.* 718)

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) the victor and received pardon, and others resisted him and were disciplined.

—13— While Cæsar was thus occupied his soldiers revolted. Being so many they drew encouragement from their very numbers and when they stopped to think of their dangers and the hopes that rested on them they became insatiable in the matter of rewards, and gathering in groups they demanded whatever each one longed for. When their talk had no effect,—for Cæsar since no enemy longer confronted him made light of them,—they became clamorous. Setting before him all the hardships they had endured and bringing to his notice any promise he had ever made them they uttered many threats besides, and thought to render him willy-nilly their slave. As they gained nothing this way, they demanded with much heat and deafening shouts to be relieved at least from further service, saying they were worn out. This was not because they really wished to be free from it, for most of them were in their prime, but because they had an inkling of the coming conflict between Cæsar and Antony and for that reason set a high value upon themselves. And what they could not obtain by requests they expected they could secure by threatening to abandon him. Not even this, however, served their purpose. Cæsar would not yield to them, even if he knew for an absolute certainty that the war was going to occur and clearly understood their wishes. He did not think it proper for a commander to do anything against his will under compulsion from the soldiers, because they would be sure, if

he did, to want to get the advantage of him again in some other matter. So he pretended that their request was a fair one and their desire only human and dismissed first those that had accompanied him in the campaign against Antony at Mutina, and next, since the rest were troublesome, all of them who had been ten years in the service. And in order to restrain the remainder he gave further notice that he would no longer employ any one of them, no matter how much such a person might wish it. On hearing this they uttered not another word, but began to exhibit great devotion toward him because he announced that he would give to the men that had been released,— not to all, save to the first of them, but to the worthiest,— everything that he had promised, and would assign them land. They were also influenced by the fact that he gave to all of them five hundred denarii and to those who had been victors in the sea-fight a crown of olive besides. After this he inspired them all personally with great hopes and the centurions with the idea that he would appoint them to the senatorial bodies in their native lands. Upon his lieutenants he bestowed various gifts and upon Agrippa a golden crown adorned with beaks of ships,— a decoration given to nobody before or since. And it was later ratified by a decree that as often as any persons celebrated a triumph, wearing[1] the laurel crown, Agrippa should always wear this trophy of the naval encounter.

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) — 14 —

[1] Verb suggested by Leunclavius.

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) In this way Cæsar calmed the soldiers temporarily. The money he gave them at once and the land not much later. And since what was still held by the government at the time did not suffice, he bought more in addition, especially considerable from the Campanians dwelling in Capua, since their city needed a number of settlers. To them he also gave in return the so-called Julian supply of water, one of their chief sources of pride at all times, and the Gnosian territory,[2] from which they still gather harvests.

That took place later. At the time under discussion he administered the government in Sicily and through Statilius Taurus won both the Libyas without a struggle and sent back to Antony a number of ships equivalent to those lost. —15— Meantime conditions in Etruria which had been full of rebellion regained a state of quiet when the inhabitants heard of his victory. The people of the capital unanimously bestowed laudations upon him and images, the right to front seats and an arch surmounted by a trophy, as well as the privilege of riding into the city on horseback, of wearing the laurel crown on all occasions, and of holding a banquet with his wife and children in the precinct of the Capitoline Jupiter on the anniversary of the day that he had conquered, which was to be a perpetual day of thanksgiving. This is what they granted him directly after the victory. The persons to announce it were, first, a soldier stationed in the city, who on the very day in

2 This is the well-known Gnosos in Crete. For further information in regard to the matter see Strabo X, 4, 9 (p. 477) and Velleius Paterculus, II, 81, 2.

question had become possessed by some god and after saying and doing many unusual things finally ran up to the temple on the Capitol and laid his sword at the feet of Jupiter to signify that there would be no further use for it; after that came the rest who had been present at the action and had been sent to Rome by Cæsar. When he arrived himself he assembled them according to ancestral custom outside the pomerium, gave them an account of what had been done, and renounced some of the honors voted him. He then remitted the tribute called for by the registered lists and everything else that was owing the government since before the period of the civil wars, abolished certain taxes, and refused to accept the priesthood of Lepidus, which was offered to him; for it was not lawful to take away the appointment from a man still alive. At this time they voted him many other distinctions. Some at once declared that this striking magnanimity of his at this time was due to the calumnies of Antony and of Lepidus and was intended to lay the blame of former unjust behavior upon them alone. Others said that since he was unable in any way to collect the debts he made of the people's impotency a favor that cost him nothing. In spite of this various talk that gained currency in different quarters they now resolved that a house be presented to him from the public treasury. He had made the place on the Palatine which he had bought to erect a structure public property, and had consecrated it to Apollo, because a thunderbolt had descended upon it. Hence they voted him the

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) house and protection from any insult by deed or word. Any one who committed such an offence was to be bound by the same penalties as prevailed in the case of a tribune. For he received permission to sit upon the same benches with them.

—16— These were the gifts bestowed upon Cæsar by the senate. As for him, he enrolled among the augurs, above the proper number, Valerius Messala, whom he previously in the proscriptions condemned to death, made the people of Utica citizens, and gave orders that no one should wear purple clothing except senators and such as held public office. For it had been already appropriated by ordinary individuals in a few cases. In this same year there was no ædile owing to a lack of candidates, and the prætors and the tribunes performed the ædiles' duties: also no prætor urbanus was appointed for the Feriæ, but some of the regular prætors discharged his functions. Other matters in the city and in the rest of Italy were under the charge of one Gaius Mæcenas, a knight, both then and for a long time afterward.

—17— Now Sextus after taking ship from Messana was afraid of pursuit and suspected that there might be some act of treachery on the part of his retinue. Therefore he gave notice to them that he was going to sail seaward, but when he had extinguished the light which flagships exhibit during night voyages for the purpose of having the rest follow close behind, he coasted along Italy, then went over to Corcyra and from there came to Cephallenia. Here the remainder of his vessels, which

had by chance been driven from the course by a storm, joined him again. Accordingly, after calling them together, he took off his general's uniform and made an address of which the substance was that while they remained together they could render no lasting aid to one another or escape detection, but if they scattered they could more easily make good their escape; and he advised each man to look out individually and separately for his own safety. The majority were led to give ear to his arguments and they departed in different directions, while he with the remainder crossed over to Asia with the intention of going straight to Antony. When he reached Lesbos and learned that the latter had gone on a campaign against the Medes and that Cæsar and Lepidus had become estranged, he decided to winter in the country. The Lesbians, indeed, out of affectionate remembrance for his father were ready to receive and detain him. He ascertained, however, that Antony had met with a mishap in Media, and reflected further that Gaius Furnius, temporarily the governor of Asia, was not friendly to him. Hence he did not remain, but hoping to succeed to Antony's leadership because a number of men had come to him from Sicily and still others had rallied around him, some drawn by the glamour of his father's renown and some who were seeking a livelihood, he resumed the outfit of a general and continued his preparations to occupy the opposite shore. Meantime Antony had got back again into friendly territory and on learning

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

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B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) what Sextus was doing promised he would grant him amnesty and favor, if he would lay down his arms. Sextus wrote back to the effect that he would obey him, but did not do so, because he felt a contempt for the man, inspired by his recent disasters, and because he immediately set off for Egypt. Hence he held to his previous design and entered into negotiations with the Parthians. Antony ascertained this, but without turning back sent against him the fleet and Marcus Titius, who had formerly come to him from Sextus and was still with him. Sextus received information of this move in advance, and in alarm, since his preparations were not yet complete, abandoned his anchorage. He went forward then, taking the course which seemed most likely to afford escape, and reached Nicomedea, where he was overtaken. At this he opened negotiations with Antony, placing some hope in him because of the kindness which had been shown him. When the chieftain, however, refused to enter into a truce with him without first taking possession of the ships and the rest of his force, Sextus despaired of safety by sea, put all of his heavier baggage into the ships (which he thereupon burned) and proceeded inland. Titius and Furnius pursued him, and overtaking him at Midaeium in Phrygia surrounded him and captured him alive. When Antony learned this he at first under the influence of anger sent a despatch that the captive should be put to death, but again not long after repenting[1] . . . that his life should be spared . . . . .[1] Now

[1] There is at this point a gap of one line in the MSS.

the bearer of the second letter came in before the first, and later Titius received the epistle in regard to killing him. Thinking, therefore, that it was really the second, or else knowing the truth but not caring to heed it, he followed the order of the arrival of the two, but not their manifest intention. So Sextus was executed in the consulship of Lucius Cornificius and one Sextus Pompeius. Cæsar held a horse-race in honor of the event, and set up for Antony a chariot in front of the rostra and images in the temple of Concord, giving him also authority to hold banquets there with his wife and children, this being similar to the decree that had once been passed in his own honor. He pretended to be still Antony's friend and was endeavoring to console him for the disasters inflicted by the Parthians and in that way to cure any jealousy that might be felt at his own victory and the decrees which followed it.

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

B. C. 35 (*a. u.* 719)

This was what Cæsar did: Antony's experience with the barbarians was as follows. Publius Ventidius heard that Pacorus was gathering an army and was invading Syria, and became afraid, since the cities had not grown quiet and the legions were still scattered in winter-quarters, and so he acted as follows to delay him and make the assembling of an army a slow process. He knew that a certain prince Channæus, with whom he enjoyed an acquaintance, was rather disposed to favor the Parthian cause. Ventidius, then, honored him as if he had his entire confidence and took him as an adviser in some matters where he could not himself be injured and would cause Channæus to think he pos-

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B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716) sessed his most hidden secrets. Having reached this point he affected to be afraid that the barbarians might abandon the place where they customarily crossed the Euphrates near where the city Zeugma is located, and use some other road farther down the river. The latter, he said, was in a flat district convenient for the enemy, whereas the former was hilly and suited *them* best. He persuaded the prince to believe this and through the latter deceived Pacorus. The Parthian leader took the route through the flat district, where Ventidius kept pretending he hoped he would not go, and as this was longer than the other it gave the —20— Roman time to assemble his forces. So he met Pacorus when he had advanced to Cyrrestician Syria and conquered him. For he did not prevent them from crossing the river, and when they had got across he did not at once attack them, so that they imputed sloth and weakness to the Romans and therefore marched against the Roman fortification, although on higher ground, expecting to take it without resistance. When a sally was suddenly made, the attacking party, being cavalry, was driven back without effort down the slope. At the foot they defended themselves valiantly,—the majority of them were in armor,—but were confused by the unexpectedness of the onslaught and stumbling over one another were damaged most of all by the heavy-armed men and the slingers. The latter struck them from a distance with powerful weapons and proved a very great annoyance. The fall of Pacorus at this critical juncture injured them most of all. As soon as

they saw that their leader had perished, a few steadily contended over his body, but when these were destroyed all the rest gave way. Some of them desired to escape homeward across the bridge and were not able, being cut off and killed before they could reach it, and others fled for refuge to Antiochus in Commagene. Ventidius easily reduced the rest of the places in Syria, whose attitude had depended on the outcome of the war, by sending the monarch's head about through the different cities; their doubtful allegiance had been due to their extreme love for Pacorus because of his justness and mildness,— a love which had equaled that bestowed by them upon any previous sovereign. The general himself led an expedition against Antiochus on the plea that he had not delivered up the suppliants, but really because of his money, of which he had vast stores. B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

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When he had progressed so far Antony suddenly came upon him, and so far from being pleased was actually jealous of his having gained some reputation by his own efforts. Consequently he removed him from his command and employed him on no other business either at the time or later, though he obtained thanksgivings for both achievements and a triumph for his assistant's work. The Romans of the capital voted these honors to Antony as a result of his prominence and in accordance with law, because he was commander: but they voted them also to Ventidius, since they thought that he had paid the Parthians in full through the death of Pacorus for the disasters that

B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716) Roman arms had incurred in the time of Crassus, especially since both events had befallen on the same day of the corresponding years. And it turned out that Ventidius alone celebrated the triumph, even as the victory had been his alone, for Antony met an untimely fate, and he acquired a greater reputation from this fact and the irony of fortune alike. He himself had once marched in procession with the other captives at the triumph of Pompeius Strabo, and now he was the first of the Romans to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.

—22— This took place at a later period: at the time mentioned Antony attacked Antiochus, shut him up in Samosata and proceeded to besiege him. As he accomplished nothing and the time was spent in vain, and he suspected that the soldiers felt coldly toward him on account of his dishonoring Ventidius, he secretly opened negotiations with the foe, and made fictitious agreements with him so that he might have a fair appearing reason for withdrawal. In the end Antony got neither hostages (except two and these of little importance) nor the money which he had demanded, but he granted Antiochus the death of one Alexander, who had earlier deserted from him to the Roman side. After doing this he set out for Italy, and Gaius Sosius received from him the governorship of Syria and Cilicia. This man subdued the Aradii, who had been besieged up to this time and had been reduced to hard straits by famine and disease, and conquered Antigonus in battle after killing the Roman guards that he

kept about him, and reduced him by siege when he took refuge in Jerusalem. The Jews had committed many outrages upon the Romans,— for the race is very bitter when aroused to anger,— but they suffered far more themselves. The first of them were captured fighting for the precinct of their god, and later the rest on the day even then called the day of Saturn. And so great still were their religious scruples that the men who had been first captured along with the temple obtained leave from Sosius when the day of Saturn came around again, and went up with the remaining population into the building, where they performed all the customary rites. These people Antony entrusted to one Herod to govern, and Antigonus he bound to a cross and flogged,— treatment accorded to no other king by the Romans,— and subsequently slew him. B. C. 38 (*a. u.* 716)

This was the course of events in the days of Claudius and Norbanus: the following year the Romans accomplished nothing worthy of note in Syria. Antony arrived in Italy and returned again to the province, consuming the entire season: and Sosius, because he would be advancing his master's interests and not his own, and furthermore dreading his jealousy and anger, spent the time in devising means not for achieving success and drawing down his enmity, but for pleasing him by remaining quiet. Parthian affairs with no outside interference underwent a severe revolution from the following cause. Orodes their king succumbed to age and grief for Pacorus combined, and while still alive delivered the government to Phraates, the eldest of his —23— B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717)

B. C. 37 (*a. u.* 717) remaining children. He in his discharge of it proved himself the most impious of men. He treacherously murdered his brothers, sons of the daughter of Antiochus, because they were his superiors in excellence and (on their mother's side) in family: when Antiochus chafed under this outrage he killed him in addition and after that destroyed the noblest men in the remaining population and kept committing many other abuses. Consequently a number of the more prominent persons abandoned him and betook themselves to various places, some going to Antony, among whom was Monæses. This happened in the consulship of Agrippa and Gallus. During the remainder of winter, when Gallus and Nerva were holding office, Publius Canidius Crassus made a campaign against the Iberians that inhabit this portion of the world, conquered in battle their king Pharnabazus and brought them into alliance; with this king he invaded Albanis, the adjoining country, and, after overcoming the dwellers there and their king Zober, conciliated them likewise. Antony was elated at this and furthermore based great hopes upon Monæses, who had promised him to lead his army and bring over to him most of Parthia without conflict. Hence the Roman took up the war against the Parthians in earnest and besides making various presents to Monæses gave him three Roman cities to govern until he should finish the war, and promised him in addition the Parthian kingdom. While they were so occupied Phraates became terrified, especially because the Parthians took the flight of Monæses very much amiss, and

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B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

he opened negotiations with him, offering him anything whatever, and so persuaded him to return. When Antony found this out, he was naturally angry, but did not kill Monæses although the latter was still in his power; for he felt sure he could not win the confidence of any other of the barbarians, in case he should do such a thing, and he wanted to try a little trick against them. He accordingly released Monæses, apparently supposing the latter was going to bring the Parthian affairs under his control, and sent envoys with him to Phraates. Nominally he was arranging for peace on the condition of getting back the standards and the prisoners captured in the disaster of Crassus, intending to take the king off his guard while the latter was expecting a pacific settlement; but in fact he was putting everything in readiness for war. And he went as far as the Euphrates, thinking it was free of guards. When, however, he found that whole region carefully guarded, he turned aside from it, but led a campaign against Artavasdes, the king of the Medes, persuaded thereto by the king of Greater Armenia, who had the same name and was an enemy of the aforementioned. Just as he was he at once advanced toward Armenia, and learning there that the Mede had gone a considerable distance from his own land in the discharge of his duties as an ally of the Parthian king, he left behind the beasts of burden and a portion of the army with Oppius Statianus, giving orders for them to follow, and himself taking the cavalry and the strongest of the infantry hurried on in the confidence of seizing all his op-

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

—25—

B. C. 36 (a. u. 718) ponent's strongholds at one blow; he assailed Praaspa, the royal residence, heaped up mounds and made constant attacks. When the Parthian and the Medan kings ascertained this, they left him to continue his idle toil,— for the walls were strong and many were defending them,— but assailed Statianus off his guard and wearied on the march and slew the whole detachment except Polemon, king of Pontus, who was then accompanying the expedition. Him alone they took alive and released in exchange for ransom. They were able to accomplish this because the Armenian king was not present at the battle; but though he might have helped the Romans, as some say, he neither did this nor —26— joined Antony, but retired to his own country. Antony hastened at the first message sent him by Statianus to go to his assistance, but was too late. For except corpses he found no one. This outcome caused him fear, but, inasmuch as he fell in with no barbarian, he suspected that they had departed in some direction through terror, and this lent him new courage. Hence when he met them a little later he routed them, for his slingers were numerous, and as the latter could shoot farther than would the bows they inflicted severe injury upon the men in armor. However, he did not kill any remarkable number of them, because the barbarians could ride fast. So he proceeded again against Praaspa and besieged it, though he did no great damage to the enemy; for the men inside the walls repulsed him vigorously, and those outside could not easily be entrapped into a combat. Thus he lost many of his

own men in searching for and bringing provisions, and many by his own discipline. At first, as long as they could get their food from somewhere in the neighborhood, they had no difficulty about either undertaking: they could attend to the siege and safely secure supplies both at once. When, however, all material at hand had been used up, and the soldiers were obliged to go to some distance, it happened to them that if few were sent anywhere, not only did they not bring anything, but they perished as well; if a number were sent, they left the wall destitute of besiegers and meantime lost many men and many engines at the hands of the barbarians, who would make a sortie against them. For this reason Antony gave them all barley instead of wheat and destroyed every tenth man in some instances: indeed, the entire force which was supposed to be besieging endured the hardships of persons besieged. The men within the walls watched carefully for opportunities to make sallies; and those outside harassed fearfully the Romans that remained in position as often as they became separated, accomplishing this by making a sudden charge and wheeling about again in a narrow space: this force outside did not trouble the food trains while the latter were en route to the villages, but would fall upon them unexpectedly when scattered in the homeward march. But since Antony even under these conditions maintained his place before the city, Phraates, fearing that in the long run he might do it some harm either by himself or through securing some allied force, secretly sent some men to

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

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B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) open negotiations with him and persuaded him by pretending that it would be very easy to secure peace. After this, when men were sent to him by Antony, he held a conference with them seated upon a golden chair and twanging his bowstring; he first inveighed against them at length, but finally promised that he would grant peace, if they would straightway remove their camp. On hearing this Antony was both alarmed at his boastfulness and ready to believe that a truce could be secured if he himself should shift his position: hence he withdrew without destroying any of his implements of siege but behaved as if in friendly territory. —28— When he had done this and was awaiting the truce, the Medes burned the engines and scattered the mounds, while the Parthians made no proposition to him respecting peace but suddenly attacked him and inflicted very serious damage. He found out that he had been deceived and did not venture to employ any further envoys, being sure that the barbarians would not agree to any reasonable terms, and not wishing to cast the soldiers into dejection by failing to arrange a truce. Therefore he resolved, since he had once started, to hurry on into Armenia. His troops took another road, since the one by which they had come they believed to have been blocked entirely, and on the way their sufferings were unusually great. They came into unknown regions where they wandered at random, and furthermore the barbarians seized the passes in advance of their approach, digging trenches outside of some and building palisades in front of others, spoiled

the water-courses everywhere, and drove away the flocks. In case they ever got a chance to march through more favorable territory, the enemy would turn them aside from such places by false announcements that they had been occupied beforehand, and caused them to take different roads along which ambuscades had been previously posted, so that many perished through such mishaps and many of hunger. As a result there were some desertions, and they would all have gone over, had not the barbarians shot down before the eyes of the others any who dared to take this course. Consequently the men refrained from this, and from Fortune's hands obtained the following relief. One day when they fell into an ambush and were struck with fast-flying arrows, they suddenly made by joining shields the *testudo,* and rested their left knees on the ground. The barbarians had never seen anything of the kind before and thought that they had fallen from their wounds and needed only one finishing blow; so they threw aside their bows, leaped from their horses, and drawing their daggers came close to put an end to them. At this the Romans rose to their feet, spread out the phalanx at a word, and each one attacked the man nearest and facing him; thus they cut down great numbers since they were contending armed against an unprotected foe, men prepared against men off their guard, heavy infantry against archers, Romans against barbarians. All the survivors immediately retired and no one followed them for the future.

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

—29—

This *testudo* and the way in which it is formed de- —30—

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

serve a word of explanation. The baggage animals, the light-armed troops, and the cavalry are marshaled in the center of the army. Those infantrymen who use the oblong, hollow, grooved shields are drawn up around the edges, making a rectangular figure; and, facing outward with spear-points projecting,[1] they enclose the rest. The other infantrymen, who have flat shields, form a compact body in the center and raise their shields above themselves and above all the rest, so that nothing but shields can be seen in every part of the phalanx alike and all the men by the density of formation are under shelter from missiles. It is so marvelously strong that men can walk upon it, and whenever they get into a hollow, narrow passage, even horses and vehicles can be driven over it. Such is the method of this arrangement, and this shows why it has received the title of *testudo*,[2]— with reference to its strength and to the excellent shelter it affords. They use it in two ways: either they approach some fort to assault it, often even enabling men to scale the very walls, or where sometimes they are surrounded by archers they all bend together,— even the horses being taught to kneel and recline,— and thereby cause the foe to think that they are exhausted; then, when the others draw near, they suddenly rise, to the latter's great alarm.

1 Using Naber's emendation προβεβλημένοι.

2 The Latin word *testudo*, represented in Greek by the precisely equivalent χελώνη in Dio's narrative, means "tortoise."

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B. C. 36
(*a. u.* 718)

The *testudo,* then, is the kind of device just described. As for Antony, he suffered no further harm from the enemy, but underwent severe hardships by reason of the cold. It was now winter, and the mountain districts of Armenia, through which, as the only route open to him, he was actually thankful to be able to proceed, are never free from snow and ice. The wounds, of which the men had many, there created especial discomfort. So many kept perishing and were continually rendered useless for fighting that he would not allow reports of each individual case, but forbade any one to bring him any such news; and although he was angry with the Armenian king for deserting them, and anxious to take vengeance on him, he nevertheless humiliated himself before the monarch and paid court to him for the purpose of obtaining provisions and money from him. Finally, as the soldiers could not hold out to march farther, in the winter time, too, and were at any rate going to have their hardships for nothing since he was minded to return to Armenia before a great while, he flattered the prince tremendously and made him many attractive promises, to get him to allow the men to winter where they were; he said that in the spring he would make another campaign against the Parthians. Money also came to him from Cleopatra, so that to each of the infantrymen was given one hundred denarii[1] and to the rest a proportionate allowance. But inasmuch as the amount sent

[1] The amount is not given in the MSS. The traditional sum, incorporated in most editions to fill the gap and complete the sense, is *thirty-five.* "One hundred" is a clever conjecture of Boissevain's.

B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718) was not enough for them he paid the remainder from his own funds, and though the expense was his own he gave Cleopatra the credit of the favor. For he both solicited contributions from his friends and levied a great deal of money upon the allies.

—82— Following these transactions he departed for Egypt. Now the Romans at home were not ignorant of anything that had taken place in spite of the fact that his despatches did not contain the truth; for he concealed all his unpleasant experiences and some of them he described as just the opposite, making it appear that he was progressing famously: but, for all that, rumor reported the truth and Cæsar and his circle investigated it carefully and discussed it. They did not, however, make public their evidence, but instead sacrificed cattle and held festivals. Since Cæsar at that time was still getting the worst of it against Sextus, the truth of the facts could not be rendered fitting or opportune. Besides his above actions Antony assigned positions of government, giving Gaul to Amyntas, though he had been only the secretary of Deiotarus, and also adding to his domain Lycaonia with portions of Pamphylia, and bestowing upon Archelaus Cappadocia after driving out Ariarathes. This Archelaus on his father's side belonged to those Archelauses who had contended against the Romans, but on his mother's side was the son of Glaphyra, an hetæra. It is quite true that for these appointments Antony, who could be very magnanimous in dealing with the possessions of other people, was somewhat less ill spoken of among the soldiers.

But in the matter of Cleopatra he incurred outspoken dislike because he had taken into his family children of hers,— the elder ones being Alexander and Cleopatra, twins at a birth, and the younger one Ptolemy, called also Philadelphus,— and because he had granted to them a great deal of Arabia, both the district of Malchus and that of the Ituræans (for he executed Lysanias, whom he had himself made king over them, on the charge that he had favored Paccrus) and also a great deal of Phœnicia and Palestine together with parts of Crete, and Cyrene and Cyprus. B. C. 36 (*a. u.* 718)

These are his acts at that time: the following year, when Pompeius and Cornificius were consuls, he attempted to conduct a campaign against the Armenian prince; and as he placed no little hope in the Mede, because the latter was indignant at Phraates owing to not having received from him much of the spoils or any other honor, and was anxious to punish the Armenian king for bringing in the Romans, Antony sent Polemon to him and requested friendship and alliance. And he was so well satisfied with the business that he both made terms with the Mede and later gave Polemon Lesser Armenia as a reward for his embassy. First he summoned the Armenian to Egypt as a friend, intending to seize him there without effort and make away with him; but when the prince suspected this and did not obey, he plotted to deceive him in another fashion. He did not openly evince anger toward him, in order not to alienate him, but to the end that he might find his foe unprepared set sail from Egypt with the avowed —33— B. C. 35 (*a. u.* 719)

B. C. 35 (*a. u.* 719) object of making one more campaign against the Parthians. On the way Antony learned that Octavia was arriving from Rome, and went no farther, but returned: this he did in spite of having at once ordered her to go home and later accepting the gifts which she sent, some of them being soldiers which she had begged from her brother for this very purpose.

—34— As for him, he became more than ever a slave to the passion and wiles of Cleopatra. Cæsar meantime, since Sextus had perished and affairs in Libya required settlement, went to Sicily as if intending to take ship thither, but after delaying there found that the winter made it too late for crossing. Now the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, and Iapudes had not for a long time been behaving fairly toward the Romans, but had failed to contribute revenue and sometimes would invade and harm the neighboring districts. At this time, in view of Octavius's absence, they were openly in revolt. Consequently he turned back and began his preparations against them. Some of the men who had been dismissed when they became disorderly, and had received nothing, wished to serve again: therefore he assigned them to one camp, in order that being alone they might find it impossible to corrupt any one else and in case they should wish to show themselves rebellious might be detected at once. As this did not teach them moderation any the more, he sent out a few of the eldest of them to become colonists in Gaul, thinking that thus he would inspire the rest with hopes and win their devotion. Since even then they continued

audacious, some of them paid the penalty. The rest displayed rage at this, whereupon he called them together as if for some other purpose, had the rest of the army surround them, took away their arms, and removed them from the service. In this way they learned both their own weakness and Cæsar's force of mind, and so they really experienced a change of heart and after urgent supplications were allowed to enter the service anew. For Cæsar, being in need of soldiers and fearing that Antony would appropriate them, said that he pardoned them, and he found them most useful for all tasks. B. C. 35 (*a. u.* 719)

It was later that they proved their sincerity. At this time he himself led the campaign against the Iapudes, assigning the rest of the tribes to others to subdue. Those that were on his side of the mountains, dwelling not far from the sea, he reduced with comparatively little trouble, but he overcame those on the heights and beyond them with no small hardship. They strengthened Metulum, the largest of their cities, and repulsed many assaults of the Romans, burned to the ground many engines and laid low Octavius himself as he was trying to step from a wooden tower upon the circuit of the wall. Later, when he still did not desist but kept sending for additional forces, they pretended to wish to negotiate terms and received members of garrisons into their citadel. Then by night they destroyed all of these and set fire to their houses, some killing themselves and some their wives and children in addition, so that nothing whatever remained —35—

B. C. 35 (*a. u.* 719) for Cæsar. For not only they but also such as were captured alive destroyed themselves voluntarily shortly afterward.

—36— When these had perished and the rest had been subdued without performing any exploit of note, he made a campaign against the Pannonians. He had no complaint to bring against them, not having been wronged by them in any way, but he wanted both to give his soldiers practice and to support them abroad: for he regarded every demonstration against a weaker party as just, when it pleased the man whom weapons made their superior. The Pannonians are settled near Dalmatia close along the Ister from Noricum to European Mœsia and lead the most miserable existence of mankind. They are not well off in the matter of land or sky, they cultivate no olives or vines except to the slightest extent, and these wretched varieties, since the greater part of their days is passed in the midst of most rigorous winter, but they drink as well as eat barley and millet. They have been considered very brave, however, during all periods of which we have cognizance. For they are very quick to anger and ready to slay, inasmuch as they possess nothing which can give them a happy life. This I know not by hearsay or reading only, but I have learned it from actual experience as their governor. For after my term as ruler in Africa and in Dalmatia,— the latter position my father also held for a time,— I was appointed[1] to Upper Pannonia, so-called, and hence my record is

[1] Probably in A. D. 227.

founded on exact knowledge of all conditions among them. Their name is due to the fact that they cut up a kind of toga in a way peculiar to themselves into strips which they call *panni,* and then stitch these together into sleeved tunics for themselves. B. C. 35 (*a. u.* 719)

They have been named so either for this or for some other reason; but certain of the Greeks who were ignorant of the truth have spoken of them as Pæones, which is an old word but does not belong there, but rather applies to Rhodope, close to the present Macedonia, as far as the sea. Wherefore I shall call the dwellers in the latter district Pæones, but the others Pannonians, just as they themselves and as the Romans do.

—37— It was against this people, then, that Cæsar at that time conducted a campaign. At first he did not devastate or plunder at all, although they abandoned their villages in the plain. He hoped to make them his subjects of their free will. But when they harassed him as he advanced to Siscia, he became angry, burned their land, and took all the booty he could. When he drew near the city the natives for a moment listened to their rulers and made terms with him and gave hostages, but afterward shut their gates and accepted a state of siege. They possessed strong walls and were in general encouraged by the presence of two navigable rivers. The one named the Colops[1] flows past the very circuit of the wall and empties into the Savus not far distant: it has now encircled the entire

[1] Called *Colapis* by Strabo and Pliny.

B. C. 35 (a. u. 719) city, for Tiberius gave it this shape by constructing a great canal through which it rejoins its ancient course. At that time between the Colops on the one hand, which flowed on past the very walls, and the Savus on the other, which flowed at a little distance, an empty space had been left which had been buttressed with palisades and ditches. Cæsar secured boats made by the allies in that vicinity, and after towing them through the Ister into the Savus, and through that stream into the Colops, he assailed the enemy with infantry and ships together, and had some naval battles on the river. For the barbarians prepared in turn some boats made of one piece of wood with which they risked a conflict; and on the river they killed besides many others Menas the freedman of Sextus, and on the land they vigorously repulsed the invader until they ascertained that some of their allies had been ambushed and destroyed. Then in dejection they yielded. When they had thus been captured the remainder of Pannonian territory was induced to capitulate.

—38— After this he left Fufius Geminus there with a small force and himself returned to Rome. The triumph which had been voted to him he deferred, but granted Octavia and Livia images, the right of administering their own affairs without a supervisor, and freedom from fear and inviolability equally with the tribunes. In emulation of his father he had started out to lead an expedition into Britain, and had already advanced into

B. C. 34 (a. u. 720) Gaul after the winter in which Antony for the second time and Lucius Libo were consuls, when some of the

newly captured and Dalmatians with them rose in revolt. Geminus, although expelled from Siscia, recovered the Pannonians by a few battles; and Valerius Messala overthrew the Salassi and the rest who had joined them in rebellion. Against the Dalmatians first Agrippa and then Cæsar also made campaigns. The most of them they subjugated after undergoing many terrible experiences themselves, such as Cæsar's being wounded, barley being given to some of the soldiers instead of wheat, and others, who had deserted the standards, being decimated: with the remaining tribes[1] Statilius Taurus carried on war. B. C. 34 (a. u. 720)

Antony meanwhile resigned his office as soon as appointed, putting Lucius Sempronius Atratinus in his place; consequently some name the latter and not the former in the enumeration of the consuls. In the course of his efforts to take vengeance on the Armenian king with least trouble to himself, he asked the hand of his daughter, pretending to want to unite her in marriage to his son Alexander; he sent on this errand one Quintus Deillius, who had once been a favorite of his, and promised to give the monarch many gifts. Finally, at the beginning of spring, he came suddenly into Nicopolis (founded by Pompey) and sent for him, stating that he wanted to deliberate on and execute with his aid some measures against the Parthians. The king —39—

[1] A marginal note in Reimar's edition suggests amending the rather abrupt λοιποῖς at this point to Λιβούρνοις ("waged war with (i. e., against) thee Liburni"); and we might be e tempted to follow it, but for the fact that Appian uses language almost identical with Dio's in his Illyrian Wars, chapter 27 ("He [Augustus] left Statilius Taurus to finish the war").

B. C. 34 (*a. u.* 720) suspecting the plot did not come, so he sent Deillius to have another talk with him and marched with undiminished haste toward Artaxata. In this way, after a long time, partly by persuading him through friends, and partly by scaring him through his soldiers, and writing and acting toward him in every way as thoroughly friendly, he induced him to come into his camp. Thereupon the Roman arrested him and at first keeping the prince without bonds he led him around among the garrisons with whom his treasures were deposited, to see if he could win them without a struggle. He made a pretence of having arrested him for no other purpose than to collect tribute of the Armenians that would ensure both his preservation and his sovereignty. When, however, the guardians of the gold would have nothing to do with him and the troops under arms chose Artaxes, the eldest of his children, king in his stead, Antony bound him in silver chains. It seemed disgraceful, probably, for one who had been
—40— a king to be made fast in iron bonds. After this, capturing some settlements peaceably and some by force, Antony occupied all of Armenia, for Artaxes after fighting an engagement and being worsted retired to the Parthian prince. After doing this he betrothed to his son the daughter of the Median king with the intention of making him still more his friend; then he left the legions in Armenia and went once more to Egypt, taking the great mass of booty and the Armenian with his wife and children. He sent them ahead with the other captives for a triumph held in Alexandria, and

himself drove into the city upon a chariot, and among the other favors he granted to Cleopatra he brought before her the Armenian and his family in golden bonds. She was seated in the midst of the populace upon a platform plated with silver and upon a gilded chair. The barbarians would not be her suppliants nor do obeisance to her, though much coercion was brought to bear upon them and hopes were held out to persuade them, but they merely addressed her by name: this gave them a reputation for spirit, but they were subject to a great deal of ill usage on account of it. B. C. 34 (a. u. 720)

After this Antony gave an entertainment to the Alexandrians, and in the assemblage had Cleopatra and her children sit by his side: also in the course of a public address he enjoined that she be called Queen of Monarchs, and Ptolemy (whom he named Cæsarion) King of Kings. He then made a different distribution by which he gave them Egypt and Cyprus. For he declared that one was the wife and the other the true son of the former Cæsar and he made the plea that he was doing this as a mark of favor to the dead statesman,— his purpose being to cast reproach in this way upon Octavianus Cæsar because he was only an adopted and not a real son of his. Besides making this assignment to them, he promised to give to his own children by Cleopatra the following lands,— to Ptolemy Syria and all the region west of the Euphrates as far as the Hellespont, to Cleopatra Libya about Cyrene, and to their brother Alexander Armenia and the rest of the districts across the Euphrates as far as the Indi. The —41—

B. C. 34 (*a. u.* 720) latter he bestowed as if they were already his. Not only did he say this in Alexandria, but sent a despatch to Rome, in order that it might secure ratification also from the people there. Nothing of this, however, was

B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722) read in public. Domitius and Sosius were consuls by that time and being extremely devoted to him refused to accede to Cæsar's urgent demands that they should publish it to all. Though they prevailed in this matter Cæsar won a victory in turn by not having anything that had been written about the Armenian king made known to the public. He felt pity for the prince because he had been secretly in communication with him for the purpose of injuring Antony, and he grudged the latter his triumph. While Antony was engaged as described he dared to write to the senate that he wished to give up his office and put all affairs into the hands of that body and of the people: he was not really intending to do anything of the kind, but he desired that under the influence of the hopes he roused they might either compel Cæsar, because on the spot, to give up his arms first, or begin to hate him, if he would not heed them.

—42— In addition to these events at that time the consuls celebrated the festival held in honor of Venus Genetrix. During the Feriæ, prefects, boys and beardless youths, appointed by Cæsar and sprung from knights but not from senators, directed ceremonies. Also Æmilius Lepidus Paulus constructed at his own expense the so-called *Porticus Pauli* and dedicated it in his consulship; for he was consul a portion of that

year. And Agrippa restored from his own purse the so-called Marcian water-supply, which had been cut off by the destruction of the pipes, and carried it in pipes to many parts of the city. These men, though rivals in the outlay of their private funds, still dissembled the fact and behaved sensibly: others who were holding even some most insignificant office strove to get a triumph voted to themselves, some through Antony and some through Cæsar; and on this pretext they levied large sums upon foreign nations for gold crowns. B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722)

The next year Agrippa agreed to be made ædile and without taking anything from the public treasury repaired all the public buildings and all the roads, cleaned out the sewers, and sailed through them underground into the Tiber. And seeing that in the hippodrome men made mistakes about the number of turns necessary, he established the system of dolphins and egg-shaped objects, so that by them the number of times the track had been circled might be clearly shown. Furthermore he distributed to all olive oil and salt, and had the baths open free of charge throughout the year for the use of both men and women. In the many festivals of all kinds which he gave (so many that the children of senators could perform the "Troy" equestrian exercise), he also paid barbers, to the end that no one should be at any expense for their services. Finally he rained upon the heads of the people in the theatre tickets that were good for money in one case, clothes in another, and something else in a third, and he also would place various other large stocks of —43— B. C. 33 (*a. u.* 721)

B. C. 33 (*a. u.* 721) goods in the squares and allow the people to scramble for them. Besides doing this Agrippa drove the astrologers and charlatans from the city. During these same days a decree was passed that no one belonging to the senatorial class should be tried for piracy, and so those who were under any such charge at the time were released and some were given *carte blanche* to commit crimes in future. Cæsar became consul for the second time with Lucius Tullus as his colleague, but on the very first day, as Antony had done, he resigned; and with the sanction of the senate he introduced some persons from the populace to the rank of patricians. When a certain Lucius Asellius, who was prætor, on account of a long sickness wished to lay down his office, he appointed his son in his stead. And another prætor died on the last day of his term, whereupon Cæsar chose another for the remaining hours. At the decease of Bocchus he gave his kingdom to no one else, but enrolled it among the Roman provinces. And since the Dalmatians had been utterly subdued, he erected from the spoils thus gained the porticoes and secured the collection of books called the Octavian, after his sister.

—44— Antony meantime had marched as far as the Araxes, presumably to conduct a campaign against the Parthians, but was satisfied to arrange terms with the Median monarch. They made a covenant to serve each other as allies, the one against the Parthians and the other against Cæsar, and to cement the compact they exchanged some soldiers; the Median prince received

a portion of the newly acquired Armenia and Antony his daughter Iotape, to be united in marriage with Alexander, and the military standards taken in the battle with Statianus; after this Antony bestowed upon Polemon, as I have stated, Lesser Armenia, both made Lucius Flavius consul and removed him (as his colleague), and set out for Ionia and Greece to wage war against Cæsar. The Median at first, by employing the Romans as allies, conquered the Parthians and Artaxes who came against him; but as Antony sent for his soldiers and moreover retained those of the prince, the latter was in turn defeated and captured, and so Armenia was lost together with Media. B. C. 33 (*a. u.* 721)

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
50

The following is contained in the Fiftieth of Dio's Rome.

How Cæsar and Antony commenced hostilities against each other (chapters 1–14).

How Cæsar conquered Antony at Actium (chapters 15–35).

Duration of time two years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated:

Cn. Domitius L. F. Cn. N. Ahenobarbus, C. Sosius C. F. T. N. (B. C. 32 = a. u. 722.)

Cæsar (III), M. Valerius M. F. Messala Corvinus. (B. C. 31 = a. u. 723.)

(*BOOK 50, BOISSEVAIN.*)

The Roman people had been robbed of democracy —1— but had not become definitely a monarchy: Antony and Cæsar still controlled affairs on an equal footing, had divided the management of most of them, and nominally considered that the rest belonged to them in common, though in reality they endeavored to appropriate each interest as fast as either was able to gain any advantage over the other. Sextus had now perished, the Armenian king had been captured, the parties hostile to Cæsar were silent, the Parthians showed no signs of restlessness, and so after this they turned openly against each other and the people became entirely enslaved. The causes for the war, or the pretexts, were as follows. Antony charged against Cæsar that he had removed Lepidus from his position, and had taken possession of his territory and the troops of both him and Sextus, which ought to have been common property. He demanded the half of these as well as the half of the soldiers that had been levied in the parts of Italy which belonged to both of them. Cæsar's charge against him was that he was holding Egypt and other countries that he had not drawn by lot, had killed Sextus (whom he would willingly have spared, he said), and by deceiving and binding the Armenian king had caused much ill repute to attach to the Roman people. He, too, demanded half of the spoils, and above all reproached him with Cleopatra and the children of

hers which he had seen fit to regard as his own, the gifts bestowed upon them, and particularly that he called the boy such a name as Cæsarion and
—2— placed him in the family of Cæsar. These were their mutual charges; and to a certain extent mutual rejoinders were made, some sent by letter to each other and others given to the public, by Cæsar orally, by Antony in writing. On this pretext also they kept constantly sending envoys back and forth, wishing to appear as far as possible justified in the complaints they made and to reconnoitre each other's position at the same time. Meanwhile they were collecting money avowedly for some different purpose and were making all other preparations for war as if against other per-
B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722) sons, until the time that Gnæus Domitius and Gaius Sosius, both belonging to Antony's party, became consuls. Then they made no further concealment, but admitted their alienation outright. It happened in the following way.

Domitius did not openly attempt any radical measures, since he had had the experience of many calamities. Sosius, however, had never experienced such evils, and so on the very first day of the month he spoke at length in praise of Antony and inveighed forcibly against Cæsar. Indeed, he would have immediately introduced measures against the latter, had not Nonius Balbus, a tribune, prevented it. Cæsar had suspected what he was going to do and wished neither to permit it to come to pass nor by offering opposition to appear to be commencing war; hence he did not

enter the senate at this time nor even live in the city at all, but invented some excuse which took him out of town. He was not only influenced by the above considerations but desired to deliberate at leisure according to the reports brought to him and decide by mature reflection upon the proper course. Later he returned and convened the senate; he was surrounded by a guard of soldiers and friends who had daggers concealed, and sitting between the consuls upon his chair of state he spoke at length, and calmly, from where he sat regarding his own position, and brought many accusations against Sosius and Antony. When neither of the consuls themselves nor any one else ventured to utter a word, he bade them come together again on a specified day, giving them to understand that he would prove by certain documents that Antony was in the wrong. The consuls did not dare to reply to him and could not endure to be silent, and therefore secretly left the city before the time came for them to appear again; after that they took their way to Antony, followed by not a few of the senators who were left. Cæsar on learning this declared, to prevent its appearing that he had been abandoned by them as a result of some injustice, that he had sent them out voluntarily and that he granted the rest who so wished permission to depart unarmed to Antony. B. C. 32 (a. u. 722)

This action of theirs just mentioned was counterbalanced by the arrival of others who had fled from Antony to Cæsar — among them Titius and Plancus, though they were honored by Antony among —3—

B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722) the foremost and knew all his secrets. Their desertion was due to some friction between themselves and the Roman leader, or perhaps they were disgusted in the matter of Cleopatra: at any rate they left soon after the consuls had taken the final step and Cæsar in the latter's absence had convened the senate and read and spoken all that he wished, upon hearing of which Antony assembled a kind of senate from the ranks of his followers, and after considerable talk on both sides of the question took up the war and renounced his connection with Octavia. Cæsar was very glad to receive the pair and learned from them about Antony's condition, what he was doing, what he had in mind, what was written in his will, and the name of the man that had it; for they had taken part in sealing it. He became still more violently enraged from this cause and did not shrink from searching for the document, seizing it, and then carrying it into the senate and subsequently the assembly, and reading it. The clauses contained in it were of such a nature that his most lawless behavior brought upon him no reproach from the citizens. The writer had asseverated the fact that Cæsarion was truly sprung from Cæsar, had given some enormous presents to his children by the Egyptian queen, who were being reared by him, and had ordered that his body be buried in Alexandria and by her side.

—4— This made the Romans in their indignation believe that the other reports circulated were also true,— viz., that if Antony should prevail, he would bestow their

city upon Cleopatra and transfer the seat of power to Egypt. And thereat they became so angry that all, not only such as disliked him or were indifferent to the two men, censured him, but even his most intimate friends did so severely. For in consternation at what was read and eager to relieve themselves of the suspicion felt toward them by Cæsar, they said the same as the rest. They deprived him of the consulship, to which he had been previously elected, and of all his remaining authority. They did not declare him an enemy in so many words, because they feared its effect on his adherents, since it would be necessary that they also be held in the position of enemies in case they should not abandon him; but by action they showed their attitude as plainly as possible. For they voted to the men arrayed on his side pardon and praise if they would abandon him, and declared war outright upon Cleopatra, put on their military cloaks as though he were close at hand, and went to the temple of Bellona where they performed through Cæsar as *fetialis* all the rites preliminary to war in the customary fashion. These were stated to refer to Cleopatra, but their real bearing was on Antony. She had enslaved him so absolutely that she persuaded him to act as gymnasiarch[1] to the Alexandrians; and she was saluted by him

B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722)

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[1] The gymnasiarch was an essentially Greek official, but might be found outside of Hellas in such cities as had come under Greek influence. In Athens he exercised complete supervision of the gymnasium, paying for training and incidentals, arranging the details of contests, and empowered to eject unsuitable persons from the enclosure. We have comparatively little information about his duties and general standing elsewhere, but probably they were nearly the same. The office was commonly an annual one.

B. C. 32
(*a. u.* 722) as " queen " and " mistress," had Roman soldiers in her body-guard, and all of these inscribed her name upon their shields. She used to frequent the market-place with him, joined him in the management of festivals, in the hearing of lawsuits, and in riding; and in the cities she was actually carried in a chair, while Antony accompanied her on foot along with the eunuchs. He also termed his headquarters " the palace ", sometimes wore an Oriental dagger at his belt, dressed in a manner not in accordance with the customs of his native land, and let himself be seen even in public upon a gilded couch and a chair of similar appearance. He joined her in sitting for paintings and statues, he representing Osiris and Dionysus, and she Selene and Isis. This more than all made him seem to have become crazed by her through some enchantment. She so charmed and enthralled not only him but all the rest who had any influence with him that she conceived the hope of ruling the Romans, and made her greatest vow, whenever she took any oath, that of dispensing justice on the Capitol.

—6— This was the reason that they voted for war against Cleopatra, but they made no such declaration against Antony, knowing well that he would be made hostile in any case, for he was certainly not going to betray

Antony did not limit to Alexandria his performance of the functions of gymnasiarch. We read in Plutarch (Life of Antony, chapter 33) that at Athens on one occasion he laid aside the insignia of a Roman general to assume the purple mantle, white shoes, and the rods of this official; and in Strabo (XIV, 5, 14) that he promised the people of Tarsos to preside in a similar manner at some of their games, but when the time came sent a representative instead.— See Krause, *Gymnastik und Agonistik der Hellenen*, page 196.

her and espouse Cæsar's cause. And they wished to have this additional reproach to heap upon him, that he had voluntarily taken up war in behalf of the Egyptian woman against his native country, though no ill treatment had been accorded him personally at home. B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722)

Now the men of fighting age were being rapidly assembled on both sides, money was being collected from all quarters, and all warlike equipment was being gathered with speed. The entire armament distinctly surpassed in size anything previous. All the following nations coöperated with one side or the other in this war. Cæsar had Italy — he attached to his cause even all those who had been placed in colonies by Antony, partly by frightening them on account of their small numbers and partly by conferring benefits; among other things that he did was to settle again as an act of his own the men who inhabited Bononia, so that they might seem to be his colonists. His allies, then, were Italy, Gaul, Spain, Illyricum, the Libyans,— both those who had long since accepted Roman sway (except those about Cyrene), and those that had belonged to Bogud and Bocchus,— Sardinia, Sicily, and the rest of the islands adjacent to the aforementioned divisions of the mainland. On Antony's side were the regions obeying Rome in continental Asia, the regions of Thrace, Greece, Macedonia, the Egyptians, the Cyrenæans together with the surrounding country, the islanders dwelling near them, and practically all the princes and potentates who were neighbors to that part of the Roman empire then under his control,—

B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722) some taking the field themselves and others being represented by troops. And so enthusiastic were the outside contingents on both sides that they confirmed by oath their alliance with each man.

—7— Such was the strength of the contestants. Antony took an oath to his own soldiers that he would fight without quarter and further promised that within two months after his victory he would give up his entire power and commit it to the senate and the people: some of them with difficulty persuaded him to do so only when six months had elapsed, so that he might be able to settle matters leisurely. And he, however far he was from seriously contemplating such an act, yet made the offer to strengthen the belief that he was certainly and without fail going to conquer. He saw that his own force was much superior in numbers and hoped to weaken that of his opponent by bribes. He sent gold in every direction, most of all into Italy, and especially to Rome; and he tempted his opponents individually, trying to win followers. As a result Cæsar kept the more vigilant watch and gave money to his soldiers.

—8— Such was the vigor and the equipment of the two; and meantime all sorts of stories were circulated by men, and from the gods also there were many plain indications. An ape entered the temple of Ceres during a certain service, and tumbled about everything in the building. An owl flew first upon the temple of Concord and then upon practically all the other holiest buildings, and finally after being driven away from every other spot settled upon the temple of the Genius

Populi and was not caught, and did not depart until late in the day. The chariot of Jupiter was demolished in the Roman hippodrome, and for many days a flash would rise over the sea toward Greece and dart up into the firmament. Many unfortunate accidents also were caused by storm: a trophy standing upon the Aventine fell, a statue of Victory was dislodged from the back wall of the theatre, and the wooden bridge was broken down completely. Many objects were destroyed by fire, and moreover there was a fierce volcanic discharge from Ætna which damaged cities and fields. On seeing and hearing these things the Romans remembered also about the serpent, because he too had doubtless indicated something about the situation confronting them. A little before this a great two-headed serpent, eighty-five feet long, had suddenly appeared in Etruria and after doing much damage had been killed by lightning. This had a bearing upon all of them. The chief force engaged on both sides alike was made up of Romans, and many were destined at that juncture to perish in each army, and then all of the survivors to become the property of the victor. Antony was given omens of defeat beforehand by the children in Rome; without any one's having suggested it they formed two parties, of which one called itself the Antonians and the other the Cæsarians, and they fought with each other for two days, when those that bore Antony's name were defeated. His death was portended by what happened to one of his images set up as an offering in the temple of Jupiter at Albanum; although it was stone it sent forth streams of blood.

B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722)

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B. C. 32
(*a. u.* 722)

All alike were excited over these events, yet in that year nothing further took place. Cæsar was busied settling matters in Italy, especially when he discovered the presence of money sent by Antony, and so could not go to the front before winter. His rival started out with the intention of carrying the war into Italy before they suspected his movements, but when he came to Corcyra and ascertained that the advance guard of ships sent to reconnoitre his position was hiding in the vicinity of the mountains of Ceraunia, he conceived the idea that Cæsar himself with all his fleet had arrived; hence he would proceed no farther. Instead, he sailed back to the Peloponnesus, the season being already late autumn, and passed the winter at Patræ, distributing the soldiers in every direction to the end that they might keep guard over the various districts and secure more easily an abundance of provisions. Meanwhile volunteers from each party went over to both sides, senators as well as others, and Lucius Messius was caught as a spy by Cæsar. He released the man in spite of his being one of those previously captured at Perusia, but first showed him all his power. To Antony Cæsar sent a letter, bidding him either withdraw from the sea a day's journey on horseback, and grant him the free privilege of coming to him by boat on condition that they should meet within five days, or else to cross over to Italy himself on the same terms. Antony made a great deal of fun of him and said: "Who will be our arbitrator, if the compact is transgressed in any way?" And Cæsar did

not expect that his demands would receive compliance, but hoped to inspire his own soldiers with courage and his opponents with terror by this act. B. C. 32 (*a. u.* 722)

As consuls for the next year after this Cæsar and Antony had been appointed at the time when they settled the offices for eight years at once[1]; and this was the last year of the period: and as Antony had been deposed,— a fact which I stated,[2]—Valerius Messala, who had once been proscribed by them,[3] became consul with Cæsar. About this time a madman rushed into the theatre at one of the festivals, seized the crown of the former Cæsar and put it on, whereupon he was torn to pieces by the bystanders. A wolf that darted into the temple of Fortune was caught and killed, and at the hippodrome during the very contest of the horses a dog overpowered and devoured another dog. Fire also consumed a considerable portion of the hippodrome, the temple of Ceres, another shrine dedicated to Spes, besides a large number of other structures. The freedmen were thought to have caused this. All of them who were in Italy and possessed property worth five myriads[4] or more had been ordered to contribute an eighth of it. The result was numerous riots, murders, and firing of buildings on their part, and they were not brought to order until they were subdued by armed force. After this the freedmen who held any land in Italy grew frightened and kept quiet: they had — 10 — B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

1 See Book Forty-eight, chapter 35.
2 Chapter 4 of this book.
3 Cp. Book Forty-seven, chapter 11.
4 Sc. of denarii.

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) been ordered, too, to give a quarter of their annual income, and though they were on the point of rebelling against this extortion, they were not bold enough after the demonstration mentioned to show further insubordination, but reluctantly made their contribution without disputing the matter. Therefore it was believed that the fire was due to a plot originated by the freedmen: yet this did not prevent it from being recorded among the great portents, because of the number of buildings burned.

—11— Disregarding such omens as had appeared to them they neither felt fear nor displayed less hostility but spent the winter in employing spies and annoying each other. Cæsar had set sail from Brundusium and proceeded as far as Corcyra, intending to attack the ships near Actium while off their guard, but he encountered rough weather and received damage which caused him to withdraw. When spring came, Antony made no move at any point: the crews that manned the triremes were made up of all kinds of nations, and as they had been wintering at a distance from him they had secured no practice and had been diminished in numbers by disease and desertions; Agrippa also had seized Methone by storm, had killed Bogud there, was watching for merchant vessels to come to land, and was making descents from time to time on various parts of Greece, which caused Antony extreme disturbance. Cæsar in turn was encouraged by this and wished to employ as soon as possible the energy of the army, which was trained to a fine point, and to carry on the

war in Greece near his rival's supporters rather than in Italy near Rome. Therefore he collected all his soldiers who were of any value, and all of the men of influence, both senators and knights, at Brundusium. He wished to have the first to coöperate with him and to keep the second from being alone and acting in any revolutionary way, but chiefly he wished to show mankind that the largest and strongest element among the Romans was in accord with him. Therefore he ordered all to bring with them a stated number of servants and that, except the soldiers, they should also carry food for themselves; after this with the entire array he crossed the Ionian Gulf. He was leading them not to the Peloponnesus or against Antony, but to Actium, where the greater part of his rival's fleet was at anchor, to see if he could gain possession of it, willing or unwilling, in advance. Consequently he disembarked the cavalry under the shadow of the Ceraunian mountains and sent them to the point mentioned, while he himself with his ships seized Corcyra, deserted by the garrisons within it, and came to a stop in the so-called Sweet Harbor: it is so named because it is made sweet by the river emptying into it. There he established a naval station and from there he set out to sail to Actium. No one came out to meet him or would hold parley with him, though he urged them to do one of two things,— come to an agreement or come into battle. But the first alternative they would not accept through distrust, nor the second, through fear. He then occupied the site where Ni-

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

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(*a. u.* 723)

copolis now stands and took up a position on a high piece of ground there from which there is a view over all the outer sea near Paxa, over the inner Ambracian Gulf, and the intermediary water (on which are the harbors near Nicopolis) alike. This spot he strengthened and constructed walls from it down to Comarus, the outer harbor, so that he commanded Actium with his camp and his fleet, by land and sea. I have heard the report that he transferred triremes from the outer sea to the gulf through the fortifications, using newly flayed hides smeared with olive oil instead of hauling-engines. However, I can find no exploit recorded of these ships in the gulf and therefore I am unable to trust the tradition; for it was certainly no small task to draw triremes on hides over a long and uneven tract of land. Still, it is said to have been performed. Actium is a place sacred to Apollo and is located in front of the mouth of the narrows leading into the Ambracian Gulf opposite the harbors at Nicopolis. These narrows are of uniform breadth, though closely confined, for a long distance, and both they and all the waters outside the entrance are fit for ships to come to anchor in and lie in wait. This space the adherents of Antony had occupied in advance, had built towers on each side of the mouth, and had taken up the intervening space with ships so that they could both sail out and retreat with security. The men were bivouacked on the farther side of the narrows, along by the sanctuary, on an extensive level area quite suitable for either battle or encampment. The nature of the place

made them far more subject to disease both in winter and in summer. B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

—13— As soon as Antony ascertained Cæsar's arrival, he did not delay, but hastened to Actium with his followers. He reached there in a short time but did not at once risk an encounter, though Cæsar was constantly marshaling his infantry in front of the camp, often making dashes at them with his ships and beaching their transports; for his object was to join battle with only such as were present, before Antony's entire command assembled. For this very reason the latter was unwilling to risk his all, and he had recourse for several days to trials and skirmishes until he had gathered his legions. With these, especially since Cæsar no longer displayed an equal readiness to assail them, he crossed the narrows and encamped not far from him, after which he sent cavalry around the gulf and besieged him on both sides. Cæsar himself remained quiet, and did not take any risks which he could avoid, but sent a detachment into Greece and Macedonia with the intention of drawing Antony off in that direction. While they were so engaged Agrippa sailed suddenly to Leucas and captured the vessels there, took Patræ by conquering Quintus Nasidius in a fight at sea, and later also reduced Corinth. Following upon these events Marcus Titius and Statilius Taurus made a sudden charge upon Antony's cavalry, which they defeated, and won over Philadelphus, king of Paphlagonia. Meantime, also, Gnæus Domitius, having some grievance against Cleopatra, transferred his allegiance

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) and proved, indeed, of no service to Cæsar (for he fell sick and died not long after), but still created the impression that his desertion was due to despair of the success of the party on whose side he was ranged. Many others followed his example, so that Antony was no longer equally imbued with courage but was suspicious of everybody. It was after this that he tortured and put to death Iamblichus, king of some of the Arabians, and others, and delivered Quintus Postumius, a senator, to his servants to be placed on the rack. Finally he became afraid that Quintus Deillius and Amyntas the Gaul, who happened to have been sent into Macedonia and Thrace after mercenaries, would espouse Cæsar's cause, and he started to overtake them, pretending that he wished to render them assistance in case any hostile force should attack. And

—14— meantime a battle at sea occurred. Lucius Tarius, with a few ships was anchored opposite Sosius, and the latter hoped to achieve a notable success by attacking him before Agrippa, to whom the whole fleet had been entrusted, should arrive. Accordingly, after waiting for a thick mist, so that Tarius should not become aware of their numbers beforehand and flee, he set sail suddenly just before dawn and immediately at the first assault routed his opponent and pursued him, but failed to capture him; for Agrippa by chance met Sosius on the way, so that he not only gained nothing from the victory but perished[2] together with Tarcondimotus and many others.

[1] *L. Tarius Rufus.*

[2] Dio in some unknown manner has at this point evidently made a very striking mistake. Sosius was not killed in the encounter but

Antony, because of his conflict and because he himself on his return had been defeated in a cavalry battle by Cæsar's advance guard, no longer thought it well to encamp in two different places, but during the night left the redoubt which was near his opponents and retired to the other side of the narrows, where the larger part of his army had bivouacked. When provisions also began to fail him because he was cut off from foraging, he held a council to deliberate whether they should remain in position and hazard an encounter or transfer their post somewhere else and make the war a long one. After several had given opinions the advice of Cleopatra prevailed,— that the choicest sites be given in possession of garrisons and that the rest of the force weigh anchor with them for Egypt. She held this view as a result of being disturbed by omens. Swallows had built their nests about her tent and on the flagship on which she sailed, and milk and blood together had dripped from beeswax. Their images with the forms of gods which the Athenians had placed on their Acropolis were hurled down by thunderbolts into the Theatre. This and the consequent dejection and listlessness of the army began to alarm Cleopatra and she filled Antony with fears. They did not wish, however, to sail out either secretly or openly as fugitives, for fear they should strike terror to the hearts of their allies, but rather with preparations

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

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survived to be pardoned by Octavius after the latter's victory. And our historian, who here says he perished, speaks in the next book (chapter 2) of the amnesty accorded.

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) made for a naval battle, in order that they might equally well force their way through in case there should be any resistance. Therefore they chose out first the best of the vessels, since the sailors had become fewer by death and desertion, and burned the rest; next they secretly put all their most prized valuables aboard of them by night. When the boats were ready, Antony gathered his soldiers and spoke as follows:—

—16— "All provisions that I was required to make for the war have received due attention, fellow-soldiers, in advance. First, there is your immense throng, all the chosen flower of our dependents and allies; and to such a degree are you masters of every form of combat recognized among us that alone by yourselves you are formidable to adversaries. Then again, you yourselves can see how large and how fine a fleet we have and how many fine hoplites, cavalry, slingers, peltasts, archers, mounted archers. Most of these classes are not found at all on the other side, and so far as they are found they are much fewer and weaker than ours. The funds of the enemy are small, though obtained by forced contributions, and can not last long, while they have rendered the contributors better disposed toward us than toward the men who took them; hence the population is in no way favorable to the oppressors and is moreover on the point of open revolt. Our treasury, filled from abundant resources, has harmed no one and will aid all

—17— of us. In addition to these considerations so numerous and of such great importance I am on general princi-

ples disinclined to make any bombastic statement about myself. Yet since this too is one of the factors contributing to supremacy in war and is believed among all men to be of greatest importance,— I mean that men who are to fight well must secure an excellent general,— necessity itself has rendered quite indispensable some remarks about myself, their purpose being to enable you to realize still more the fact that not only are you such soldiers that you could conquer even without a good leader, but I am such a leader that I can win even with poor soldiers. I am at that age when persons attain their greatest perfection both of body and intellect and suffer deterioration neither through the rashness of youth nor the feebleness of old age, but are strongest because in a condition half-way between the two. Moreover I possess such a nature and such a training that I can with greatest ease discern what requires to be done and make it known. Experience, which causes even the ignorant and the uneducated to appear to be of some value, I have been acquiring through my whole political and whole military career. From boyhood till now I have been continually exercised in similar pursuits; I have been much ruled and done much ruling, from which I have learned on the one hand what kind of orders and of what magnitude must be issued, and on the other how far and in what way one must render obedience. I have been subject to terror, to confidence: as a result I have made it my custom neither to entertain any fear too readily nor to venture on any hazard too heedlessly. I have

B. C. 31
(*a. u.* 723)

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) met with good fortune, I have met with failure: consequently I find it possible to avoid both despair and excess of pride.

—18— "I speak to you who know these facts and make you who hear them my witnesses not in the intention of uttering idle boasts about myself,—your consciousness of the truth being sufficient glory for me,—but to the end that you may in this way bring home to yourselves how much better we are equipped than our opponents. For, while they are inferior to us in quantity both of soldiers and of money and in diversity of equipment, in no one respect are they so strikingly lacking as in the age and inexperience of their general. About him I need in general make no exact or detailed statement, but to sum up I will say this, which you all understand, that he is a veritable weakling in body and has never himself been victor in any important battle either on land or on the sea. Indeed, at Phillipi and in the same conflict I won the day, whereas he was defeated.

"To this degree do we differ from each other, and usually victories fall to the better equipped. And if they have any strength at all, you would find it to exist in their heavy-armed force on land; as for their ships, they will not so much as be able to sail out against us. You yourselves can of course see the size and stoutness of our vessels, which are such that if the enemy's were equivalent to them in number, yet because of these advantages the foe could do no damage either by charges from the side or by charges from the front. For first the thickness of the timbers and second the

very height of the ships would certainly check them, even if there were no one on board to defend them. Where will any one find a chance to assail ships which carry so many archers and slingers striking assailants, moreover, from the towers up aloft? If any one should approach, how could he fail to get sunk by the very number of the oars or how could he fail to be plunged under water when shot at by all the warriors on the decks and in the towers? Do not think that they have any nautical ability because Agrippa won a sea-fight off Sicily: they contended not against Sextus but against his slaves, not against a like equipment with ours but against one far inferior. If, again, any one makes much of their good fortune in that combat, he is bound to take into equal consideration the defeat which Cæsar himself suffered at the hands of Sextus. By this comparison he will find that conditions are not the same, but that all our advantages are more numerous and greater than theirs. And, in general, how large a part does Sicily form of the whole empire and how large a fraction of our equipment did the troops of Sextus possess, that any one should properly fear Cæsar's armament, which is precisely the same as before and has grown neither larger nor better, just on account of his good luck, instead of taking courage from the defeat that he endured? Reflecting on this fact I have not cared to risk our first engagement with the infantry, where they appear to have strength in a way, in order that no one of you should be liable to discouragement as a result of any failure in that department:

B. C. 31 (a. u. 723)

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B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) instead, I have chosen to begin with the ships where we are strongest and have a vast superiority over our antagonists, to the end that after a victory with these we may despise the infantry. You know well that the whole outcome of the war depends on each side on our fleets. If we come out victorious in this engagement, we shall suffer no harm from any of the rest but cut them off on a kind of islet,— for all surrounding regions are in our possession,— and without effort subdue them, if in no other way, by hunger.

—20— "Now I do not think that further words are necessary to tell you that we shall be struggling not for small or unimportant interests, but it will prove true that if you are zealous you will obtain the greatest rewards, but if careless will suffer the most frightful misfortunes. What would they not do to us, if they should prevail, when they killed practically all the followers of Sextus that had been of any prominence, and even destroyed many followers of Lepidus that coöperated with Cæsar's party? But why should I mention this, seeing that they have removed Lepidus, who was guilty of no wrong and was further their ally, from all his powers as general and keep him under guard as if he were some captive? They have further hounded for money all the freedmen in Italy and likewise other men who possess any land to such an extent as to force some of them to take up arms, with the consequence that not a few perished. Is it possible that those who spared not their allies will spare us? Will those who seized for funds the property of their own adherents

refrain from our wealth? Will they show humanity as victors who before victory have committed every conceivable outrage? Not to spend time in speaking of the concerns of other people, I will enumerate the audacity that they have displayed toward us who stand here. Who was ignorant that I was chosen a partner and colleague of Cæsar and received charge of the management of public affairs equally with him, received similar honors and offices, and have been a great while now in possession of them? Yet of all of them, so far as is in his power, I have been deprived; I have become a private citizen instead of a leader, an outcast from the franchise instead of consul, and this not by the action of the people or the senate but by his own act and that of his adherents, who do not comprehend that they are preparing a sovereign for themselves first of all. For how could one speak of enactments of people and senate, when the consuls and some others fled straightway from the city, in order to escape casting any such vote? How will that man spare either you or anybody else, when he dared while I was alive, in possession of such great power, a victor over the Armenians, to seek for my will, take it by violence from those who had received it, open it, and read it publicly? And how will he manifest any humanity to others with whom he has no connection, when he has shown himself such a man toward me,—his friend, his table companion, his relative? B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

"Now in case we are to draw any inferences from his decrees, he threatens you openly, having made the majority of you enemies outright, but against me per- —21—

B. C. 31
(*a. u.* 723)

sonally no such declaration has been made, though he is at war with me and is already acting in every way like one who has not only conquered me but murdered me. Hence, when he treated me in such a way whom he pretends not yet even at this day to regard as an enemy, he will surely not keep his hands off you, with whom he clearly admits that he is at odds. What does it signify that he is threatening us all alike with arms but in his decree declares he is at war with some and not with others? It is not, by Jupiter, with the intention of making any distinction between us, or treating one class in one way and another in another, if he prevails, but it is in order to set us at variance and in collision and thus render us weaker. He is not unaware that while we are in accord and doing everything as one body he can never in any way get the upper hand, but if we quarrel, and some choose one policy

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and the rest another, he may perhaps prevail. It is for this reason that he assumes this kind of attitude toward us. I and the Romans that cleave to me foresee the danger, although so far as the decrees are concerned we enjoy a kind of amnesty: we comprehend his plot and neither abandon you nor look personally to our own advantage. In like manner you, too, whom he does not even himself deny that he regards as hostile, yes, most hostile, ought to bear in mind all these facts, and embracing common dangers and common hopes coöperate in every way and show enthusiasm to an equal degree in our enterprise and set over against each other carefully first what we shall suffer

(as I said), if defeated, and what we shall gain, if victorious. For it is a great thing for us to escape being worsted and so enduring any form of insult or rapacity, but greatest of all to conquer and effect whatever any one of us may wish. On the other hand, it is most disgraceful for us, who are so many and so valiant, who have weapons and money and ships and horses, to choose the worse instead of the better course, and when we might afford the other party liberty to prefer to join them in slavery. Our aims are so utterly opposed that, whereas he desires to reign as sovereign over you, I wish to free you and them together, and this I have confirmed by oath. Therefore as men who are to struggle for both sides alike and to win blessings that shall be common to all, let us labor, fellow-soldiers, to prevail at the present juncture and to gain happiness for all time."

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

—23—

After delivering a speech of this sort Antony put all his most prominent associates aboard the boats, to prevent them from concerting revolutionary measures when they got by themselves, as Deillius and some other deserters had done; he also embarked great numbers of archers, slingers, and hoplites. And since the defeat of Sextus had been largely due to the size of Cæsar's ships and the number of his marines, Antony had equipped his vessels to surpass greatly those of his opponents, for he had had constructed only a few triremes, but the rest were ships with four banks and with ten banks, and represented all the remaining degrees of capacity: upon these he had built lofty towers,

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) and he had put aboard a crowd of men who could fight from behind walls, as it were. Cæsar for his part was observing their equipment and making his preparations; when he learned from Deillius and others their intention he himself assembled the army and spoke to this effect:—

—24— "Having discovered, fellow-soldiers, both from what I have learned from hearsay and from what I have tested by experience, that the most and greatest military enterprises, or, indeed, I might say human affairs in general, turn out in favor of those persons who both think and act in a more just and pious manner, I am keeping this strictly in mind myself and I advise you to consider it. No matter how numerous and mighty the force we possess, no matter if it be such that even a man who chose the less just of two courses might expect to win with its aid, nevertheless I base my confidence far more upon the causes underlying the war than upon this factor. For that we who are Romans and lords of the greatest and best portion of the world should be despised and trodden under foot of an Egyptian woman is unworthy of our fathers who overthrew Pyrrhus, Philip, Perseus, Antiochus, who uprooted the Numantini and the Carthaginians, who cut down the Cimbri and the Ambrones; it is unworthy also of ourselves who have subjugated the Gauls, have subdued the Pannonians, have advanced as far as the Ister, have crossed the Rhine, have gone over into Britain. How could all those who have had a hand in the exploits mentioned fail to grieve vehemently, if

they should learn that we had succumbed to an accursed woman? Should we not be guilty of a gross deviation from right conduct, if, after surpassing all men everywhere in valor, we should then bear humbly the insults of this throng, who, O Hercules, are Alexandrians and Egyptians (what worse or what truer name could one apply to them?), who serve reptiles and other creatures as gods, who embalm their bodies to secure a reputation for immortality, who are most reckless in braggadocio but most deficient in bravery, and worst of all are slaves to a woman instead of a man? Yet these have dared to lay claim to our possessions and to acquire them through us, evidently expecting that we will give up the prosperity which we possess for them. Who can help lamenting to see —25— Roman soldiers acting as body-guards of their queen? Who can help groaning when he hears Roman knights and senators flattering her like eunuchs? Who can help weeping when he both hears and sees Antony himself, the man twice consul, often imperator, to whom was committed in common with me the superintendence of the public business, who was entrusted with so many cities, so many legions,— when he sees that this man has now abandoned all his ancestors' habits of life, has emulated all alien and barbaric customs, that he pays no honor to us or to the laws or to his fathers' gods, but worships that wench as if she were some Isis or Selene, calling her children Sun and Moon, and finally himself bearing the title of Osiris and Dionysus, in consequence of which he has bestowed entire islands

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) and some of the continents, as though he were master of the whole earth and the whole sea? I am sure that this appears marvelous and incredible to you, fellow-soldiers: therefore you ought to be the more indignant. For if that is actually so which you do not even believe on hearing it, and if that man in his voluptuary career commits acts at which any one who learns of them must grieve, would you not properly become exceedingly enraged?

—26— "Yet at the start I was so devoted to him that I gave him a share of my leadership, married my sister to him, and granted him legions. Even after this I felt so kindly, so affectionately toward him that I was unwilling to wage war on him because of his insulting my sister, or because he neglected the children she had borne him, or because he preferred the Egyptian woman to her, or because he bestowed upon the former's children practically all your possessions, or, in fine, for any other reason. The cause is that, first of all, I did not think it proper to assume the same attitude toward Antony as toward Cleopatra. I deemed her by the very fact of her foreign birth to be at the outset hostile to his career, but I believed that he, as a citizen, could be corrected. Later I entertained the hope that if not voluntarily at least reluctantly he might change his mind as a result of the decrees passed against her. Consequently I did not declare war upon him. He, however, has looked haughtily and disdainfully upon my efforts and will neither be released, though we would fain release him, nor be pitied though we try to

pity him. He is either unreasonable or mad,— and this B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) which I have heard I do believe, that he has been bewitched by that accursed female,— and therefore pays no heed to our kindness or humaneness, but being in slavery to that woman he undertakes in her behalf both war and needless dangers which are both against our interests and against those of his country. What else, then, is our duty except to fight him back together with Cleopatra? Hence let no one call him a Roman —27— but rather an Egyptian, nor Antony but rather Serapio. Let no one think that he was ever consul or imperator, but only gymnasiarch. He has himself of his own free will chosen the latter title instead of the former, and casting away all the august terms of his own land has become one of the cymbal players from Canopus.[1] Again, let no one fear that he can give any unfavorable turn to the war. Even previously he was of no ability, as you know clearly who conquered him near Mutina. And even if once he did attain to some capacity through campaigning with us, be well assured that he has now ruined all of it by his changed manner of life. It is impossible for one who leads an existence of royal luxury and coddles himself like a woman to think any valorous thoughts or do valorous deeds, because it is quite inevitable that a person takes the impress of the practices with which he comes in

1 Canopus was only fifteen miles distant from Alexandria (hence its pertinence here) and was noted for its many festivals and bad morals, — the latter being superinduced by the presence in the city of a large floating population of foreigners and sailors. The atmosphere of the town (to compare small things with great) was, in a word, that of Corinth.

B. C. 31
(a. u. 723)

contact. A proof of this is that in the one war which he has waged in all this long time and the one campaign that he has made he lost great numbers of citizens in the battles, returned in thorough disgrace from Praaspa, and parted with very many additional men in the flight. If any one of us were obliged to perform a set dance or cordax[1] in an amusing way, such a person would surely yield the honors to him; he has practiced this: but since it is a case of arms and battle, what is there about him that any one should dread? His physical condition? He has passed his prime and become effeminate. His strength of mind? He plays the woman and has surrendered himself to unnatural lust. His piety toward our gods? He is at war both with them and his country. His faithfulness to his allies? But is any one unaware how he deceived and imprisoned the Armenian? His liberal treatment of his friends? But who has not seen the men who have miserably perished at his hands? His reputation with the soldiers? But who even of them has not condemned him? Evidence of their feeling is found in the fact that numbers daily come over to our side. For my part I think that all our citizens will do this, as on a former occasion when he was going from Brundusium into Gaul. So long as they expected to get rich without danger, some were very glad to cleave to him. But they will not care to fight against us, their own countrymen, in behalf of what does not belong to them at all, especially when they are given the opportunity to win

[1] The cordax was a dance peculiar to Greek comedy and of an appropriately licentious character, resembling in some points certain of the Oriental dances that survive to the present day.

without hazard both preservation and prosperity by joining us. B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

"Some one may say, however, that he has many allies and a store of wealth. —28— Well, how we have been accustomed to conquer the dwellers on Asia the mainland is known to Scipio Asiaticus the renowned, is known to Sulla the fortunate, to Lucullus, to Pompey, to my father Cæsar, and to your own selves, who vanquished the supporters of Brutus and Cassius. This being so, if you think their wealth is so much more than others', you must be all the more eager to make it your own. It is but fair that for the greatest prizes the greatest conflicts should be undergone. And I can tell you nothing else greater than that prize which lies within your grasp,— namely, to preserve the renown of your forefathers, to guard your individual pride, to take vengeance on those in revolt against us, to repulse those who insult you, to conquer and rule all mankind, to allow no woman to make herself equal to a man. Against the Taurisci and Iapudes and Dalmatians and Pannonians you yourselves now before me battled most zealously and frequently for some few walls and desert land; you subdued all of them though they are admittedly a most warlike race; and, by Jupiter, against Sextus also, for Sicily merely, and against this very Antony, for Mutina merely, you carried on a similar struggle, so that you came out victorious over both. And now will you show any less zeal against a woman whose plots concern all your possessions, and against her husband, who has distributed to her children all your property,

B. C. 31 (a. u. 723) and against their noble table-companions and parasites, whom they themselves stigmatize as backhouse wits? How can it be? Is it on account of their numbers? But no number of bodies can conquer valor. On account of their race? They have practiced carrying burdens rather than warfare. On account of their experience? They know better how to row than to conduct a naval battle. I am really ashamed that we are going to contend with such fellows, whom if we vanquish we shall gain no glory, whereas if we are defeated —29— we shall be disgraced. And surely you do not think that the size of their vessels or the thickness of the timbers is equivalent to our valor. What ship ever by itself either wounded or killed anybody? Will they not by their very height and thickness be more difficult to move for the rowers driving them and less obedient to their pilots? What use can be made of them by the warriors on board, when the vessels can employ neither frontal assault nor flank attack, which are the methods of naval contests? Surely they do not intend to employ infantry tactics against us on the sea, nor are they prepared to shut themselves up as in wooden walls and stand a siege. That would be entirely to our benefit,—assaulting wooden barriers, I mean. If their ships stay close together as if built into the brine, it will be possible for us to burst asunder their formation with our rams, to inflict wounds with engines from a distance, to burn them to the water's edge by missiles on fire. If they venture to make any movement, they will not overtake any one when pursuing nor escape

any one when fleeing, since they are most useless by reason of their weight for any action, and quite calculated by their size to suffer some harm. Indeed, what need is there to spend time in speaking further of them, when we have often already made a trial of them both near Leucas and here but recently, and so far from proving inferior to them we have everywhere shown ourselves superior? Strengthened not more by my words than by your own deeds you should desire now to put an end to the entire war. For you are well aware of the fact that if we beat them to-day we shall have no further trouble. By nature every human force when it fails in first encounters becomes more discouraged with respect to those to come. We are indisputably superior to them on land and could vanquish them if they were absolutely fresh. They are themselves so conscious of this fact,— for I am not going to conceal from you what I have heard,— that they are discouraged at what has already happened and despair of safety if they stay where they are, and they are therefore undertaking to escape to some point and are sailing out now not with the idea of a battle, but with the idea of flight. They have placed in their ships the best and most valuable of the possessions belonging to them, to the end that, if they find it feasible, they may escape with them. Since, then, they admit that they are weaker than we and carry the prizes of victory in their ships, let us not allow them to sail away to any other place, but conquer them here and take all the spoils away from them."

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

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B. C. 31
(*a. u.* 723)
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Such were Cæsar's words. After this he formed a plan to let them slip by, intending to fall upon them from the rear: he himself by fast sailing expected to capture them directly, and when the leaders had plainly shown that they were attempting to run away he thought that the remainder would make no contest about surrendering. He was restrained, however, by Agrippa, who feared that they might not overtake the fugitives, who would probably use sails, and he also felt some confidence of conquering without much effort because meantime a squall of rain with large quantities of spray had driven in the face of Antony's fleet alone and had created disturbance all through it. Hence he abandoned this plan, and after putting vast numbers of infantry aboard the ships himself and placing all his associates into auxiliary boats for the purpose of sailing about quickly, giving notice of requisite action to the warriors, and reporting to him what he ought to know, he awaited the onset of the foe. They weighed anchor to the sound of the trumpet and with ships in close array drew up their line a little outside the narrows, not advancing any farther: he in turn started out as if to come to close quarters or even make them retire. When they neither made a corresponding advance nor turned about, but remained in position and further made their array extremely dense, he became doubtful what to do. Therefore he ordered the sailors to let their oars rest in the water and waited for a time: then suddenly at a given signal led forward both the wings and bent around in the hope chiefly of sur-

rounding the enemy, or otherwise of at least breaking their formation. Antony was afraid of this movement of his to wheel about and surround them, and hence adopted so far as he could corresponding tactics, which brought him, though reluctantly, into close combat. So they attacked and began the conflict, both sides uttering many exhortations in their own ranks as to both artifice and zeal, and hearing many from the men on shore that shouted to them. The struggle was not of a similar nature on the two sides, but Cæsar's followers having smaller and swifter ships went with a rush, and when they rammed were fenced about on all sides to avoid being wounded. If they sank any boat, well: if not, they would back water before a close engagement could be begun, and would either ram the same vessels suddenly again, or would let some go and turn their attention to others; and having damaged them slightly, to whatever degree the limited time would allow, they would proceed against others and then still others, in order that their assault upon any vessel might be so far as possible unexpected. Since they dreaded the defence of the enemy from a distance and likewise the battle at close quarters, they delayed neither in the approach nor in the encounter, but running up suddenly with the object of arriving before the opposing archers could work, they would inflict some wounds and cause a disturbance merely, so as to escape being held, and then retire out of range. The enemy tried to strike the approaching ships with many stones and arrows flying thick and fast, and to cast the grapnels

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

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B. C. 31 (a. u. 723) upon the assailants. And in case they could reach them, they got the better of it, but if they missed, their boats would be pierced and they begin to sink, or else in their endeavor to avoid this calamity they would waste time and lay themselves open to attack on the part of some others. For when two or three at once fell upon the same ship, part would do all the damage they could and the rest suffer the brunt of the injuries. On the one side the pilots and the rowers endured the most annoyance and fatigue, and on the other the marines: and the one side resembled cavalry, now making a charge, now withdrawing, on account of the manœuvres on their part in assaulting and backing water, and the other was like heavy-armed men guarding against the approach of foes and trying as much as possible to hold them. As a result they gained mutual advantages: the one party fell unobserved upon the lines of oars projecting from the ships and shattered the blades, whereas the other party with rocks and engines from above tried to sink them. There were also certain disadvantages: the one party could not injure those approaching it, and the other party, if it failed to sink some vessels by its ramming, was hemmed in and found no longer an equal contest.

—33— The battle was an even one for a long time and neither antagonist could get the upper hand, but the outcome of it was finally like this. Cleopatra, riding at anchor behind the warriors, could not endure the long, obscure uncertainty and delay, but harassed with worry (which was due to her being a woman and an

Egyptian) at the struggle which for so long continued doubtful, and at the fearful expectancy on both sides, suddenly herself started to flee and raised the signal for the remainder of her subjects. So, as they at once raised their sails and sped out to sea, while a wind of some force had by chance arisen, Antony thought they were fleeing not at the bidding of Cleopatra, but through fear because they felt themselves vanquished, and followed them. When this took place the rest of the soldiers became both discouraged and confused, and rather wishing themselves to escape likewise kept raising their sails, and the others kept throwing the towers and the furnishings into the sea in order to lighten the vessels and make good their departure. While they were occupied in this way their adversaries fell upon them, not pursuing the fugitives, because they themselves were without sails and prepared only for a naval battle, and many contended with one ship, both from afar and alongside. Then on the part of both alike the conflict became most diverse and fierce. Cæsar's men damaged the lower parts of the ships all around, crushed the oars, knocked off the rudders, and climbed on the decks, where they took hold of some and pulled them down, pushed off others, and fought with still others, since they were now equal to them in numbers. Antony's soldiers pushed them back with boathooks, cut them down with axes, threw down upon them rocks and other masses of material made ready for just this purpose, repulsed those that tried to climb up, and joined issue with such as came close enough.

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

B. C. 31
(*a. u.* 723)

And one viewing the business might have compared it, likening small things to great, to walls or many thick-set islands being besieged by sea. Thus the one party strove to scale the boats like some land or fortress and eagerly brought to bear everything that contributed to this result. The others tried to repel them, devising every means that is commonly used in such a case.

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As the fight continued equal, Cæsar, at a loss what he should do, sent for fire from the camp. Previously he had wished to avoid using it, in order to gain possession of the money. Now he saw that it was impossible for him to win in any other way, and had recourse to this, as the only thing that would assist him. Thus another form of battle was brought about. The assailants would approach their victims from many directions at once, shoot blazing missiles at them, and hurl torches fastened to javelins from their hands, and with the aid of engines threw pots full of charcoal and pitch upon some boats from a distance. The defenders tried to ward these off individually and when any of them flew past and caught the timbers and at once started a great flame, as must be the case in a ship, they used first the drinking-water which they carried on board and extinguished some conflagrations: when that was gone they dipped up the sea-water. And in case they could use great quantities of it at once, they would stop the fire by main force: but they were unable to do this everywhere, for they did not have many buckets or large ones, and in their confusion brought them up half

full, so that far from doing any service they only quickened the flame. For salt water poured on a fire in small quantities makes it burn up brightly. As they found themselves getting the worst of it in this, they heaped on the blaze their thick mantles and the corpses. For a time these checked the fire and it seemed to abate; later, especially as the wind came upon it in great gusts, it shot up more brilliant than ever and was increased by the fuel. While only a part of a ship was burning, others stood by it and the men would leap into it and hew down some parts and carry away others. These detached parts some threw into the sea and others upon their opponents, in case they could do them any damage. Others were constantly going to the sound portion of the vessel and now more than ever they used the grappling irons and the long spears with the purpose of attaching some hostile ship to theirs and transferring themselves to it; or, if that was out of the question, they tried to set it on fire likewise. But the hostile fleet was guarding against this very attempt and none of it came near enough; and as the fire spread to the encircling walls and descended to the flooring, the most terrible of fates confronted them. Some, and particularly the sailors, perished by the smoke before the flame approached them, while others were roasted in the midst of it as though in ovens. Others were cooked in their armor, which became redhot. There were still others, who, before suffering such a death, or when they were half burned, threw off their armor and were wounded by the men

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(*a. u.* 723)

shooting from a distance, or again were choked by leaping into the sea, or were struck by their opponents and drowned, or were mangled by sea-monsters. The only ones to obtain an endurable death, considering the sufferings round about, were such as killed one another or themselves before any calamity befell them. These did not have to submit to torture, and as corpses had the burning ships for their funeral pyre. The Cæsarians, who saw this, at first so long as any of the foe were still able to defend themselves would not come near; but when the fire began to consume the ships and the men so far from being able to do any harm to an enemy could not even help themselves, they eagerly sailed up to them to see if they could in any way gain possession of the money, and they endeavored to extinguish the fire which they themselves had caused. As a result many of them also perished in the course of their plundering in the flame.

DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY
51

The following is contained in the Fifty-first of Dio's Rome:

How Cæsar after his victory at Actium transacted business requiring immediate attention (chapters 1–4).

About Antony and Cleopatra and their movements after the defeat (chapters 5–8).

How Antony, defeated in Egypt, killed himself (chapters 9–14).

How Cæsar subdued Egypt (chapters 15–18).

How Cæsar came to Rome and conducted a triumph (chapters 19–21).

How the Curia Julia was dedicated (chapter 22).

How Moesia was reduced (chapters 23–27).

Duration of time the remainder of the consulships of Cæsar (3rd) and M. Valerius Corvinus Messala, together with two additional years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated:

Cæsar (IV), M. Licinius M. F. Crassus. (B. C. 30 = a. u. 724.)

Cæsar (V), Sextus Apuleius Sexti F. (B. C. 29 = a. u. 725.)

Such was the naval battle which occurred between them on the second of September. I have not elsewhere used a like expression, not being in the habit of giving precise dates, but I do it here because then for the first time Cæsar alone held the entire power. Consequently the enumeration of the years of his supremacy starts from precisely that day. And before it had gone he set up as an offering to Apollo of Actium a trireme, a four-banked ship, and so on up to one of ten banks, from the captive vessels; and he built a larger temple. He also instituted a quinquennial musical and gymnastic contest involving horseracing,— a "sacred" festival, as they call all which include distribution of food,— and entitled it Actia. Further, by gathering some settlers and ousting others who dwelt nearby from their homes, he founded a city on the site of the camp and named it Nicopolis.[1] On the spot where he had had his tent he laid a foundation of square stones, and put there a shrine of Apollo open to the sky, adorning it with the captured beaks. B. C. 31 (a. u. 723)

But this was done later. At the time he despatched one division of the ships to pursue Antony and Cleopatra; so these followed in their wake, but as it seemed impossible to overtake the fugitives they returned. With his remaining vessels he took the enemy's ram-

1 Nicopolis, i. e., "City of Victory." The same name was given by Pompey to a town founded after his defeat of Mithridates. (See Book Thirty-six, chapter 50.)

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723) parts, where no one opposed him because of small numbers, and then overtook and without a battle got possession of the other army which was retreating into Macedonia. Various important contingents had already made their escape, the Romans to Antony and the rest of the allies to their homes. The latter moreover evinced no further hostility to Cæsar, but both they and all the peoples who had formerly belonged to Rome remained quiet, and some at once and others

—2— later made terms. Cæsar now proceeded to teach the cities a lesson by levying money and taking away the remnant of authority over their citizens that they possessed in their assemblies. From all the potentates and kings, save Amyntas and Archelaus, he took all the lands that they had received from Antony. Philopator son of Tarcondimotus, Lycomedes ruler in a portion of Cappadocian Pontus, and Alexander the brother of Iamblichus he even removed from their principalities. The last named, because he had secured his appointment as a reward for accusing the conqueror, he placed in his triumphal procession and afterward killed. The kingdom of Lycomedes he gave to one Medeus, because the latter had previous to the naval engagement detached the Mysians in Asia from Antony and with them had waged war upon such as followed Antony's fortunes. The people of Cydonea and Lampea he set free, because they had rendered him some assistance, and he helped the Lampeans found anew their city, from which they had been uprooted. As for the senators and knights and other

prominent men who had been active in Antony's cause, he imposed fines upon many of them, executed many of them, and some he spared entirely. Among the last Sosius was a distinguished example: for though he had often fought against Cæsar and now fled and hid himself, but was subsequently discovered, his life was nevertheless preserved. Likewise one Marcus Scaurus, a half-brother of Sextus on the mother's side, had been condemned to death, but was later released for the sake of his mother Mucia. Of those who underwent the extreme punishment the Aquilii Flori and Curio were the most noted. The latter met death because he was a son of the former Curio who had once been of great assistance to the former Cæsar. And the Flori both perished because Octavius commanded that one of them should draw the lot to be slain. They were father and son, and when the latter, before any drawing took place, voluntarily surrendered himself to the executioner the former felt such great grief that he died also by his own hand. B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

This, then, was the end of these persons. The mass of Antony's soldiers was included in the ranks of Cæsar's legions and later he sent back to Italy the citizens over age of both forces, without giving any of them anything, and the remainder he disbanded. They had shown an ugly temper toward him in Sicily after the victory, and he feared they might create a disturbance again. Hence he hastened before the least signs of an uprising were manifested to discharge some entirely from the service under arms and to scatter the —3—

B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

great majority of the rest. As he was even at this time suspicious of the freedmen, he remitted their one-quarter contribution[1] which they were still owing of the money assessed upon them. And they no longer bore him any malice for deprivations they had endured, but rejoiced as if they had received as a gift what they had not been obliged to contribute. The men still left in the rank and file showed no disposition to rebel, partly because they were held in check by their commanding officers, but mostly through hopes of the wealth of Egypt. The men, however, who had helped Cæsar to gain the victory and had been dismissed from the service, were irritated at having obtained no meed of valor, and not much later they began a revolutionary movement. Cæsar was suspicious of them, and fearing that they might despise Mæcenas, to whom at that time Rome and the remainder of Italy had been entrusted, because he was a knight, he sent Agrippa to Italy as if on some routine business. He also gave to Agrippa and to Mæcenas so great authority over everything that they might read beforehand the letters which he often wrote to the senate and to various officials, and then change whatever they wished in them. Therefore they received also from him a ring, so that they should have the means of sealing the epistles. He had had the seal which he used most at that time made double, with a sphinx raised on both sides alike. Subsequently he had his own image made in *intaglio,* and sealed everything with that. Later emperors likewise

[1] An allusion to the second of the two taxes mentioned in Book Fifty, chapter 10.

employed it, except Galba. The latter gave his sanction with an ancestral device which showed a dog bending forward from the prow of a ship. The way that Octavius wrote both to these two magistrates and to the rest of his intimate friends whenever there was need of forwarding information to them secretly was to write in place of the proper letter in each word the second one following. B. C. 31 (*a. u.* 723)

—4— Octavius, with the idea that there would be no more danger from the veterans, administered affairs in Greece and took part in the Mysteries of the two goddesses. He then went over into Asia and settled matters there, all the time keeping a sharp lookout for Antony's movements. For he had not yet received any definite information regarding the course his rival had followed in his escape, and so he kept making preparations to proceed against him, if he should find out exactly. Meantime the ex-soldiers made an open demonstration, because he was so far separated from them, and he began to fear that if they got a leader they might do some damage. Consequently he assigned to others the task of searching for Antony, and hurried to Italy himself, in the middle of the winter of the year that he was holding office for the fourth time, with Marcus Crassus. The latter, in spite of having been attached to the cause of Sextus and of Antony, was then his fellow consul without having even passed through the prætorship. Cæsar came, then, to Brundusium but progressed no farther. The senate on ascertaining that his boat was nearing Italy went there to meet him, save the tribunes B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

B. C. 30 (a. u. 724) and two prætors, who by decree stayed at home; and the class of knights as well as the majority of the people and still others, some represented by embassy and many as voluntary followers, came together there, so that there was no further sign of rebellion on the part of any one, so brilliant was his arrival, and so enthusiastic over him were the masses. They, too, some through fear, others through hopes, others obeying a summons, had come to Brundusium. To certain of them Cæsar gave money, but to the rest who had been the constant companions of his campaigns, he assigned land also. By turning the townspeople in Italy who had sided with Antony out of their homes he was able to grant to his soldiers their cities and their farms. To most of the outcasts from the settlements he granted permission in turn to dwell in Dyrrachium, Philippi, and elsewhere. To the remainder he either distributed or promised money for their land. Though he had now acquired great sums by his victory, he was spending still more. For this reason he advertised in the public market his own possessions and those of his companions, in order that any one who desired to buy or claim any of them might do so. Nothing was sold, however, and nothing repaid. Who, pray, would have dared to undertake to do either? But he secured by this means a reasonable excuse for a delay in carrying out his offers, and later he discharged the debt out of the spoils of the Egyptians.

—5— He settled this and the rest of the urgent business, and gave to such as had received a kind of semi-amnesty the right to live in Italy, not before permitted. After this he forgave the populace left behind in Rome

for not having come to him, and on the thirtieth day after his arrival set sail again for Greece. In the midst of winter he dragged his ships across the isthmus of the Peloponnesus and got back to Asia so quickly that Antony and Cleopatra received each piece of news simultaneously,— that he had departed and that he had returned. They, on fleeing from the naval battle, had gone as far as the Peloponnesus together. From there they sent away some of their associates,— all, in fact, whom they suspected,— while many withdrew against their will, and Cleopatra hastened to Egypt, for fear that her subjects might perhaps revolt, if they heard of the disaster before her coming. In order to make her approach safe, at any rate, she crowned her prows, as a sign of conquest, with garlands, and had some songs of victory sung by flute-players. When she reached safety, she murdered many of the foremost men, who had ever been restless under her rule and were now in a state of excitement at her disaster. From their estates and from various repositories hallowed and sacred she gathered a vast store of wealth, sparing not even the most revered of consecrated treasures. She fitted out her forces and looked about for possible alliances. The Armenian king she killed and sent his head to the Median, who might be influenced by this act, she thought, to aid them. As for Antony, he sailed to Pinarius Scarpus in Libya, and to the army previously collected under him there for the protection of Egypt. This general, however, would[1] not receive him and also slew the first men that Antony sent, besides destroying some of the

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

[1] Verb supplied by R. Stephanus.

B. C. 30 (a. u. 724) soldiers under his command who showed displeasure at this act. Then Antony, too, proceeded to Alexandria, having accomplished nothing.

—6— Now among the other preparations that they made for speedy warfare they enrolled among the ephebi their sons, Cleopatra Cæsarion and Antony Antyllus, who was borne to him by Fulvia and was then with him. Their purpose was to arouse interest among the Egyptians, who would feel that they already had a man for king, and that the rest might recognize these children as their lords, in case any untoward accident should happen to the parents, and so continue the struggle. This proved the lads' undoing. For Cæsar, on the ground that they were men and held a certain form of sovereignty, spared neither of them. But to return: the two were preparing to wage war in Egypt with ships and infantry, and to this end they called also upon the neighboring tribes and the kings that were friendly to them. Nor did they relax their readiness also to sail to Spain, if there should be urgent need, believing that they could alienate the inhabitants of that land by their money if nothing more, and again they thought of transferring the seat of the conflict to the Red Sea. To the end that while engaged in these plans they might escape observation for the longest possible time or deceive Cæsar in some way or slay him by treachery, they despatched men who carried letters to him in regard to peace, but money for his followers. Meantime, also, unknown to Antony, Cleopatra sent to him a golden scepter and a golden crown

and the royal throne, through which she signified that she delivered the government to him. He might hate Antony, if he would only take pity on her. Cæsar accepted the gifts as a good omen, but made no answer to Antony. To Cleopatra he forwarded publicly threatening messages and an announcement that if she would renounce the use of arms and her sovereignty, he would deliberate what ought to be done in her case. Secretely he sent word that, if she would kill Antony, he would grant her pardon and leave her empire unmolested. B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

—7— While these negotiations were going on, the Arabians, influenced by Quintus Didius, the governor of Syria, burned the ships which had been built in the Arabian Gulf for the voyage to the Red Sea, and all the peoples and the potentates refused their assistance. And it occurs to me to wonder that many others also, though they had received many gifts from Antony and Cleopatra, now left them in the lurch. The men, however, of lowest rank who were being supported for gladiatorial combats showed the utmost zeal in their behalf and contended most bravely. These were practicing in Cyzicus for the triumphal games which they were expecting to hold in honor of Cæsar's overthrow, and as soon as they were made aware of what had taken place, they set out for Egypt with the intention of aiding their superiors. Many were their contests with Amyntas in Gaul, and many with the children of Tarcondimotus in Cilicia, who had been their strongest friends but now in view of the changed circumstances

B. C. 30 (a. u. 724) had gone over to the other side; and many were their struggles against Didius, who hindered them while passing through. They proved unable, after all, to make their way to Egypt. Yet even when they had been encompassed on all sides, not even then would they accept any terms of surrender, though Didius made them many promises. They sent for Antony, feeling that they could fight with him better in Syria: then, when he neither came himself nor sent them any message, they decided that he had perished, and reluctantly made terms with the condition that they should never take part in a gladiatorial show. They received from Didius Daphne, the suburb of Antioch, to dwell in, until the matter was called to Cæsar's attention. Then they were tricked (somewhat later) by Messala and were sent in different directions under the pretext that they were to be enlisted in different legions and were in some convenient way destroyed.

—8— When Antony and Cleopatra heard from the envoys the commands which Cæsar issued regarding them, they sent to him again. The queen promised that she would give him large amounts of money. Antony reminded him of their friendship and kinship, and also made a defence of his association with the Egyptian woman; he enumerated the occasions on which they had helped each other gain the objects of their loves,[1] and all the wanton pranks in which they two had shared as young men. Finally he surrendered to him Publius Turullius, a senator, who had been an assassin of Cæsar,

[1] Cobet's interpretation (Mnemosyne X (N. S.), 1882).

but was then living with him as a friend. He actually offered to commit suicide, if in that way Cleopatra might be saved. Cæsar put Turullius to death; it happened that this man had cut wood for the fleet from the forest of Asclepius in Cos, and by his punishment in the same place he was thought to have paid the penalty to the god. But to Antony Cæsar did not even then answer a word. The latter consequently despatched a third embassy, sending him his son Antyllus with considerable gold coin. His rival accepted the money, but sent the boy back empty-handed and gave him no answer. To Cleopatra, however, as the first time so the second and the third time he sent many threats and promises alike. Yet he was afraid, even so, that they might despair of in any way obtaining pardon from him and so hold out, and that they would survive by their own efforts, or set sail for Spain and Gaul, or destroy the money, the bulk of which he heard was immense. Cleopatra had gathered it all in the monument she was constructing in the palace; and she threatened to burn all of it with her, in case she should miss the smallest of her demands. Octavius sent therefore Thyrsus, a freedman of his, to speak to her kindly in every way and to tell her further that it so happened that he was in love with her. He hoped at least by this means, since she thought she had the power to arouse passion in all mankind, that he might remove Antony from the scene and keep her and her money intact. And so it proved.

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

Before quite all this had occurred Antony learned —9—

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

that Cornelius Gallus had taken charge of Scarpus's army and with the men had suddenly marched upon Paxætonium and occupied it. Hence, though he wished to set out and follow the summons of the gladiators, he did not go into Syria. He proceeded against Gallus, believing that he could certainly win over his soldiers without effort; they had been with him on campaigns and were well disposed. At any rate he could subdue them by main strength, since he was leading a large force both of ships and of infantry upon them. However, he found himself unable even to hold converse with them, although he approached their wall and shouted and hallooed. For Gallus by ordering his trumpeters to sound their instruments all together gave no one a chance to hear a word. Antony further failed in a sudden assault and subsequently met a reverse with his ships. Gallus by night had chains stretched across the mouth of the harbor under water and took no open measures to guard against them but quite disdainfully allowed them to sail freely in. When, however, they were inside, he drew up the chains by means of machines and encompassing his oppenent's ships on all sides,— on land, from the houses, and on the sea, — he burned some and sank others. The next event was that Cæsar took Pelusium, pretendedly by storm, but really betrayed by Cleopatra. She saw that no one came to her aid and perceived that Cæsar was not to be withstood; most important of all, she heard the message sent to her by Thyrsus, and believed that she was really the object of affection. Her confidence was strengthened first of all by her wish that it be true, and second by the fact that she had enslaved his father

and Antony alike. As a result she expected that she should gain not only forgiveness and sovereignty over the Egyptians, but empire over the Romans as well. At once she yielded Pelusium to him. After this, when he marched against the city, she secretly prevented the Alexandrians from making a sortie, though she pretended to urge them strongly to do so. B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

—10— At the news about Pelusium Antony returned from Parætonium and in front of Alexandria met Cæsar, who was exhausted from travel; he joined battle with him, therefore, with his cavalry and was victorious. From this success Antony gained courage, as also from his being able to shoot arrows into his rival's camp carrying pamphlets which promised the men fifteen hundred denarii; so he attacked also with his infantry and was defeated. Cæsar himself voluntarily read the pamphlets to his soldiers, reproaching Antony the while, and led them to feel ashamed of treachery and to acquire enthusiasm in his behalf. They gained by this in zeal, both through indignation at being tempted and through their attempt to show that they would not willingly gain a reputation for baseness. Antony after his unexpected setback took refuge in his fleet and prepared to have a combat on the water, or in any case to sail to Spain. Cleopatra seeing this caused the ships to desert and she herself rushed suddenly into the mausoleum pretending that she feared Cæsar and desired by some means to destroy herself before capture, but really as an invitation to Antony to enter there also. He had an inkling that he was being betrayed, but his infatuation would not allow him to believe it, and, as one might say, he pitied her more

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724) than himself. Cleopatra was fully aware of this and hoped that if he should be informed that she was dead, he would not prolong his life but meet death at once. Accordingly, she hastened into the monument with one eunuch and two female attendants and from there sent a message to him to the effect that she had passed away. When he heard it, he did not delay, but was seized with a desire to follow her in death. Then first he asked one of the bystanders to slay him, but the man drew a sword and despatched himself. Wishing to imitate his courage Antony gave himself a wound and fell upon his face, causing the bystanders to think that he was dead. An outcry was raised at his deed, and Cleopatra hearing it leaned out over the top of the monument. By a certain contrivance its doors once closed could not be opened again, but above, near the ceiling, it had not yet been completed. That was where they saw her leaning out and some began to utter shouts that reached the ears of Antony. He, learning that she survived, stood up as if he had still the power to live; but a great gush of blood from his wound made him despair of rescue and he besought those present to carry him to the monument and to hoist him by the ropes that were hanging there to elevate stone blocks. This was done and he died there on Cleopatra's bosom.

—11— She now began to feel confidence in Cæsar and immediately made him aware of what had taken place, but did not feel altogether confident that she would experience no harm. Hence she kept herself within the structure, in order that if there should be no other motive for her preservation, she might at least purchase pardon and her sovereignty through fear about

her money. Even then in such depths of calamity she remembered that she was queen, and chose rather to die with the name and dignities of a sovereign than to live as an ordinary person. It should be stated that she kept fire on hand to use upon her money and asps and other reptiles to use upon herself, and that she had tried the latter on human beings to see in what way they killed in each case. Cæsar was anxious to make himself master of her treasures, to seize her alive, and to take her back for his triumph. However, as he had given her a kind of pledge, he did not wish to appear to have acted personally as an impostor, since this would prevent him from treating her as a captive and to a certain extent subdued against her will. He therefore sent to her Gaius Proculeius, a knight, and Epaphroditus, a freedman, giving them directions what they must say and do. So they obtained an audience with Cleopatra and after some accusations of a mild type suddenly laid hold of her before any decision was reached. Then they put out of her way everything by which she could bring death upon herself and allowed her to spend some days where she was, since the embalming of Antony's body claimed her attention. After that they took her to the palace, but did not remove any of her accustomed retinue or attendants, to the end that she should still more hope to accomplish her wishes and do no harm to herself. When she expressed a desire to appear before Cæsar and converse with him, it was granted; and to beguile her still more, he promised that he would come to her himself.

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

She accordingly prepared a luxurious apartment —12—

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724) and costly couch, and adorned herself further in a kind of careless fashion,— for her mourning garb mightily became her,— and seated herself upon the couch; beside her she had placed many images of his father, of all sorts, and in her bosom she had put all the letters that his father had sent her. When, after this, Cæsar entered, she hastily arose, blushing, and said: "Hail, master, Heaven has given joy to you and taken it from me. But you see with your own eyes your father in the guise in which he often visited me, and you may hear how he honored me in various ways and made me queen of the Egyptians. That you may learn what were his own words about me, take and read the missives which he sent me with his own hand."

As she spoke thus, she read aloud many endearing expressions of his. And now she would lament and caress the letters and again fall before his images and do them reverence. She kept turning her eyes toward Cæsar, and melodiously continued to bewail her fate. She spoke in melting tones, saying at one time, "Of what avail, Cæsar, are these your letters?," and at another, "But in the man before me you also are alive for me." Then again, "Would that I had died before you!," and still again, "But if I have him, I have you!"

Some such diversity both of words and of gestures did she employ, at the same time gazing at and murmuring to him sweetly. Cæsar comprehended her outbreak of passion and appeal for sympathy. Yet he did not pretend to do so, but letting his eyes rest upon the ground, he said only this: "Be of cheer, woman,

and keep a good heart, for no harm shall befall you." She was distressed that he would neither look at her nor breathe a word about the kingdom or any sigh of love, and fell at his knees wailing: "Life for me, Cæsar, is neither desirable nor possible. This favor I beseech of you in memory of your father,— that since Heaven gave me to Antony after him, I may also die with my lord. Would that I had perished on the very instant after Cæsar's death! But since this present fate was my destiny, send me to Antony: grudge me not burial with him, that as I die because of him, so in Hades also I may dwell with him." B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

Such words she uttered expecting to obtain commiseration: Cæsar, however, made no answer to it. Fearing, however, that she might make away with herself he exhorted her again to be of good cheer, did not remove any of her attendants, and kept a careful watch upon her, that she might add brilliance to his triumph. Suspecting this, and regarding it as worse than innumerable deaths, she began to desire really to die and begged Cæsar frequently that she might be allowed to perish in some way, and devised many plans by herself. When she could accomplish nothing, she feigned to change her mind and to repose great hope in him, as well as great hope in Livia. She said she would sail voluntarily and made ready many treasured adornments as gifts. In this way she hoped to inspire confidence that she had no designs upon herself, and so be more free from scrutiny and bring about her destruction. This also took place. The other officials and Epaphroditus, to whom she had been committed, believed that her state of mind was really as it seemed, —13—

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724) and neglected to keep a careful watch. She, meanwhile, was making preparations to die as painlessly as possible. First she gave a sealed paper, in which she begged Cæsar to order that she be buried beside Antony, to Epaphroditus himself to deliver, pretending that it contained some other matter. Having by this excuse freed herself of his presence, she set to her task. She put on her most beauteous apparel and after choosing a most becoming pose, assumed all the royal robes and appurtenances, and so died.

—14— No one knows clearly in what manner she perished, for there were found merely slight indentations on her arm. Some say that she applied an asp which had been brought in to her in a water-jar or among some flowers. Others declare that she had smeared a needle, with which she was wont to braid her hair, with some poison possessed of such properties that it would not injure the surface of the body at all, but if it touched the least drop of blood it caused death very quickly and painlessly. The supposition is, then, that previously it had been her custom to wear it in her hair, and on this occasion after first making a small scratch on her arm with some instrument, she dipped the needle in the blood. In this or some very similar way she perished with her two handmaidens. The eunuch, at the moment her body was taken up, presented himself voluntarily to the serpents, and after being bitten by them leaped into a coffin which had been prepared by him. Cæsar on hearing of her demise was shocked, and both viewed her body and applied drugs to it and

sent for Psylli,[1] in the hope that she might possibly revive. These Psylli, who are male, for there is no woman born in their tribe, have the power of sucking out before a person dies all the poison of every reptile and are not harmed themselves when bitten by any such creature. They are propagated from one another and they test their offspring, the latter being thrown among serpents at once or having serpents laid upon their swaddling-clothes. In such cases the poisonous creatures do not harm the child and are benumbed by its clothing. This is the nature of their function. But Cæsar, when he could not in any way resuscitate Cleopatra, felt admiration and pity for her and was himself excessively grieved, as much as if he had been deprived of all the glory of the victory. B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

So Antony and Cleopatra, who had been the authors of many evils to the Egyptians and to the Romans, thus fought and thus met death. They were embalmed in the same fashion and buried in the same tomb. Their spiritual qualities and the fortunes of their lives deserve a word of comment. —15—

Antony had no superior in comprehending his duty, yet he committed many acts of folly. He was distinguished for his bravery in some cases, yet he often failed through cowardice. He was characterized equally by greatness of soul and a servile disposition of mind. He would plunder the property of others, and still relinquish his own. He pitied many without cause and chastised even a greater number unjustly.

1 Compare Pliny, Natural History, XXI, 78.

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724) Consequently, though he rose from weakness to great strength, and from the depths of poverty to great riches, he drew no profit from either circumstance, but whereas he had hoped to hold the Roman power alone, he actually killed himself.

Cleopatra was of insatiable passion and insatiable avarice, was ambitious for renown, and most scornfully bold. By the influence of love she won dominion over the Egyptians, and hoped to attain a similar position over the Romans, but being disappointed of this she destroyed herself also. She captivated two of the men who were the greatest Romans of her day, and because of the third she committed suicide.

Such were these two persons, and in this way did they pass from the scene. Of their children Antyllus was slain immediately, though he was betrothed to the daughter of Cæsar, and had taken refuge in his father's hero-shrine which Cleopatra had built. Cæsarion was fleeing to Ethiopia, but was overtaken on the road and murdered. Cleopatra was married to Juba the son of Juba. To this man, who had been brought up in Italy and had been with him on campaigns, Cæsar gave the maid and her ancestral kingdom, and he granted them the lives of Alexander and Ptolemy. To his nieces, children of Antony by Octavia and reared by her, he assigned money from their father's estate. He also ordered his freedmen to give at once to Iullus, the child of Antony and Fulvia, everything which by law they were obliged to bequeath

him at their death. As for the rest who had until then been connected with Antony's cause, he punished some and released others, either from personal motives or to oblige his friends. And since there were found at the court many children of potentates and kings who were being supported, some as hostages and others for the display of wanton power, he sent some back to their homes, joined others in marriage with one another, and kept possession of still others. I shall omit most of these cases and mention only two. He freely restored Iotape to the Median king, who had found an asylum with him after the defeat, but refused the request of Artaxes that his brothers be sent him, because this prince had put to death the Romans left behind in Armenia. This was the disposition he made of such captives. —16— B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

The Egyptians and Alexandrians were all spared, and Cæsar did not injure one of them. The truth was that he did not see fit to visit any extreme vengeance upon so great a people, who might prove very useful to the Romans in many ways. He nevertheless offered the pretext that he wished to please their god Serapis, Alexander their founder, and, third, Areus a citizen, who was a philosopher and enjoyed his society. The speech in which he proclaimed to them his pardon he spoke in Greek, so that they might understand him. After this he viewed the body of Alexander and also touched it, at which a piece of the nose, it is said, was crushed. But he would not go to see the remains of the Ptolemies, though the Alexandrians were extremely

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724) anxious to show them, for he said: "I wanted to see a king, and not corpses." For the same reason he would not enter the presence of Apis, declaring that he was "accustomed to worship gods and not cattle."

—17— Soon after he made Egypt tributary and gave it in charge of Cornelius Gallus. In view of the populousness of both cities and country, and the facile, fickle character of the inhabitants, and the importance of grain supplies and revenue, so far from daring to entrust the land to any senator he would not even grant one permission to live in it, unless he made the concession to some one *nominatim*. On the other hand, he did not allow the Egyptians to be senators in Rome, but after considering individual cases on their merits he commanded the Alexandrians to conduct their government without senators; with such capacity for revolution did he credit them. And of the system then imposed upon them most details are rigorously preserved to the present day, but there are senators in Alexandria, beginning first under the emperor Severus, and they also may serve in Rome, having first been enrolled in the senate in the reign of his son Antoninus.

Thus was Egypt enslaved. All of the inhabitants who resisted were subdued after a time, as, indeed, Heaven very clearly indicated to them would occur. For it rained not only water, where previously no drop had ever fallen, but also blood. At the same time that this was falling from the clouds glimpses were caught of armor. Elsewhere there was the clashing of drums

and cymbals and the notes of flutes and trumpets. A serpent of huge size was suddenly seen and gave a hiss incredibly loud. Meanwhile comet stars came frequently into view and ghosts of the dead took shape. The statues frowned: Apis bellowed a lament and shed tears. Such was the status of things in that respect. B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

In the palace quantities of money were found. Cleopatra had taken practically all the offerings from even the holiest shrines and so helped to swell the spoils of the Romans, while the latter on their own part incurred no defilement. Large sums were also obtained from every man under accusation. More than that, all the rest against whom no personal complaint could be brought had two-thirds of their property demanded of them. Out of this all the soldiers got what was still owing to them, and those who were with Cæsar at that time secured in addition two hundred and fifty denarii apiece for not plundering the city. All was made good to those who had previously loaned anything, and to both senators and knights who had taken part in the war great sums were given. In fine, the Roman empire was enriched and its temples adorned.

—18— After attending to the matters before mentioned Cæsar founded there also on the site of the battle a city and gave to it likewise a name and dedicatory games, as in the previous instance. In regard to the canals he cleared out some of them and dug others over again, and he also settled important questions. Then he went through Syria into the province of Asia and passed the winter there attending to the business of

B. C. 30
(a. u. 724)

the subject nations in detail and likewise to that of the Parthians. There had been disputes among them and a certain Tiridates had risen against Phraates; as long as Antony's opposition lasted, even after the naval battle, Cæsar had not only not attached himself to either side, though they sought his alliance, but made no other answer than that he would think it over. His excuse was that he was busy with Egypt, but in reality he wanted them meantime to exhaust themselves by fighting against each other. Now that Antony was dead and of the two combatants Tiridates, defeated, had taken refuge in Syria, and Phraates, victorious, had sent envoys, he negotiated with the latter in a friendly manner: and without promising to aid Tiridates, he allowed him to live in Syria. He received a son of Phraates as a mark of friendliness, and took the youth to Rome, where he kept him as a hostage.

— 19 —

Meanwhile, and still earlier, the Romans at home had passed many resolutions respecting the victory at sea. They granted Cæsar a triumph (over Cleopatra) and granted him an arch bearing a trophy at Brundusium, and another one in the Roman Forum. Moreover, the lower part of the Julian hero-shrine was to be adorned with the beaks of the captive ships and a festival every five years to be celebrated in his honor. There should be a thanksgiving on his birthday and on the anniversary of the announcement of the victory: when he entered the city the (vestal virgin) priestesses, the senate and the people, with their wives and children, were to meet him. It is quite superfluous to mention

the prayers, the images, the privileges of front seats, and everything else of the sort. At the very first they both voted him these honors, and either tore down or erased the memorials that had lent Antony distinction. They declared the day on which the latter had been born accursed and forbade the employment of the surname Marcus by any one of his kin. His death was announced during a part of the year when Cicero, the son of Cicero, was consul; and on ascertaining this some believed it had come to pass not without divine direction, since the consul's father had owed his death chiefly to Antony. Then they voted to Cæsar additional crowns and many thanksgivings, and granted him among other rights authority to conduct a triumph over the Egyptians also. For neither previously nor at that time did they mention by name Antony and the rest of the Romans who had been vanquished with him, and so imply that it was proper to hold a celebration over them. The day on which Alexandria was captured they declared fortunate and directed that for the years to come it should be taken as the starting-point of enumeration by the inhabitants of that town.[1] Also Cæsar was to hold the tribunician power for life, to have the right to defend such as called upon him for help both within the pomerium and outside to the distance of eight half-stadia (a privilege possessed by none of the tribunes), as also to judge appealed cases; and

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724)

[1] There is an ambiguous *αὐτῶν* here. Only Boissée, however, takes it to mean the Romans. Leonicenus, Sturz and Wagner translate is as "Alexandrians."

B. C. 30 (*a. u.* 724) a vote of his, like the vote of Athena,[1] was to be cast in all the courts. In the prayers in behalf of the people and the senate petitions should be offered for him alike by the priests and by the priestesses. They also ordered that at all banquets, not only public but private also, all should pour a libation to him. These were the resolutions passed at that time.

—20—
B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725) When he was consul for the fifth time with Sextus Apuleius, they ratified all his acts by oath on the very first day of January. And when the letter came regarding the Parthians, they decreed that he should have a place in hymns along with the gods, that a tribe should be named "Julian" after him, that he should wear the triumphal crown during the progress of all the festivals, that the senators who had participated in his victory should take part in the procession wearing purple-bordered togas, and that the day on which he should enter the city should be glorified by sacrifices by the entire population and be held ever sacred. They further agreed that he might choose priests beyond the specified number, as many and as often as he should wish. This custom was handed down from that decision and the numbers have increased till they are boundless: hence I need go into no particulars about the multitude of such officials. Cæsar accepted most of the honors (save only a few): but that all the population of the city should meet him he particularly requested might not occur. Yet he was pleased most of all and more than at all the other decrees by the

[1] A reminiscence of the *Eumenides* of Aischylos.

fact that the senators closed the gates of Janus, implying that all their wars had ceased,— and took the "augury of health,"[1] which had all this period been omitted for reasons I have mentioned. For there were still under arms the Treveri, who had brought the Celts to help them, the Cantabri, Vaccæi, and Astures. These last were subjugated by Statilius Taurus, and those first mentioned by Nonius Gallus. There were numerous other disturbances going on in the isolated districts. Since, however, nothing of importance resulted from any of them, the Romans of that time did not consider that war was in progress and I have nothing notable to record about them. Cæsar meanwhile was giving his attention to various business, and granted permission that precincts dedicated to Rome and to Cæsar his father,— calling him "the Julian hero,"— should be set apart in Ephesus and in Nicæa. These cities had at that time attained chief place in Asia and in Bithynia respectively. To these two divinities he ordered the Romans who dwelt near them to pay honor. He allowed the foreigners (under the name of "Hellenes") to establish a precinct to himself,— the Asians having theirs in Pergamum and the Bithynians theirs in Nicomedea. This custom, beginning with him, has continued in the case of other emperors, and imperial precincts have been hallowed not only among Hellenic nations but in all the rest which yield obedience to the Romans. In the capital itself and in the rest of Italy there is no one, however, no matter how great renown he has achieved, that has dared to do

B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725)

[1] See Glossary (last volume) and also compare the beginning of chapter 24 in Book Thirty-seven.

B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725) this. Still, even there, after their death, honors as to gods are bestowed upon those who have ruled uprightly, and hero-shrines are built.

All this took place in the winter, during which the Pergamenians also received authority to celebrate the so-called "Sacred" contest in honor of his temple.

—21— In the course of the summer Cæsar crossed over to Greece and on to Italy. Among the others who offered sacrifice, as has been mentioned, when he entered the City, was the consul Valerius Potitus. Cæsar was consul all the year, as the two previous, but Potitus was the successor of Sextus. It was he who publicly and in person sacrificed oxen in behalf of the senate and of the people at Cæsar's arrival, something that had never before been done in the case of any single man. After this his newly returned colleague praised and honored his lieutenants, as had been the custom. Among the many marks of favor by which Cæsar distinguished Agrippa was the dark blue symbol[1] of naval supremacy. To his soldiers also he made certain presents: to the people he distributed a hundred denarii each, first to those ranking as adults, and afterward to the children as a mark of his affection for his nephew Marcellus. Further let it be noted that he would not accept from the cities of Italy the gold to be used for the crowns. Moreover he paid everything which he himself owed to any one and, as has been said, he did not exact what the others were owing to him. All this caused the Romans to forget every unpleasant-

[1] Latin "vexillum cæruleum,"— a kind of flag or banner.

ness, and they viewed his triumph with pleasure, quite as if the defeated parties had all been foreigners. So vast an amount of money circulated through all the city alike that the price of goods rose and loans which had previously been in demand at twelve per cent. were now made at one-third that rate. The celebration on the first day was in honor of the wars against the Pannonians and Dalmatians, Iapudia and adjoining territory, and a few Celts and Gauls. Gaius Carrinas had subdued the Morini and some others who had risen against Roman dominion, and had repulsed the Suevi, who had crossed the Rhine to wage war. Therefore he too held a triumph, in spite of the fact that his father had been put to death by Sulla and he himself had once been prevented from holding office with the rest of his peers. Cæsar also held one since the credit of this victory properly pertained to his position as imperator. B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725)

These were the celebrations on the first day. On the second came the commemoration of the naval victory at Actium; on the third that of the subjugation of Egypt. All the processions proved notable by reason of the spoils from this land,— so many had been gathered that they sufficed for all the occasions,— but this Egyptian celebration was especially costly and magnificent. Among other features a representation of Cleopatra upon the bed of death was carried by, so that in a way she too was seen with the other captives, and with Alexander, otherwise Helios, and Cleopatra, otherwise Selene, her children, and helped to grace

B. C. 29 (a. u. 725) the triumph. Behind them all Cæsar came driving, and did everything according to custom except that he allowed his fellow-consul and the other magistrates, contrary to custom, to follow him with the senators who had participated in the victory. It had been usual for such dignitaries to lead and for only the senators to follow.[1]

—22— After completing this, he dedicated the temple of Minerva, called also the Chalcidicum, and the Julian senate-house, which had been built in honor of his father.[2] In it he set up the statue of Victory which is still in existence, probably signifying that it was from her that he had received his dominion. It belonged to the Tarentini, and had been brought from there to Rone, where it was placed in the senate-chamber and decked with the spoils of Egypt. The spoils were also employed at this time for adorning the Julian hero-shrine, when it was consecrated. Many of them were placed as offerings in it and others were dedicated to Capitoline Jupiter and Juno and Minerva, while all the votive gifts that were thought to have previously reposed there or were still reposing were now by decree taken down as defiled. Thus Cleopatra, although defeated and captured, was nevertheless glorified, because her adornments repose in our tem-

[1] The custom was that the magistrates should issue from the town to meet the triumphator and then march ahead of him. Octavius by putting them behind him symbolized his position as chief citizen of the State.

[2] These buildings are mentioned together also in the Monumentum Ancyranum (CIL., III, part 2, pp. 780–781).

ples and she herself is seen in gold in the shrine of Venus. B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725)

At the consecration of the hero-shrine there were all sorts of contests, and the children of the nobles performed the Troy equestrian exercise. Men who were their peers also contended on chargers and pairs and three-horse teams. A certain Quintus Vitellius, a senator, fought as a gladiator. All kinds of wild beasts and kine were slain by the wholesale, among them a rhinoceros and a hippopotamus, then seen for the first time in Rome. Many have described the appearance of the hippo and it has been seen by many more. As for the rhinoceros, it is in most respects like an elephant, but has a projecting horn at the very tip of its nose and through this fact has received its name. Besides the introduction of these beasts Dacians and Suebi fought in throngs with each other. The latter are Celts, the former a species of Scythian. The Suebi, to be exact, dwell across the Rhine (though many cities elsewhere claim their name), and the Dacians on both sides of the Ister. Such of them, however, as live on this side of it and near the Triballic country are reckoned in with the district of Mœsia and are called Mœsi save among those who are in the very neighborhood. Such as are on the other side are called Dacians, and are either a branch of the Getæ or Thracians belonging to the Dacian race that once inhabited Rhodope. Now these Dacians had before this time sent envoys to Cæsar: but when they obtained none of

B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725) their requests, they turned away to follow Antony. To him, however, they were of no great assistance, owing to disputes among themselves. Some were consequently captured and later set to fight the Suebi.

The whole spectacle lasted naturally a number of days. There was no intermission in spite of a sickness of Cæsar's, but it was carried on in his absence, under the direction of others. During its course the senators on one day severally held banquets in the entrance to their homes. Of what moved them to this I have no knowledge, for it has not been recorded. Such was the progress of the events of those days.

—23— While Cæsar was yet in his fourth consulship Statilius Taurus had both constructed at his own expense and dedicated with armed combat a hunting-theatre of stone on the Campus Martius. On this account he was permitted by the people to choose one of the prætors year after year. During this same period Marcus Crassus was sent into Macedonia and Greece and carried on war with the Dacians and Bastarnæ. It has already been stated who the former were and how they had been made hostile. The Bastarnæ are properly classed as Scythians and at this time had crossed the Ister and subdued the part of Mœsia opposite them, then the Triballi who live near it, and the Dardani who inhabit the Triballian country. While they were so engaged they had no trouble with the Romans. But when they crossed the Hæmus and overran the portion of Thrace belonging to the Dentheleti who had a compact with Rome, then Crassus, partly to defend Sitas king of the Dentheleti, who was blind, but chiefly

because of fear for Macedonia, came out to meet them. By his mere approach he threw them into a panic and drove them from the land without a conflict. Next he pursued them, as they were retiring homeward, gained possession of the district called Segetica, and invading Mœsia damaged that territory. He made an assault upon a strong fortification, also, and though his advance line met with a rebuff,— the Mœsians making a sally against it, because they thought these were all of the enemy,— still, when he came to the rescue with his whole remaining army he both cut his opponents down in open fight and annihilated them by an ambuscade. B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725)

While he was thus engaged, the Bastarnæ ceased their flight and remained near the Cedrus[1] river to watch what would take place. When, after conquering the Mœsians, the Roman general started against them, they sent envoys forbidding him to pursue them, since they had done the Romans no harm. Crassus detained them, saying he would give them their answer the following day, and besides treating them kindly he made them drunk, so that he learned all their plans. The whole Scythian race is insatiable in the use of wine and quickly succumbs to its influence. Crassus meanwhile, during the night, advanced to a wood, and after stationing scouts in front of the forest made his army stop there. Thereupon the Bastarnæ, thinking the former were alone, made a charge upon them, following them up also when the men retreated into the dense forest, and many of the pursuers perished there as well as many others in the flight which followed. —24—

[1] The name of this river is also spelled *Cebrus*.

B. C. 29 (a. u. 725) They were obstructed by their wagons, which were behind them, and owed their defeat further to their desire to save their wives and children. Their king Deldo was slain by Crassus himself. The armor stripped from the prince he would have dedicated as spolia opima to Jupiter Feretrius, had he been a general acting on his own authority. Such was the course of that engagement: of the remainder some took refuge in a grove, which was set on fire all around, and others leaped into a fort, where they were annihilated. Still others perished, either by being driven into the Ister or after being scattered through the country. Some survived even yet and occupied a strong post where Crassus besieged them in vain for several days. Then with the aid of Roles, king of some of the Getæ, he destroyed them. Roles when he visited Cæsar was treated as a friend and ally for this assistance: the captives were distributed to the soldiers.

—25— After accomplishing this Crassus turned his attention to the Mœsians; and partly by persuading some of them, partly by scaring them, and partly by the application of force he subjugated all except a very few, though with labor and danger. Temporarily, owing to the winter, he retired into friendly territory after suffering greatly from the cold, and still more at the hands of the Thracians, through whose country, as friendly, he was returning. Hence he decided to be satisfied with what he had effected. For sacrifices and a triumph had been voted not only to Cæsar but to him also, though, according at least to some accounts, he did not secure the title of imperator, but Cæsar alone

might apply it to himself. The Bastarnæ, however, angry at their disasters, on learning that he would make no further campaigns against them turned again upon the Dentheleti and Sitas, whom they regarded as having been the chief cause of their evils. Then Crassus, though reluctantly, took the field and by forced marches fell upon them unexpectedly, conquered, and thereafter imposed such terms as he pleased. Now that he had once taken up arms again he conceived a desire to recompense the Thracians, who had harassed him during his retreat from Mœsia; for news was brought at this time that they were fortifying positions and were spoiling for a fight. And he did subdue them, though not without effort, by conquering in battle the Merdi and the Serdi and cutting off the hands of the captives. He overran the rest of the country except the land of the Odrysæ. These he spared because they are attached to the service of Dionysus, and had come to meet him on this occasion without arms. Also he granted them the piece of land in which they magnify the god, and took it away from the Bessi, who were occupying it. B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725)

—26— While he was so occupied he received a summons from Roles, who had become embroiled with Dapyx, himself also a king of the Getæ. Crassus went to help him and by hurling the horse of his opponents back upon the infantry he thoroughly terrified the latter, so that he carried the battle no further but caused a great slaughter of the fugitives of both divisions. Next he cut off Dapyx, who had taken refuge in a fort,

B. C. 29 (a. u. 725) and besieged him. During the investment some one from the walls saluted him in Greek, and upon obtaining an audience arranged to betray the place. The barbarians caught in this way turned upon one another, and Dapyx was killed, besides many others. His brother, however, Crassus took alive and not only did him no harm, but released him.

At the close of this exploit he led his army against the cave called Keiri. The natives in great numbers had occupied this place, which is extremely large and so very strong that the tradition obtains that the Titans after the defeat administered to them by the gods took refuge there. Here the people had brought together all their flocks and their other principal valuables. Crassus after finding all its entrances, which are crooked and hard to search out, walled them up, and in this way subjugated the men by famine. Upon this success he did not keep his hands from the rest of the Getæ, though they had nothing to do with Dapyx. He marched upon Genoucla, the most strongly defended fortress of the kingdom of Zuraxes, because he heard that the standards which the Bastarnæ had taken from Gaius Antonius near the city of the Istriani were there. His assault was made both with the infantry and upon the Ister,— the city being near the water,— and in a short time, though with much labor in spite of the absence of Zuraxes, he took the place. The king as soon as he heard of the Roman's approach had set off with money to the Scythians to seek an alliance, and did not return in time.

This he did among the Getæ. Some of the Mœsians

who had been subdued rose in revolt, and them he won back by the energy of others: he himself led a campaign against the Artacii and a few other tribes who had never been captured and would not acknowledge his authority, priding themselves greatly on this point and imbuing the rest with both anger and a disposition to rebel. He brought them to terms partly by force, as they did but little, and partly by the fear which the capture of some inspired. This took a long time. I record the names, as the facts, according to the tradition which has been handed down. Anciently Mœsians and Getæ occupied all the land between the Hæmus and the Ister. As time went on some of them changed their names to something else. Since then there have been included under the name of Mœsia all the tribes which the Savus by emptying into the Ister north of Dalmatia, Macedonia and Thrace, separates from Pannonia. Two of the many nations found among them are the Triballi, once so named, and the Dardani, who have the same designation at present.

B. C. 29 (*a. u.* 725) —27—

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